

ARISTOTELIAN PAPERS

Revised and Reprinted

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TO
FRANCESCO ORESTANO
OF THE
REALE ACCADEMIA D'ITALIA
FOR WHOM THE BONDS BETWEEN SCHOLARS
ARE BONDS OF PEACE BETWEEN THE NATIONS

PREFACE

The following papers are now brought together in the hope that such value as they may have had before will be slightly enhanced where they can give support to one another; that pupils of mine who have come to be teachers, and some pupils of theirs, will welcome the collection; and that a few of the papers as a whole, with elements in each of the rest, are worth rescuing from the gathering oblivion of their separate publication as magazine articles or reviews in the past. Some of the reviews were meant to be, almost, original studies; no review has here been resurrected in which I did not try to throw some light on the subject of the book reviewed. And so far as I could do so without eliminating all coherence from the article, I have tended in revision to omit from each what had the air of local and temporary interest at an earlier date. Again, where I could do so without reconstructing any article as a whole, I have tried to make each one of them a little better than it was, and have freely improved all of them, or certainly have attempted it, in small details.

To the casual reader it may seem that the relation of some papers here included to the name of ‘Aristotelian’ may be slight. If the charge is pushed, I can only say that my debt to Aristotle as a critic and a thinker is evident to me in every one of them, and that, while the mention of his name in one or two of them may look incidental, not one of them would have taken its shape, or had its spirit, if my preoccupation with this author, and especially with his *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, had not been intense; thus in the

paper called *The Climax* the reference to him is basic, and similarly in the paper called *Smyth on Aeschylus*. It is a preoccupation now of virtually all the active lifetime of a teacher who, within that period, has published a half-dozen books of Aristotle or about him; for convenient reference a list of them here follows:

Aristotle *On the Art of Poetry*; an Amplified Version with Supplementary Illustrations, for Students of English. Boston, Ginn and Company, 1913. Pp. xl, 101. (Now published by Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York.)

An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy; with an Adaptation of the *Poetics*, and a Translation of the 'Tractatus Coislinianus.' New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922. Pp. xxii, 324.

The *Poetics* of Aristotle; its Meaning and Influence. (Vol. 6 of Our Debt to Greece and Rome, ed. by Hadzsits and Robinson.) Boston, Marshall Jones Company, 1923. Pp. xi, 157. (Out of print. The series in which it appeared is now published by Longman's, Green and Company, New York.)

A Bibliography of the *Poetics* of Aristotle. (By Lane Cooper and Alfred Gudeman. Vol. 11 of Cornell Studies in English.) New Haven, Yale University Press, 1928. Pp. xiv, 194. (Now published by the Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.)

The *Rhetoric* of Aristotle; an Expanded Translation with Supplementary Examples, for Students of Composition and Public Speaking. New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1932. Pp. l, 259. (Now published by the Appleton-Century Company, New York.)

Aristotle, Galileo, and the Tower of Pisa. Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1935. Pp. 102.

In the present volume, in Part I and Part II, containing articles and reviews respectively, the items under each of the two heads are chronologically arranged according to the dates of publication, save for the remarks on Gilbert

Murray's Preface to the *Poetics*. This is a Preface to a booklet containing Bywater's translation; my remarks on it in *The Classical Weekly* 15 (1922).95-6 were neither precisely a review, nor yet an independent article, but something betwixt and between. I have therefore appended them to a notice that partly concerns Bywater's translation.

It only remains for me to thank those whom I ought to thank. First those who have graciously given the necessary or desirable permission to reprint; the specific indications will be found at the beginning of the several papers. My thanks, then, are due to the following. The editor or editors of *The Journal of English and Germanic Philology* for the articles called Some Wordsworthian Similes (below, pp. 3-17), and The Villain as 'Hero' (pp. 131-143). Of *Classical Philology* for The Fifth Form of 'Discovery' in the *Poetics* of Aristotle (pp. 18-33). Of *The American Journal of Philology* for A Pun in the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle (pp. 34-44), Haemon and Jocasta Advising (pp. 61-75), The Oxford Translation of Aristotle (pp. 160-167), and The *Poetics* in the Loeb Classical Library (pp. 214-218). Of *The Sewanee Review* for The Climax (pp. 45-60). Of *The Quarterly Journal of Speech* for The *Rhetoric* of Aristotle, and its Relation to the *Poetics* (pp. 76-89). Of *The Scientific Monthly* for Galileo and Scientific History (pp. 90-100). Of *The Saturday Evening Post* for a quotation in Galileo and Scientific History from the late Mr. Collins (pp. 99-100). Of the Rand Memorial Volume for The Verbal 'Ornament' (pp. 101-128). Of *The Classical Weekly* for Gudeman's Translation of the *Poetics* (pp. 154-159), the remarks (mentioned above) on the Preface by Gilbert Murray (pp. 164-167), Ross on Aristotle (pp. 168-171), Stocks' 'Aristotelianism' (pp. 180-187), and Burnet on Aristotle (pp. 188-196). Of *The*

Nation (New York) for Smyth on Aeschylus (pp. 172–179). Of *The Publications of the Modern Language Association of America* for Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Mr. Lowes (pp. 197–213). And of *The Philosophical Review* for Gudeman's Edition of the *Poetics* (pp. 219–222).

And lastly I thank those who have helped me in revising and proof-reading the contents of the volume, especially, among my colleagues and former pupils, Harry Caplan and James Hutton of Cornell University, and Sister Margaret Teresa of Nazareth College, and, among the present graduate students at Cornell University, Mary Louise Carlson, Gordon Macdonald Kirkwood, and Mary Ann Tibbetts.

LANE COOPER

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PART I
ARTICLES

SOME WORDSWORTHIAN SIMILES¹

(Aristotle, *Poetics* 22.1459^a 4-8)

Speaking of an earlier stage in the growth of his imagination, Wordsworth remarks to Coleridge (*Prelude* 2.376-86):

Nor should this, perchance,
Pass unrecorded, that I still had loved
The exercise and produce of a toil,
Than analytic industry to me
More pleasing, and whose character I deem
Is more poetic as resembling more
Creative agency. The song would speak
Of that interminable building reared
By observation of affinities
In objects where no brotherhood exists
To passive minds.

What his amplifying song could not here refrain from uttering struck Wordsworth, ‘perchance,’ as a matter that might almost go without discussion — at least in a poem addressed to the reflective Coleridge. Yet had Wordsworth been writing a prose treatise for the public, and had he been dealing with the psychology of literary artists in general, instead of the mind of one individual artist, however representative, his pronouncement might properly have taken on a form even more explicit and assured. At all events he would have had good precedent for such assurance. Aristotle in his *Poetics*, although he holds poets to be ‘makers of plots’ — rather than ‘makers of verse’ —

¹ From *The Journal of English and Germanic Philology* 6 (1907).179-89; by permission.

nevertheless at one point regards the imaginative faculty as lurking, after the final analysis, in an innate command of figurative detail. According to this view, and to play a little with etymology, we may credit the poet or maker with being a creator of figures or imagery even before he is a creator of fiction or plot. With regard to diction, says Aristotle, 'it is important to make the right use of each of the elements mentioned'—lengthened, curtailed, and otherwise altered words—'as well as of compound and strange words' (words not customary, say, at Athens):

But most important by far is it to have a command of metaphor. This is the one thing one poet cannot learn from another. It is the mark of genius; for to coin good metaphors involves an insight into the resemblances between objects that are superficially unlike.²

Now it may be argued that the ability to see hidden yet essential resemblance and coherence in objects that supply figures of speech, and thus fitly to join things that after all belong together so as to give an audience unexpected and lively satisfaction through the poet's language, is a power related to a quite general principle in the art of composition and in all artistic construction. It seems to be the power to see how things go together; so that we have here a law that readily extends itself from smaller details to larger, and from the joining of two objects (and their names) in a figure of speech to the joining of larger elements in a drama or an epic poem, or in any other kind of poetry. The two objects in which the poet sees the resemblance causing him to join them in a metaphor or simile have a mutual relation like that of any other two parts of his work which he puts together. The power to form a

² *Poetics* 22; see the precise reference in the title of this paper. The translation here partly follows the free rendering in my Amplified Version of the *Poetics* (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company), p. 76.

single image in a speech will not differ, then, from the power by which an author connects any two elements in his poem, and forms that inclusive image of the whole which is the plot of an epic poem or a drama. The plot is the soul of the drama. On the other hand, the *Poetics* of Aristotle assumes that one poet actually can learn some things from another; one of them is skill in constructing plots; in this realm it is clear that poets have learnt better methods of arrangement and construction from those who went before them. True, they have freely borrowed metaphors and the like from one another, and have had their insight into hidden resemblances stimulated by the figurative language of their predecessors; the rest of us, according to our power, are indebted to them for such stimulation. ‘Poets,’ says Bacon, ‘make men witty.’ Still, the fact remains that this power of seeing resemblances in a flash is innate. Aristotle the critic, and Wordsworth poet of the mind of man, are good witnesses to it as a mark of genius.

In this paper I wish merely to bring together some of the marks of Wordsworth’s genius, choosing from the wealth of his imagery a number of those figures in which, as it seems to me, his originality, and boldness of vision, and if they are contemplated steadily, his justice of vision also, are most strikingly exemplified. Undoubtedly, his eye for resemblances may be best appreciated through his similes and direct comparisons; in these, the affinities that he discovers between ‘objects where no brotherhood exists to passive minds’ are most plainly affirmed; more plainly, of course, than in his *metaphors*, if the latter term be restricted to its technical usage. Inasmuch as the similes here collected represent to me ultimate elements in Wordsworth’s style, I have made no systematic effort to find external ‘sources’ for them — although here and there they may remind one of Virgil or Shakespeare, of Homer or

the Bible. Nor have I tried to arrange them according to any plan suggestive of analytic industry. Obviously they might be grouped under a few main heads; for example: similes or comparisons implying a 'brotherhood' existent between man and the lower animals, or between man and inanimate nature, so-called, or between inanimate nature and the lower animals; yet this arrangement might savor of a partition in the great whole of nature such as Wordsworth hardly would countenance. It is, in fact, his active sense of a vital unity pervading the great whole that enables him to assert so strong, often so startling, a bond of affinity among the parts. Accordingly, I shall content myself with presenting this material as I have noted it, supplying now and then a word of explanation where the sense demands it, but trusting that the separate comparisons by themselves will be enough 'to startle and waylay' the reader, and afterwards 'to haunt' him, without further literary artifice.

The first 'creative' synthesis to summon our attention belongs to the early period referred to in the lines with which we began. It is extremely characteristic:

Calm is all nature as a resting wheel.

(*Written In Very Early Youth 1.*) ³

In their present connection the following need no comment.

Free as a colt at pasture on the hill,
I ranged at large, through London's wide domain,
Month after month.

(*Prelude 9.23-5.*) ⁴

³ Wordsworth, *Poetical Works*, Oxford Edition, in one volume, ed. by Hutchinson, p. 1. Other references to Wordsworth's poems in this article are to this edition, noted as *P.W.*, by page-number. Titles of poems are indicated by the catch-titles used in my *Concordance to the Poems of William Wordsworth*.

⁴ *P.W.*, p. 710.

She shall be sportive as the fawn
 That wild with glee across the lawn
 Or up the mountain springs.

(*Three years 13-15.*) ⁵

Here is the seductive and alluring half-breed pictured in *Ruth*; panther and dolphin are creatures of the pagan Bacchus:

He was a lovely Youth! I guess
 The panther in the wilderness
 Was not so fair as he;
 And, when he chose to sport and play,
 No dolphin ever was so gay
 Upon the tropic sea.

(*Ruth 37-42.*) ⁶

Wordsworth's cloud-similes are familiar:

Soft as a cloud is yon blue Ridge —

(*Soft as 1.*) ⁷

I wandered lonely as a cloud
 That floats on high o'er vales and hills,
 When all at once I saw a crowd,
 A host, of golden daffodils.

(*I wandered 1-4.*) ⁸

He told of the magnolia, spread
 High as a cloud, high over head!
 The cypress and her spire.

(*Ruth 61-3.*) ⁹

The Knight had ridden down from Wensley Moor
 With the slow motion of a summer's cloud.

(*Hart-leap Well 1-2.*) ¹⁰

⁵ P.W., p. 187.

⁷ P.W., p. 456.

⁹ P.W., p. 193.

⁶ P.W., p. 192.

⁸ P.W., p. 187.

¹⁰ P.W., p. 200.

In the next two, it is probable, we have reminiscences of Wordsworth's reading in the Arctic explorers; both he and Coleridge read a number of such things as the *Voyages* of James and Foxe. He is seeking for violent figures with which to depict phases of the French Revolution.

Zeal, which yet
Had slumbered, now in opposition burst
Forth like a Polar summer.

*(Prelude 9.254-6.)*¹¹

Look! and behold, from Calpe's sunburnt cliffs
To the flat margin of the Baltic sea,
Long-reverenced titles cast away as weeds;
Laws overturned; and territory split,
Like fields of ice rent by the polar wind.

*(Excursion 9.336-40.)*¹²

In the following, however, he seems to be drawing upon his own observation — let us say, of Rydal or Grasmere:

Calm as a frozen lake when ruthless winds
Blow fiercely, agitating earth and sky,
The Mother now remained.

*(Excursion 3.650-2.)*¹³

Our poet's objective and passionless contemplation of death is typical in *Matthew*:

Poor Matthew, all his frolics o'er,
Is silent as a standing pool.

*(Matthew 17-18.)*¹⁴

Readers may recall Augustine Birrell's use of the two lines, after the death of Matthew Arnold.

Wordsworth's line on Milton is classic:

¹¹ P.W., p. 713.

¹² P.W., p. 889.

¹³ P.W., p. 795.

¹⁴ P.W., p. 486.

Thy soul was like a Star, and dwelt apart.

(*London, 1802*, line 9.)¹⁵

His image of our western Indian is less familiar:

Free as the sun, and lonely as the sun.

(*Excursion 3.941.*)¹⁶

His description of Mary Hutchinson, again, will be generally recognized:

Her eyes as stars of Twilight fair;

Like Twilight's, too, her dusky hair.

(*She was 5-6.*)¹⁷

Likewise his daffodils:

Continuous as the stars that shine

And twinkle on the milky way,

They stretched in never-ending line

Along the margin of a bay.

(*I wandered 7-10.*)¹⁸

Curious is his recollection of the room in Paris where he slept at the outbreak of the Revolution:

The place, all hushed and silent as it was,

Appeared unfit for the repose of night,

Defenceless as a wood where tigers roam.

(*Prelude 10.91-3.*)¹⁹

Curious also his remembrance of that noble revolutionist, his friend Beaupuy:

While he read,

Or mused, his sword was haunted by his touch

Continually, like an uneasy place

In his own body.

(*Prelude 9.158-61.*)²⁰

¹⁵ P.W., p. 307.

¹⁷ P.W., p. 186.

¹⁹ P.W., p. 719.

¹⁶ P.W., p. 799.

¹⁸ P.W., p. 187.

²⁰ P.W., p. 712.

I have already noted several Wordsworthian similes of calm. None is more famous than this:

It is a beauteous evening, calm and free,
The holy time is quiet as a Nun
Breathless with adoration.

*(It is a 1-3.)*²¹

Similes of agitation likewise are typical:

Surprised by joy — impatient as the Wind
I turned to share the transport — Oh! with whom
But Thee, deep buried in the silent tomb.

*(Surprised by 1-3.)*²²

But the Man,
Who trembled, trunk and limbs, like some huge oak
By a fierce tempest shaken, soon resumed
The steadfast quiet natural to a mind
Of composition gentle and sedate.

*(Excursion 6.143-7.)*²³

In fact, the rapid transition from tumult to repose is one of Wordsworth's favorite devices. So here:

That Soul,
Which with the motion of a virtuous act
Flashes a look of terror upon guilt,
Is, after conflict, quiet as the ocean,
By a miraculous finger stilled at once.

*(Borderers 1.169-73.)*²⁴

And here:

This Sea that bares her bosom to the moon;
The winds that will be howling at all hours,
And are up-gathered now like sleeping flowers;
For this, for everything, we are out of tune.

*(The world is 5-8.)*²⁵

²¹ P.W., p. 258.

²³ P.W., p. 840.

²⁵ P.W., p. 259.

²² P.W., p. 257.

²⁴ P.W., p. 40; cf. Mark 4:39.

Occasionally in the poetry of Wordsworth there is the touch of Homer:

Far into the night
The Housewife plied her own peculiar work,
Making the cottage through the silent hours
Murmur as with the sound of summer flies.

*(Michael 125-8.)*²⁶

I add a number of examples without remark:

Light as a sunbeam glides along the hills
She vanished — eager to impart the scheme
To her loved brother and his shy compeer.

*(Excursion 9.429-31.)*²⁷

And the boat advanced
Through crystal water, smoothly as a hawk,
That, disentangled from the shady boughs
Of some thick wood, her place of covert, cleaves
With correspondent wings the abyss of air.

*(Excursion 9.490-94.)*²⁸

No fountain from its rocky cave
E'er tripped with foot so free;
She seemed as happy as a wave
That dances on the sea.

*(We walked 49-52.)*²⁹

And, while the Pony moves his legs,
In Johnny's left hand you may see
The green bough motionless and dead:
The Moon that shines above his head
Is not more still and mute than he.

*(Idiot Boy 77-81.)*³⁰

²⁶ P.W., p. 133.

²⁷ P.W., p. 890.

²⁸ P.W., p. 891.

²⁹ P.W., p. 487.

³⁰ P.W., p. 127.

Perhaps he's turned himself about,
 His face unto his horse's tail,
 And, still and mute, in wonder lost,
 All silent as a horseman-ghost,
 He travels slowly down the vale.

(*Idiot Boy* 322-6.) ³¹

In one way and another, Wordsworth knew a great deal about the joys of travel and discovery:

Before me shone a glorious world—
 Fresh as a banner bright, unfurled
 To music suddenly.

(*Ruth* 169-71.) ³²

Two lines from *The Thorn*,

Not higher than a two years' child
 It stands erect, this aged Thorn,

(*Thorn* 5-6.) ³³

remind us of various similar passages, among them the couplet supplied by Wordsworth near the beginning of Coleridge's *Ancient Mariner*:

And listens like a three years' child:
 The Mariner hath his will.

From Wordsworth came also the simile (*Ancient Mariner*, first edition, lines 218-9):

And thou art long and lank and brown
 As is the ribb'd Sea-sand.

I have elsewhere argued (see below, p. 203) that the contributions of Wordsworth may have included the comparison of the sun to 'a weft' in the lines (*ibid.* 83-4):

³¹ P.W., p. 129.

³² P.W., p. 194.

³³ P.W., p. 197.

And broad as a weft upon the left
Went down into the Sea.

Wordsworth rated very high the imaginative quality in *Peter Bell*. Was his opinion partly based upon the similes in that poem? Three or four instances from it may not be out of place.

The Ass is startled — and stops short
Right in the middle of the thicket;
And Peter, wont to whistle loud
Whether alone or in a crowd,
Is silent as a silent cricket.

(P.B. 621-5.)³⁴

By this his heart is lighter far;
And, finding that he can account
So snugly for that crimson stain,
His evil spirit up again
Does like an empty bucket mount.

(P.B. 801-5.)³⁵

But as an oak in breathless air
Will stand though to the centre hewn;
Or as the weakest things, if frost
Have stiffened them, maintain their post;
So he beneath the gazing moon! —

(P.B. 846-50.)³⁶

But, more than all, his heart is stung
To think of one, almost a child;
A sweet and playful Highland girl,
As light and beauteous as a squirrel,
As beauteous and as wild!

(P.B. 886-90.)³⁷

³⁴ P.W., p. 243.

³⁵ P.W., p. 245; cf. Shakespeare, *Richard II* 4.i.185.

³⁶ P.W., p. 246.

³⁷ P.W., p. 246.

My list would be imperfect without an example from the poem in which, as one of the best of Wordsworthian critics, Richard Holt Hutton, averred, our poet reached the high-water mark of his power and technique, the *Song at the Feast of Brougham Castle*:

Now Who is he that bounds with joy
 On Carrock's side, a Shepherd-boy?
 No thoughts hath he but thoughts that pass
 Light as the wind along the grass.
 Can this be He who hither came
 In secret, like a smothered flame?

(*Brougham* 72-7.)³⁸

For myself, I tend to accord the highest praise to the style and matter in *The White Doe of Rylstone*, and at random select this compound simile from it describing Francis Norton:

He, following wheresoe'er he might,
 Hath watched the Banner from afar,
 As shepherds watch a lonely star,
 Or mariners the distant light
 That guides them through a stormy night.

(*White Doe* 757-61.)³⁹

But we must not omit the passage that Wordsworth introduces, from his own works, in his Preface to the Edition of 1815, as an illustration of the way in which the poetic faculty is employed 'upon images in a conjunction by which they modify each other':

As a huge stone is sometimes seen to lie
 Couched on the bald top of an eminence;
 Wonder to all who do the same espy,
 By what means it could thither come, and whence;

³⁸ *P.W.*, p. 204.

³⁹ *P.W.*, p. 404.

So that it seems a thing endued with sense:
 Like a sea-beast crawled forth, that on a shelf
 Of rock or sand reposeth, there to sun itself;

Such seemed this Man, not all alive nor dead,
 Nor all asleep — in his extreme old age. . . .

Motionless as a cloud the old Man stood,
 That heareth not the loud winds when they call;
 And moveth all together, if it move at all.

(*Resolution* 57-65, 75-7.) ⁴⁰

In these images, [Wordsworth explains,] the conferring, the abstracting, and the modifying powers of the Imagination, immediately and mediately acting, are all brought into conjunction. The stone is endowed with something of the power of life to approximate it to the sea-beast; and the sea-beast stripped of some of its vital qualities to assimilate it to the stone; which intermediate image is thus treated for the purpose of bringing the original image, that of the stone, to a nearer resemblance to the figure and condition of the aged Man; who is divested of so much of the indications of life and motion as to bring him to the point where the two objects unite and coalesce in just comparison.⁴¹

As may be surmised from examples given above, Wordsworth, through the boldness and rapidity of his vision, often omits such steps of assimilation or ‘coalescence’ as he here reveals; yet his most surprising comparisons are not on that account necessarily less ‘just.’ Similes must sometimes have flashed upon his inward eye with so compelling a claim to reality that, however remote the two objects compared might be ‘to passive minds,’ he was constrained to disregard all the steps of artistic gradation in uniting them. In such cases, to ‘modify’ might have in-

⁴⁰ *P.W.*, p. 196; cf. p. 956.

⁴¹ *P.W.*, p. 956.

volved a false and unworthy manipulation. Wordsworth's similes, no matter how abrupt at first sight, are a part of his truest experience. 'Many of my poems,' he tells us,⁴² 'have been influenced by my own circumstances when I was writing them. *The Warning* was composed on horse-back, while I was riding from Moresby in a snow-storm. Hence the simile in that poem:

While thoughts press on, and feelings overflow,
And quick words round him fall like flakes of snow.

*(Warning 20-1.)*⁴³

This experience was not the less authentic even if, as is likely, a passage from Homer worked beneath the surface in his memory:

But when he uttered his great voice from his chest, and words like unto the snowflakes of winter, then could no mortal man contend with Odysseus.⁴⁴

It is not, then, on account of a superficial interest or peculiarity attaching to Wordsworth's similes that I have brought some of them together for inspection, but rather on account of their deep underlying truth — truth to their author and to the constitution of things as he saw it. And they well illustrate the correctness of Aristotle's observation regarding the native insight of a poet. At first blush a few of them may appear to be literary abortions, crude excrescences. But if it be generally admitted that Wordsworth saw more profoundly into nature than any other English poet of his era, we may be unsafe in rejecting even the least expected of his comparisons — for example,

Calm is all nature as a resting wheel

⁴² *Memoirs of Wordsworth*, by Christopher Wordsworth, 2.476.

⁴³ *P.W.*, p. 503.

⁴⁴ *Iliad* 3.221-3.

— without a considerable pause for reflection. To the passive mind they may now and then be a stumbling-block, and to the unsympathetic, foolishness. Their truth and justice become apparent when they are dwelt upon with active sympathy by a mind that through habit is less inclined to condemn than to admire.

THE FIFTH FORM OF 'DISCOVERY' IN THE
*POETICS*¹

(16.1455^a 12-16)

The universal longing for knowledge is the key-note in the philosophy of Aristotle; doubtless the most familiar sentence in his works is the opening maxim of the *Metaphysics*: 'All men by nature desire to know.' The satisfaction of this desire is to him the basic pleasure, not only in the pursuit of science and philosophy, but also in the realm of art, and hence of poetry. When we see a face drawn to the life, the difference between the medium of the artist and the flesh and blood of the living original occasions a moment of suspense — there is a sudden inference as we catch the resemblance, and we exclaim in recognition: 'Why, that is he!' — that is the man we know so well. So, one may add, the hasty reader, snatching at delight, foregoes the cumulative satisfaction to be had from the successive disclosures of a long story, and skips to the end of the book in order to learn at once the main outcome of the whole. Or again, to return to Aristotle, the essential mark of genius in a poet is the ability to discover underlying resemblances in things that are superficially unlike, a power that is shown in his command of figurative language — in similes and the like. And, again, the style that gives the greatest pleasure is the one in which the current diction, instantly intelligible, is diversified with just the right admixture of strange or rare terms — archaic words and so on. Thus Lincoln said, not 'Eighty-seven' years

¹ From *Classical Philology* 13 (1918).251-61, as revised and adapted in my volume, *An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy*, New York, 1922, pp. 290-305.

ago, but 'Four score and seven.' The perfection of style is to be clear without being ordinary; an infusion of the less familiar, so long as we do not convert our language into an enigma or a jargon, gives opportunity for a succession of delights arising from the recognition of meanings. Aristotle does not precisely say all this, but I trust no injury has been done to his remarks on diction if we detect in them a latent resemblance to other parts of his theory.

There can at all events be no question as to the importance he attaches to that element in the plot of a drama or an epic poem which he calls 'discovery' (*ἀναγνώσις*) or, as we sometimes render it, 'recognition.'² Like other terms found in the *Poetics*, this may be taken first in a more general sense, and then in a more special or technical sense. Discovery in general is simply a transition from ignorance to knowledge. You may discover the identity of a person, or of your dog 'Argus,' or of inanimate, even casual, things. You may discover the solution of a riddle propounded by the Sphinx. You may discover that such and such a thing has or has not occurred, or that you yourself have or have not done a particular deed. Thus Oedipus discovers, or thinks he discovers, all sorts of things true or untrue — that Creon is plotting against him; that Tiresias is basely involved in the plot; that he, the hero, could not have slain his father and married his mother, fulfilling the oracle, since he discovers that Polybus of Corinth has died a natural death; that Polybus and Merope after all were not his parents; that the man he slew at the cross-roads was his father, and the queen he subsequently married, his mother; that, as Tiresias had said, he himself, Oedipus, is the accursed defiler of the land whom

² See Bernadotte Perrin, *Recognition Scenes in Greek Literature* in *The American Journal of Philology* 30 (1909).371–404; Hubert Philippart, *La Théorie Aristotélicienne de l'Anagnorisis* in *Revue des Études Grecques* 38 (1925).171–204.

he has been seeking. 'Oedipus' is the real answer to the riddle of the Sphinx: more than other infants, he with the pierced feet went on all fours in the morning of life; he above all went proudly erect at noon; and he it was who in his blindness went with a staff in the night of age. All the while the unfamiliar, as it is added on, is converted into the familiar; the unexpected turns out to be the very thing we were awaiting. The unknown stranger is revealed as the first-born of the house — who must again become a stranger, and yet again seek a familiar home and final resting-place, no longer at outlandish Thebes, but here in the neighborhood of our own Athens, at the grove beloved of his and our poet. And all the while we, with Oedipus, desire further knowledge, and our desire, momentarily baffled, is as constantly satisfied — until the entire plan of Sophocles is unfolded, and we know all. Even when the knowledge is painful, the satisfaction *is* a satisfaction. And for us, the spectators, the pain is tempered; for we behold it, not in real life, but in an imitation, with a close resemblance to reality (yet with a difference) that keeps us inferring, and saying: 'Ah, so it is — just like human fortune and misfortune as we see them every day!' The story itself, being traditional, is familiar yet old and far away; and it now has an admixture of the strange and rare which only Sophocles could give it. How delightful to learn — to discover fundamental similarity under superficial difference!

So much for 'discovery' in general. More specifically, in the technical sense, a 'discovery' is the recognition, in the drama or in a tale, of the identity of one or more persons by one or more others. X may know Y, and then Y must learn the identity of X, or the mutual ignorance of both may pass into mutual recognition, causing love or hate, and hence pleasure or pain, to one or both; but, if

the poet or novelist does his work aright, always with pleasure to the man who sees the play or hears the story — the pleasure of inferring and learning. In particular, the poet must let the audience do its own observing and draw its own inferences without too much obvious assistance. In tragedy at least, we do not wish formal proofs of identity, the display of birthmarks, scars, or tokens — necklaces and so on. Nor do we wish a purely artificial declaration from the unknown individual, with no preceding incident to make it necessary. In tragedy, tokens and declarations are the last resort of a feeble or nodding poet, who has forgotten that all men desire to learn by inference, and must not be cheated of the universal satisfaction. They like to fancy themselves wholly responsible for their mental operations; they do not wish to have their wits insulted.

The various kinds of 'discovery,' in the more technical sense, are, according to Aristotle, six in number. Of these, the first is that brought about by signs or tokens; the second is the formal declaration; the third is the one effected by memory, when the occasion stirs a man's emotions, and his display of feeling because of some remembrance reveals who he must be; and the fourth is that resulting from inference, when one agent in a drama identifies another by a process of reasoning. It is easy to see that these four divisions, and indeed all six, are not mutually exclusive, since, for example, a scar might be subsidiary to a declaration, or serve to stir a memory; or a necklace, or a bow, or a garment, might prompt an inference. The fifth kind is the 'synthetic' (or 'composite,' or fictitious — otherwise fallacious or false, or perhaps 'concocted') 'discovery,' and is the form I wish specially to examine. The sixth is the best form. In it the identity of a person is revealed, not by a scar, or by his own declaration, artificially dragged in by the poet, or by his weeping when he hears the tale

of his wanderings rehearsed by another, or by an inference made by his long-lost sister; but through the inevitable sequence of incident after incident in the plot itself. Here the action of the reader's mind follows the very action of the play, and the pleasure of learning the particular identity is but one item in an orderly series, in that passage from ignorance to knowledge which is effected by the work as a whole.

And pleasure, we must recollect, is not a state of being, but a form of action. The right functioning of the mind is pleasure. Pleasure and free activity are convertible terms. Thus the emphasis of the *Poetics* is always laid upon what is rational and orderly. An overplus of delight is experienced when a regular advance from antecedent to consequent finally brings a sudden addition to our knowledge; when by a rapid, unlabored, logical inference the desire to know the truth is satisfied. All learning is essentially rapid; the recognition dawns, then comes as a flash of pleasure.

Yet the poet has a use for what is not strictly true and logical. Even the irrational may escape censure if it be made plausible, or comic when comedy is intended. And the marvelous is sweet. It is legitimate also to represent a dramatic character as deceiving himself or another, the poet being aware that it is hard for a man swayed by anger, or fear, or any other powerful emotion, to see and tell the exact truth. People are always magnifying the things that comfort their self-love, and minifying whatever may ruffle or hurt it. Then there are characters who like to mystify their fellows, as well as those who deceive for some obvious advantage. The poet may on occasion set before us a crafty Odysseus who delights in all manner of wiles. It requires art also to portray the slippery Clytemnestra or the lying Lady Macbeth, or poor Desdemona and Deianeira in their

deceit. Superior mental activity as such is ever interesting, and the false inferences of the deceived are not unpleasing, but the reverse, unless they exceed the bounds of the credible. Furthermore, as we have seen, a slight admixture of the strange or rare gives a spice to the known and obvious. In fact, we all like to add a little something in the telling of a tale, with a view to pleasing the neighbor who hears it.

Accordingly, in his remarks on epic poetry Aristotle says (*Poetics* 24. 1460^a 17–26):

That the marvelous is a source of pleasure may be seen by the way in which people add to a story [$\pi\!\rho\!\sigma\tau\!i\theta\!\epsilon\nu\tau\!e\!s$]; for they always embellish the facts in the belief that it will gratify the listeners. Yet it is Homer above all who has shown the rest how a lie should be told; [in effect: who has shown how a poet ought to represent Odysseus or the like deceiving some other personage.] The essence of the method is the use of a paralogism, as follows. Suppose that whenever A exists or comes to pass, B must exist or occur. Men think, if the consequent B exists, the antecedent A must also; but the inference is illegitimate. For the poet, then, the right method is this: if the antecedent A is untrue, and if there is something else, B, which would necessarily exist or occur if A were true, one must add [$\pi\!\rho\!\sigma\theta\!\epsilon\!i\!v\!a\!t$] the B; for, knowing the added detail to be true, we ourselves mentally proceed to the fallacious inference that the antecedent A is likewise true. We may take an instance from the Bath-Scene in the *Odyssey*.³

That is, one must say the least possible about the A, and keep harping on the B. Turning to the Bath-Scene in *Odyssey* 19, we see the force of Aristotle's illustration. Here Odysseus, disguised in rags, wishes to convince Penelope that he, the Beggar, has seen the real Odysseus alive == A, a falsehood. Accordingly, he adds an elaborate and

³ Here and subsequently I follow, with little deviation, my Amplified Version (p. 82).

accurate description of the hero's clothing = B. Penelope knows B to be true, since the garments came from her. If A were true, that is, if the Beggar had seen Odysseus, the natural consequence, B, would be a true description of the clothing. From the truth of B, Penelope mistakenly infers the occurrence of A, and believes the Beggar.⁴

It is interesting to note in detail how Homer makes Odysseus 'add the B'; I give the passage (*Odyssey* 19. 218 ff.) in the translation of Butcher and Lang:

'Tell me what manner of raiment he was clothed in about his body, and what manner of man he was himself, and tell me of his fellows that went with him.' Then Odysseus of many counsels answered her saying: 'Lady, it is hard for one so long parted from him to tell thee all this, for it is now the twentieth year since he went thither and left my country. Yet even so I will tell thee as I see him in spirit. Goodly Odysseus wore a thick, purple mantle, twofold, which had a brooch fashioned in gold, with a double covering for the pins, and on the face of it was a curious device: a hound in his fore-paws held a dappled fawn, and gazed on it as it writhed. And all men marveled at the workmanship, how, wrought as they were in gold, the hound was gazing on the fawn and strangling it, and the fawn was writhing with his feet and striving to flee. Moreover, I marked the shining doublet about his body, as it were the skin of a dried onion, so smooth it was, and glistering as the sun; truly many women looked thereon and wondered. Yet another thing will I tell thee, and do thou ponder it in thy heart. I know not if Odysseus was thus clothed upon at home, or if one of his fellows gave him the raiment as he went on board the swift ship, or even it may be some stranger.' . . . So he spake, and in her heart he stirred yet more the desire of weeping, as she knew the certain tokens that Odysseus showed her. So when she had taken her fill

⁴ Amplified Version, p. 82.

of tearful lament, then she answered him, and spake saying: 'Now verily, stranger, thou that even before wert held in pity, shalt be dear and honorable in my halls, for it was I who gave him these garments, even such as thou namest, and folded them myself, and brought them from the chamber, and added besides the shining brooch to be his jewel.'

At this point it is well to remember several things. First of all, there are the words *προστιθέντες* and *προσθῖναι*, used in the sense of ' adding to,' as if putting together truth and falsehood were characteristic of deception. Then, there is the logical term paralogism (*παραλογισμός*) employed by Aristotle in the same connection. Again, the stock example of a liar could hardly be any other than Odysseus. Finally, we are to recall that Aristotle remarks in the *Poetics* (24. 1459^b 15-6) upon the number of 'discoveries' in the *Odyssey*; the poem is, he says, an example of an involved plot, since there is 'discovery' throughout, and it is a story of character. The incident of the false tidings, just quoted, has in fact the nature of an erroneous recognition effected in the heroine by the disguised hero, and might suggest the title '*Οδυσσεὺς ψευδάγγελος*' referred to by Aristotle in another passage which we are about to examine — save that there it does not fit the case without a textual change in the *Poetics*.

And now we have reached our special topic. The fifth form of 'discovery' described in the *Poetics* has evidently puzzled the commentators. The meaning of the name applied to it, *συνθετή*, has not been made clear. To translate this by 'composite' does not help very much unless we know the nature of the thing described — a better plan would be to transliterate and say 'synthetic.' And the example supplied by Aristotle from some poem or lay called *Odysseus the False Messenger*, or *Odysseus with the False*

Tidings, leaves us very uncertain of our facts. The text is doubtful at two points. Were it not, any translation would still be conjectural, since the reference is too brief, and of the two parties to the 'discovery' we cannot be sure who recognizes and who is recognized.

Even so, more light can be thrown on the passage. Bywater, for example, has not done so well with this difficulty as with others in the *Poetics*. But since his masterly edition may fairly be thought to sum up our present knowledge of that work,⁵ it may be well to begin with his text and translation of the passage, and to append his note on the meaning of it. Thereupon I shall give, with a few minor changes, the rendering and explanation I reached in my 'Amplified Version'; and I shall then subjoin a few reflections that have subsequently occurred to me.

Bywater reads thus (16. 1455^a 12-16):

Ἐστιν δέ τις καὶ συνθετὴ ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ τοῦ θατέρου, οἷον ἐν τῷ Ὁδυσσεῖ τῷ ψευδαγγέλῳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ [τὸ] τόξον ἔφη γνώσεσθαι ὃ οὐχ ἐωράκει, τὸ δὲ ὡς δὴ ἐκείνου ἀναγνωριοῦντος διὰ τούτου ποιῆσαι παραλογισμός.

For the last word of the passage, following Vahlen he accepts the reading of ms. Riccardianus 46, confirmed, he says, by the Arabic version of the *Poetics*, rejecting the better authority of ms. Parisinus 1741, which gives παραλογισμόν; and he translates:

There is, too, a composite Discovery arising from bad reasoning on the side of the other party. An instance of it is in *Ulysses the False Messenger*: he said he should know the bow — which he had not seen; but to suppose from that that he

⁵ True in July, 1918; I have since (1921) had opportunity to consult Gudeman's article and translation (the Preface to the latter being dated July, 1920), and shall later refer to the translation; his article and translation are noted in our *Bibliography* of the *Poetics*. Still later (1938) I may refer to his edition of the *Poetics* (1934), pp. 300-1, which, however, in 55^a 16 accepts the nominative παραλογισμός where I argue for the accusative.

would know it again (as though he had once seen it) was bad reasoning.

Bywater's note on the passage is this:

ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ: comp. ^a 4 *ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ*. Vahlen, who connects this directly with *συνθετή*, supposes the two factors in the Discovery to be a *συλλογισμός* on the side of the one, and a *παραλογισμός* on the side of the other, of the two parties: 'quae [scil. ἀναγνώρισις] ut ex simplici unius ratiocinatione prodire, ita composita esse potest alterius ex syllogismo, paralogismo alterius' (comp. also the discussion in his *Zur Kritik Aristotelischer Schriften*, p. 16). The illustration, however, from the *Οδυσσέας ψευδάγγελος* does not seem to imply anything more than an erroneous inference by one party (*παραλογισμός δὲ θατέρου*) from some statement made by the other. The reasoning in this instance Aristotle appears to regard as the illogical parallel to that in the *Choephoroe*: just as the recognition of Orestes by Electra came about through a *συλλογισμός* on her part, so that of A by B, the two personages in the *Οδυσσέας ψευδάγγελος*, is supposed to come about through a *παραλογισμός* on the part of the latter. The fallacy to be found there may have arisen from the ambiguity of the word 'know.' A having said, 'I shall know the bow,' B may have taken this to mean that he would 'know it again' (*ἀναγνωρισθεῖν*) — which was not true (comp. δὲ οὐχ ἔωράκει). In our ignorance of the play and its plot it is idle to speculate further as to the way in which the actual Discovery may have been worked out in it. The present is one of many passages showing Aristotle's affection for the forms of logic even when dealing with matters of poetry (see on 16. 1454^b 28).^e

Bywater's interpretation here suffers from his neglect to observe that, as Chapter 16 of the *Poetics* deals with 'discovery' in the technical sense, and as the examples of the other forms involve the recognition of persons, with

^a Bywater, pp. 237–8.

or without the use of tokens, so in the illustration of the fifth form what is said of the bow must almost certainly be subsidiary to the recognition of a person. He seems to have been misled, too, by a probably accidental word-echo: *γνώσεσθαι* — *ἀναγνωριῶντος*. But here *γνώσεσθαι* is an indirect quotation of something uttered by a character in some lay or poem, while *ἀναγνωριῶντος* is a part of the technical language (cf. *ἀναγνώρισις*) of the *Poetics*. Further, the whole theory of the treatise, and Aristotle's use in it of the verb *ποιεῖν*, irresistibly lead one to think of *ποιῆσαι* as here referring to the activity of the poet. My own rendering of the passage in question is, I hope, clearer, at least to the sort of student I originally had in mind. I preface it only by saying that it assumes the accusative *παραλογισμὸν* to be correct, and with the remark that I translate *συνθετή*, not by 'composite,' but by 'synthetic' or 'fictitious,' though perhaps 'concocted' would convey the idea:

Related to discovery by inference is a kind of synthetic [or 'fictitious'] discovery where the poet causes X to be recognized through the false inference of Y [or 'through a logical deception practised by X upon Y']. There is an example of this in *Odysseus with the False Tidings*. Here X says: 'I shall know the bow' (which he had not seen); but that Y should recognize X through this is to represent a false inference [i.e., to poetize a paralogism].

I now wish to add these reflections. The word *συνθετή* is here associated with a 'discovery' that is deceptive or false, and with Odysseus, the stock example of success in deceit. The mention of a paralogism, too, instantly reminds us of what Aristotle says concerning Homer and his correct method in the telling of a lie, in a passage where, as we have seen, the example is likewise that of Odysseus

effecting a false discovery, and where the notion of lying is that of adding something true to something false (cf. *προστιθέντες*, *προσθεῖναι*). 'Composite,' then, may be misleading as a translation of *συνθετή*, which rather expresses the result when the false A and the added B are put together. The Greek adjective, it is true, can hardly have the same force here as in Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound* 686 (*συνθέτους λόγους* = 'lying speeches'); we need some term like 'fictitious' — one with no necessary connotation of what is morally wrongful.

[Gudeman's German translation of the *Poetics* (1921) is based upon a fresh study of the Arabic version. Where we have heretofore read 'know the bow,' he, like Margoliouth (1911), gives, 'string the bow'; I have often tried to identify Aristotle's *Odysseus with the False Tidings* as one of the 'lays' in the *Odyssey* (see my Amplified Version, p. 56). The Arabic version, then, leads us to connect the example with *Odyssey* 21 or some adaptation of it. Gudeman (p. 33) translates:

Es gibt aber auch eine zusammengesetzte Art der Erkenntnung, aus dem Fehlschluss des einen (der angeredeten Person), wie zum Beispiel im *Odysseus der Trugbote*. Da behauptete der eine (Odysseus), er allein könne den Bogen spannen und kein anderer. Dies lässt ihn der Dichter nach der Überlieferung sagen; wenn er nun aber hinzufügt, er werde den Bogen wiedererkennen, den er doch niemals gesehen, so war die Annahme, er werde diesen (wirklich) wiedererkennen, ein Fehlschluss.

The Arabic version evidently warrants an interpretation different from that of Bywater; at this point there must have been a notable difference between the Greek text that lay behind that and the Syriac version, on the one hand, and ms. Parisinus 1741, on the other. To me, there are

great difficulties in Gudeman's rendering of the passage, but I have no means of removing them. Yet I should like to suggest the possibility of an early textual corruption. May it be that Aristotle really spoke, not of the bow (*τόξον*) of *Odyssey* 21. 11, etc., but of the nuptial bed (*λέχος*) of *Odyssey* 23. 177 ff., a description of which enters into Odysseus' revelation of himself to Penelope? The hero is still in the garb of a beggar. He finally identifies himself to her by a circumstantial account of the bed — which as Beggar he had not seen. 'A great token,' he says, 'is worked into the elaborate bed; it was I that laboriously wrought this, and no other' (*τὸ δ' ἔγώ κάμον οὐδέ τις ἄλλος*). His minute description, which he could give if he were her husband, leads her, not to the legitimate inference that he *might* be so, but that he *must* be. He adds the B, and she infers the A. The 'discovery' is of the fifth or 'synthetic' sort. The author of the lay, which could still be called *Odysseus with the False Tidings*, has here 'poetized a paralogism.]

There is nothing morally objectionable in employing this kind of 'discovery.' It is not the best kind, for that grows out of the incidents of the plot; but if the poet wishes to represent a character producing a false recognition, let the device be used in the proper way — *ὡς δεῖ*. You must mention the false A, but not dwell upon it. You must put in the B, and, as Homer makes the Beggar do in describing the garments to Penelope, you must keep on adding to the description. In spite of Bywater's warning that 'it is idle to speculate further as to the way in which the actual Discovery may have been worked out' in *Odysseus with the False Tidings*, it is tempting to think of this poem or lay in connection with Book 19 or Book 23 of the *Odyssey*. If, however, the story is not Homeric, one could imagine the hero appearing in disguise, and then

proving his identity by a detailed description of his ancient bow, or perhaps offering to pick out this weapon from a number of others, and thus imposing on the guileless.

Some of these thoughts were evidently in my mind when my Amplified Version was published. But since then the whole question of the 'synthetic' or 'concocted discovery' has become more intelligible to me through the observation of actual instances of the device in literature. Aristotle was simply dealing with observed facts, so that when a point in his conception of the drama or of epic poetry is obscure, the best way of illuminating it is, not to theorize immoderately on his text, but to compare what he says with the practice of poets. Every one of his kinds of 'discovery' can be illustrated from Homer. How could it be otherwise in view of the allusion in the *Poetics* to ἀναγνώρισις in the *Odyssey*? But I have hit upon two very apt examples from the Biblical account of Joseph and his brethren, a tale that might be described in Aristotle's words as 'a complex story — there is "discovery" throughout, — and one of character.'

Thus (Gen. 37.31-3):

And they took Joseph's coat, and killed a kid of the goats, and dipped the coat in the blood; and they sent the coat of many colors, and they brought it to their father, and said: 'This have we found; know now whether it be thy son's coat or no.' And he knew it, and said: 'It is my son's coat; an evil beast hath devoured him; Joseph is without doubt rent in pieces.'

In other words, the sons supply the B, their father infers the A, and the 'concocted discovery' is effected by a paralogism. The writer of the story understood a point in his art — ποιῆσαι παραλογισμόν, — and knew how to

represent a lie — $\psi\epsilon\nu\delta\eta\lambda\acute{e}g\epsilon\nu\omega\delta\epsilon\bar{\iota}$. In fact, he is specially given to using this form of recognition. Potiphar's wife (Gen. 39. 7-20) caused Potiphar to make a false 'discovery' by means of Joseph's garment, which she laid up by her 'until his lord came home':

And she spake unto him according to these words, saying: 'The Hebrew servant which thou hast brought unto us came in unto me to mock me. And it came to pass, as I lifted up my voice and cried, that he left his garment with me, and fled out.' And it came to pass, when his master heard the words of his wife, which she spake unto him, saying, 'After this manner did thy servant to me,' that his wrath was kindled. And Joseph's master took him, and put him into the prison.

Joseph himself practised upon his brethren in somewhat similar fashion. After securing grain from him in Egypt, twice they found every man's money in his sack's mouth, and on the second occasion the silver cup of the great Egyptian diviner in Benjamin's sack.

If it be objected that the story in Genesis is historical, and that we should not attribute too much to the originality of the writer, there is an excellent reply in the *Poetics* itself (9. 1451^b 29-33):

And even if he happens to take a subject from history, he is not the less a poet for that; for there is nothing to hinder certain actual events from possessing the ideal quality of a probable or necessary sequence; and it is by virtue of representing this quality in such events that he is their poet.

It is obvious that false 'discoveries' are not restricted to a single type. Odysseus describing the garments Penelope had given him is a deceiver. Odysseus describing the nuptial couch to Penelope, who has just tried to deceive him, is in earnest. A mistaken recognition might occur

when no deceit was intended by either party. Nevertheless the poet would need to know how to bring it about, and the principle would always be the same — a mistaken inference from the known B to the seemingly necessary antecedent A. The New Comedy of Greece must have been full of incidents turning upon both innocent mistakes and guileful deceptions with regard to identity. It is easy enough to find examples in Plautus and Terence; Chremes' delusion that the courtesan Bacchis is the true love of young Clinia, in the *Self-Tormentor*, will serve as an instance. As for the modern drama, need one mention Shakespeare's *Comedy of Errors*? I take it that Aristotle's fifth form of discovery is peculiarly well-suited to comedy.

All men by nature desire to know; all like to see good representations of the human mind in action; and nearly all delight to see false inferences well portrayed — if the mystery is finally cleared, and every mistake resolved.

A PUN IN THE *RHETORIC* OF ARISTOTLE¹

(3.11.1412^a 32-1412^b 2)

In the standard text of Roemer (1885) this troublesome passage reads thus:

τὰ δὲ παρὰ γράμμα ποιεῖ οὐχ ὁ λέγει λέγειν, ἀλλ' ὁ μεταστρέφει σύνομα, οἷον τὸ Θεοδώρου εἰς Νίκωνα τὸν κιθαρῳδόν, ‘θράττει σε·’ προσποιεῖται γὰρ λέγειν τὸ ‘θράττει σε’ καὶ ἔξαπατᾶ· ἄλλο γὰρ λέγει. διὸ μαθόντι ἡδὺ, ἐπεὶ εἰ μὴ ὑπολαμβάνει Θρᾷκα εἶναι, οὐ δόξει ἀστεῖον εἶναι.

The paraphrase of this, and the note on it, in Cope's edition of the *Rhetoric* (ed. by Sandys, 1877) run as follows:

'Pleasantries arising from changes of letters (plays on words) are produced, not by a mere enunciation of a word in its direct meaning, but by something (a change) which gives a different *turn* to it, (converts or twists it into a different sense); as that of Theodorus (of Byzantium, the rhetorician . . .) against Nicon the harper, *θράττει*: he pretends namely to say "it confounds you" (you are confounded), and cheats; for he means something else: and therefore it is amusing only after one has become acquainted with the meaning (or circumstances); for if (the hearer) does n't know that he is a Thracian, he will see no point in it at all.'

Victorius and Schrader have both missed the meaning of this pun. But in order to arrive at it, we must first remove from the text the first *σε* after *θράττει* which has been introduced from the second (where it is required) and spoils the

¹ From *The American Journal of Philology* 41 (1920).48-56; by permission.

pun. Nicon, it appears from the explanation, is, or is supposed to be, of foreign extraction; and not only that, but a Thracian, the most barbarous of all nations. The Thracian women were habitually slaves, in Athenian families: Aristophanes, *Thesm.* 279, 280, 284, 293; *Pac.* 1138; *Vesp.* 828. This person is addressed by Theodorus with the word *θράττει*, which means *apparently*, ‘You are confounded’; this appears from the interpretation that follows, (*τι*) *θράττει σε*, which is of course convertible in meaning with the passive *θράττει* (and it follows also that the first *σε* must be an error of the transcriber, for *θράττει σε* would be no interpretation of *θράττει σε*; nor in that form would there be any pun). It *really* means, however, *Θρᾶττ' εἰ*, ‘You are a Thracian maid-servant’—not only an out-and-out barbarian, but effeminate to boot, and a menial. Schrader’s explanation is ‘*Θρᾶττη (sic) σε*, hoc est, *Thracier mulier te, intellige peperit*’—at once impossible in respect of the Greek, and pointless. Victorius to much the same effect.

Meineke would find in line 34 *Θρᾶττ' ησε*. Cope, as we see, would delete *σε* in line 34. Welldon in his translation (1886) follows Cope. Jebb in his posthumously published translation (ed. by Sandys, 1909) reads *θράττεισε* in line 34, and *θράττει σε* in line 35, without making clear his conception of the joke; in his foot-note Sandys adds: ‘Cobet suggested *Θρᾶττης εῖ*; Susemihl *Θρᾶττίζει*, “he is playing the Thracian” (the “other meaning,” according to Jebb), or *Θρᾶττίζει σε*, “it makes you play the Thracian.”’ On this showing, there is a presumption that the joke has not been caught; and an alteration of the text probably is demanded. My explanation has at least this merit, that it requires a slighter change (if any) of text than those hitherto put forward; for, if a change is to be made, I ask only that the final *ε* be replaced in both cases by *v*, or at most that the final *ε* be in both cases deleted.

Cope's explanation of the word-play is doubtless correct so far as concerns the idea, 'You are a Thracian quean'—menial, effeminate, and of barbarous foreign extraction; this I shall hereafter refer to as Idea No. 2. But it may be less easy to accept his rendering of the other, primary aspect of the pun (Idea No. 1): 'You are confounded'—which hardly makes sense enough (unless, with Meineke, we suppose an occasion when musical instruments were sounding); whereas this and other illustrative jokes of Aristotle we should expect to be full of wit. Let us consider a few details of the note by Cope, of the passage, and of the context.

To begin with, the pleasantry is hardly one made by Theodorus the rhetorician at the expense of Nicon. If Aristotle has taken it from the *Rhetoric* of Theodorus, it is simply one recorded in that work; from 3. ii. 1412^a 25-9² we may infer that the jokes explained by Theodorus were to some extent drawn from the comic poets; see Jebb's translation (p. 173): 'The like is true of what Theodorus calls "novelty" in style. This happens when the thing is a surprise, and, as he says, does not answer to our presentiment; like those words, formed by a change, which comic writers use. Jokes which depend on the change of a letter have this effect: they deceive.' How easy it is to go astray in the precise attribution of a joke found in Aristotle may be seen in Jebb's rendering of *Rhetoric* 3. io. 1411^a 18-21:

Or, take the iambic line of Anaxandrides about the delay of his daughters to get married—

The bridals of my girls are overdue.

² καὶ δὲ λέγει Θεόδωρος, τὸ καινὰ λέγειν. γίγνεται δὲ σταυ παράδοξον ἦ, καὶ μή, ὡς ἐκεῖνος λέγει, πρὸς τὴν ἔμπροσθεν δόξαν, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς γελοῖος τὰ παραπεποιημένα. ὅπερ δύναται καὶ τὰ παρὰ γράμμα σκώμματα· ἔξαπατῷ γάρ.

The daughters (*τῶν θυγατέρων*) are the maidens (*αι παρθένοι*) of Anaxandrides only in the sense that they figured in a comedy by this poet; the mode of allusion in Aristotle points to an important episode in some familiar play.³

An intrusive *σε* (or any intrusive particle or letter) from the hand of a napping copyist would be more likely to appear as a faulty repetition in the second occurrence (line 35) of the expression *θράττει σε* than as a faulty anticipation in the first (line 34); having written both words once, the scribe might inadvertently repeat them both. But we need not imagine a scribal error either of anticipation or repetition, for, whatever the original reading, a repetition may be correct. Supposing for the moment that Cope has duly explained both sides of the pun, we have only to imagine a pause, or pauses (between the words), which would not be noted in the manuscript; so in the joke preceding this one: ‘And as he stepped along, beneath his feet were — chilblains’ (where the listener expects ‘sandals’). In a modern book the joke as Cope understands it would be represented with the help of spaces and a dash: *Thratt ei — se.* As it happens, in the very next illustration after this — another word-play effected by a turn or twist in the pronunciation of a letter or two, Aristotle gives the form of words but once: *kai τὸ βούλει*

³ Compare the more specific allusion in *Rheticus* 3. 12. 1413^b 25–6: *οἶον καὶ Φιλήμων δὲ ὑποκριτῆς ἐτολεῖ ἐν τῇ Ἀναξανδρίδου Γέροντομανίᾳ*. Following Kock, *Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta* 2. 138–9, I have changed the γ of both Cope and Roemer to a capital letter.

If the maidens referred to in the other passage (*ὑπερῆμεροι μοι τῶν γῆμων αἱ παρθένοι*) were conceivably the daughters of Danaus, the *μοι* might indicate, not their father, but the Herald of King Aegyptus, as the speaker: ‘The marriage-bonds of the (?young) ladies, I think, have passed their date.’ The theme of the *Suppliant Maidens*, treated by Aeschylus, became the subject of a comedy *Δαναῖδες* by Aristophanes, as also of a comedy with the same title by Diphilus; see Kock 1.454; 2.548. Anaxandrides is said to have composed 65 comedies; if so, the titles of 25 are unknown; of these 25, a number must have dealt with mythological subjects (see Croiset, *Hist. Litt. Grecque* 3. 606).

*αὐτὸν πέρσαι*⁴; he trusts his reader to think of the two pronunciations at once — whatever they were, for, as Cope intimates, ‘No satisfactory explanation has hitherto been given of this pun.’⁵

However, Cope proceeds to solve it as hinging on the termination of *βούλει* (= *βουλή*); and this suggests that the turn of the pun we are examining may likewise be found in the termination of *θράττεισε* (to place the letters as they would appear in an early manuscript). The possibilities seem to be *θράττ-ει-σε*; *θράττει-σε*; *θράττεις-ε*. Assuming with Cope, Cobet, and Susemihl the possibility of a scribal error of some sort, and admitting the correctness of Cope’s interpretation of Idea No. 2, *Θράττ’ εῖ* (‘You are a Thracian maid-servant’), can we find any other interpretation for Idea No. 1 than *θράττει σε* (‘It confounds you’ — ‘You are confounded’)? Is *θράττεις*, or perhaps **θράττεῖς*, a possibility?

In a tentative answer to this question, let us begin with the description of Nicon, whom Aristotle calls *τὸν κιθαρῳδόν*, ‘the harper,’ ‘him of the cithara.’ One might be tempted to connect him with the comic poet Nicon, author of a play called *Κιθαρῳδός* (cited by Athenaeus and Pollux); save that Meineke in a casual allusion to the subject of the joke (*Comicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* 3.575) makes no reference to the poet, and that Kock (*Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta*), following Meineke, includes the poet among the later writers of the New

⁴ This also seems to come to Aristotle through Theodorus the rhetorician, the *kai τό* being correlative with the *οἷον τό* (*Θεοδώρου*).

Theodorus the actor is likewise mentioned by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* (3.2. 1404^b 22); according to Plutarch (*De se Laud.* 545 f.), he once told the comic actor Satyrus that it was easy enough to make an audience laugh, but to make them weep was the difficulty (I borrow the language of Haigh, *Attic Theatre*, 1907, p. 283). But in the present case, having cited the rhetorician, Aristotle would hardly turn to the actor without a specific identification.

⁵ Some light on it has since been thrown by H. N. Couch in *The American Journal of Philology* 52 (1931) 270–3.

Comedy. May we not, however, associate Nicon the harper with the stage in some capacity? At all events there should be a reason for the epithet applied to him by Aristotle, who commonly wastes no words — least of all in citations.

That Nicon may have been the subject of a witticism in the work of a comic poet or the like has already been suggested. I have lately gone through the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle marking the evidence hitherto noted by scholars, and collecting additional evidence, of the historical relation between rhetorical theory and the art of comedy — that relation which, as Rutherford shows (in *A Chapter in the History of Annotation*), becomes so pervasive in the scholars on Aristophanes. At this point in the text my eye was caught by the collocation of the words *κιθαρῳδόν* and *θράττει*, which sent me to Meineke and Kock, and to the *Plutus* and the *Frogs* of Aristophanes. Including the Nicon mentioned by Athenaeus and Pollux, Kock lists no fewer than nine comic poets,⁶ to each of whom is attributed a play entitled *Κιθαρῳδός*; in addition he lists a *Κιθαριστής* of Antiphanes, possibly identical with the *Κιθαρῳδός* of the same poet, a *Κιθαριστής* of Menander, and a *Κιθαρίστρια* of Anaxandrides (not to mention an *'Ορφεύς* of Antiphanes). The fortunes of the harper and his instrument evidently were a stock theme in the Middle and New Comedy. It may be added that Anaxandrides has been accounted a favorite author with Aristotle; and that we may place the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle in the time of the Middle Comedy. But since Aristotle knew the *Rhetic* of Theodorus (it was likewise known to Plato⁷) in an

⁶ Alexis, Anaxippus, Antiphanes, Apollodorus, Clearchus, Diphilus, Nicon, Sophilus, Theophilus. As for the Flute-player, male or female, Anaxilas, Antiphanes, and Philemon each composed an *Ἄνηγρης*; Phoenicides an *Ἄνηγριδες*; Diodorus, Antiphanes, and Menander each an *Ἄνηγρις*. The earliest play of the sort was Magnes' *Bαρβυτούρα*.

⁷ See, for example, *Phaedrus* 266 e.

earlier as well as a later edition, the chances favor a belief that the joke on Nicon recorded by Theodorus, if derived from the comic stage, harks back to the days of the Old Comedy and of scurrilous gibes at particular individuals. Thus in the *Clouds* 970 ff. Aristophanes pays his respects to the κιθαρώδος Phrynis, and the 'curst and crooked trills and roulades' of his school (Starkie's translation).

Of course the cithara (= harp or lyre) was itself constantly employed in the performances of the Old Comedy. In the *Birds* of Aristophanes, says Haigh (*Attic Theatre*, 1907, p. 271), 'it is clear that the flute-player and the four harpists were disguised as birds, and wore masks of an appropriate kind.' Moreover, Aristophanes parodies the sound of the cithara in verbal form — which brings us to the heart of the present article, a consideration of the stem θρατ(το) or θρετ(τα) used in imitation of a man thrumming upon a stringed instrument.

In the *Plutus* 290, 296, Aristophanes twice employs the expression θρεττανελὸ τὸν Κύκλωπα. The scholiast tells us that the word θρεττανελό comes from Philoxenus — that is, from his dithyrambic pastoral poem on the loves of the Cyclops and Galatea; Aristotle (*Poetics* 2.1448^a 14–16) gives us to understand that the work had the main characteristic of comedy. The word is thought to have been invented by Philoxenus to represent the wretched music of Polyphemus as he wooed the nymph with a twangling cithara, or with his voice in imitation of a cithara. A similar vocable, θραττό, is employed by Aristophanes in *Frogs* (Rogers' numbering) 1286, 88, 90, 92, 94, where Euripides is made to ridicule the rhythm and music of the Aeschylean choruses, and where τὸ φλαττοθραττοφλαττόθρατ, the entire expression occurring five times at brief intervals, is again imitative of a musician thrumming on a cithara or harp.

Although no instance of a verb like *θράττειν* with the meaning ‘to thrum’ or the like has come down to us (so far as I can discover) unless in the passage quoted from the *Rhetoric* (and possibly in the lines hereafter quoted from Mnesimachus), is there any reason why we should not suppose the word to have existed, at least in colloquial usage?⁸ If we admit the possibility of such a verb in the joke on Nicon the harper, a far better pun emerges. Though I must ultimately leave the details of emendation to an expert in Greek textual criticism, let us suppose for the moment that we delete the final ε; we then have: *θράττεις*. Now let us read as the conditions of this kind of pleasantry demand. The listener knows Nicon to be a harper (and from Thrace); he expects *θράττεις*. But you pause before uttering the sigma: Θρᾶττ' εῖ -s. ‘You are a scullion from Thrace’; ‘You thrum the harp.’ The deletion of the final ε is a less violent textual change than that of Susemihl, less even than that of Cope. More conservative yet would be the substitution of ν for the terminal ε: Θρᾶττ' εῖ σύ = *θράττεις σύ*. Meanwhile for those who cling to the traditional reading *θράττει σε*, a triple pun is among the possibilities: You thrum; you are a Thracian quean — you are stunned!

For my part, if it is possible, I prefer the *mot à double entente*. It is as if a bad comic poet who had been reading the good Mr. Barrie were to catch the poet Swinburne with his lyre, and to exclaim: ‘Our Lady of Thrums!’

I subjoin a few additional gleanings; and first, in order to be fair and open, the chief objection I have discovered to my interpretation of Idea No. 1, this objection being

⁸ In order to explain *βούλει αὐτὸν πέρσαι*, Majoragius, as noted by Cope, supposes that there was a verb *πέρσειν*, not elsewhere recorded. Cope rejects the hypothesis; but *θράττειν* would not be open to the same objections.

connected with the interpretation of a partly doubtful passage in a fragment from the *'Ιπποτρόφος* of Mnesimachus (Kock 2.437-8, Frg. 4; cf. Meineke 3.568-76). This fragment, preserved by Athenaeus (9.402 f.), contains an over-drawn description of a banquet, with the preparations and activities of the household; the items of the list are arranged by fours or by pairs. Lines 56-7 read:

σεμναὶ δ' αὐλῶν ἀγαναὶ φωναὶ,
μολπά, κλαγγά, θράττει, πνεῖται.

I follow Kock as well as Meineke in rejecting a third verb *νεῖται* between *θράττει* and *πνεῖται*, but place a comma after *μολπά*, and another after *κλαγγά*. Meineke (3.574-5) comments:

θράττει de turbulentio mesicorum [sic] instrumentorum strepitu dictum. Cfr. Marinus in vita Proculi cap. 33: *θράττεσθαι τὴν ἀκοὴν ἐκ τῶν θρήνων*. Pertinet huc Theodori iocus de Nicone citharoedo, *θράττει σε* apud Aristot. Rhet. 3.11, quod ambigue dictum, *obtundit aures tuas*, et *Thressa cecinit* (*Θρῆττ' ἔσε*). Id enim voluisse suspicor Theodorum. Niconem Thracem fuisse annotavit Aristoteles. Quod sequitur *νεῖται*, apud Atticos constanter futuri habet significatum, nec dicitur nisi de rebus animatis. Itaque seclusi, utpote ex dittographia ortum sequentis *πνεῖται*, quod de tibiae flatu intellegendum.

Perhaps Meineke would have rendered his position firmer by quoting from the *Vita Procli* of Marinus more exactly: *ώς μηκέτι θράττεσθαι τὴν ἀκοὴν ἐκ τῶν ἀπεμφαινόντων θρήνων*. Yet it seems like a far cry from a point of usage in Aristotle and in a poet of the Middle Comedy to an illustration from Byzantine usage of the fifth century A.D. in Marinus' biography of the Neo-Platonic philosopher. But, admitting a measure of justice in the illustration; even so, we may feel that the familiar verb

θράττειν (= *θράσσειν*) might associate itself through onomatopoeia with the sound of rhythmical music, as of the harp, and in this association might take on so much of special color as to become virtually a separate word.⁹ If so, then in the passage from Mnesimachus we should read *κλαγγά*, the shrill sound of the flute, with *πνεῖται*, as indeed Meineke suggests, and *μολπά*, a song accompanied by some other kind of measured movement, with *θράττει*, this verb being here used intransitively. In fact, my view of the word derives support from the translation of Atheneaeus by Yonge (2. 636), who renders the lines:

And lovely sounds from tuneful flutes,
And song and din go through the house,
Of instruments both wind and stringed.

The word *θράττει* does not occur in the extant portions of Aristophanes. Of the other two occurrences of the form in the comic poets, one has experienced a fortuitous association with the comedy entitled *Θράτται* of Cratinus (see Meineke 2. 227). Is it mere chance that has brought the other into a passage from the *Δουλοδιδάσκαλος* of Pherecrates (Kock 1. 155, Frg. 39) where a play has been found on *κίθαρος*, a fish, and the *κιθάρα*? —

Α. κίθαρος γεγενήσθαι καὶ γοράξειν κίθαρος ὄν.
Β. ἀγαθὸν γ' δὲ κίθαρος καὶ πρὸς Ἀπόλλωνος πάνυ.
Α. ἐκείνῳ θράττει μ', ὅτι λέγουσιν, ὡς γαθή,
ἔνεστιν ἐν κιθάρῳ τι κακόν.

Or (if we may now indulge in almost pure guesswork) is there a word-play on the fish *κίθαρος* and the fish *θράττα*? What then of the odd passage from the *'Ιχθύες* of Archippus (Kock 1. 684, Frg. 27)? —

⁹ In the quotation from Marinus, *θράττεοθαι* alliterates with *θρῆνων*.

ἀποδοῦναι δ' ὅσα ἔχομεν ἀλλήλων, ἡμᾶς μὲν τὰς Θράττας καὶ τὴν Ἀθερίνην αὐλητρίδα καὶ Σηπίαν τὴν Θύρσουν καὶ τοὺς Τριγλίας καὶ Εὔκλειδην τὸν ἄρξαντα καὶ Ἀναγυρουντόθεν τοὺς Κορακίωνας καὶ Κωβιοῦ τοῦ Σαλαμινίου τόκον καὶ Βάτραχον τὸν πάρεδρον τὸν ἐξ Ὄρεοῦ.

Here we have an indubitable pun on *θράττα* the fish and *Θράττας* the ladies of foreign extraction whose sons have an uncertain claim to Athenian citizenship. *Sepia*, the cuttle-fish, has the name of a courtesan. *Atherine* the flute-player is likewise a strange fish (see Athenaeus 7. 285 a; 329) — a woman of the same general description. Is there any reason why the *αὐλητρίς* or flute-girl should be mentioned immediately after the *Θράτται*? Are these ‘strange women’ not only fish but harpers as well? The entire passage is full of puns and allusions, not all of them explained, not all of them savory; further study of it may throw light on one or two references to *Θράττα* in Aristophanes — for example, *Acharnians* 271–5.

Finally, is it conceivable that in the joke upon Nicon the *κιθαρῳδός* the word *θράττει* contains a play upon the word *θράττα* the fish? Besides meaning a harper, *κιθαρῳδός* at times has the same, or approximately the same, signification as *κιθαρός* (= turbot). — But doubtless I should not seek too many reasons for disbelieving my earlier interpretation of the pleasantry.

THE CLIMAX¹

(*Rhetoric* 1.7.1365^a 16-19)

This, so to speak, is ‘a song of degrees’ — of more and less, of maxima and minima. Let us begin with an example or two. Touching with his gentle hand on the amenities of poets and critics, Swift, in an often misquoted passage, writes:

The vermin only tease and pinch
Their foes superior by an inch.
So, nat’ralists observe, a flea
Hath smaller fleas that on him prey;
And these have smaller fleas to bite ’em,
And so proceed *ad infinitum*.
Thus ev’ry poet, in his kind,
Is bit by him that comes behind.²

This gracious sentiment has been imitated in *A Budget of Paradoxes*, by Augustus De Morgan. While Swift only descends, De Morgan also ascends the ladder:

Great fleas have little fleas upon their backs to bite ’em,
And little fleas have lesser fleas, and so *ad infinitum*.
And the great fleas themselves, in turn, have greater fleas to
go on;
While these again have greater still, and greater still, and so on.³

But Swift caps the climax, and sets our minds at rest. The comic poet does this feat in his own way, sometimes by *climbing down* head foremost, with an unexpected

¹ From *The Sewanee Review* 32 (1924), 32-43; by permission.

² *On Poetry, A Rhapsody*, 1733, in Swift’s *Poems*, ed. by Williams, 2.651.

³ *A Budget*, etc., p. 377, as quoted by Bartlett, *Familiar Quotations*, p. 290.

plunge at the end. There is also an unspeakable depth or bathos that may be suggested and never attained; as there can be an endless ascent toward a true or false rhetorical glory. Or we may have ladder above ladder, staircase above staircase, from the infinitesimal to the infinite—and down again. Thus De Quincey pictures the telescoping visions of the Opium-Eater:

Many years ago, when I was looking over Piranesi's *Antiquities of Rome*, Mr. Coleridge, who was standing by, described to me a set of plates by that artist, called his *Dreams*, and which record the scenery of his own visions during the delirium of a fever—some of them (I describe only from memory of Mr. Coleridge's account) representing vast Gothic halls, on the floor of which stood all sorts of engines and machinery, wheels, cables, pulleys, levers, catapults, etc., etc., expressive of enormous power put forth, and resistance overcome. Creeping along the sides of the walls, you perceived a staircase; and upon it, groping his way upwards, was Piranesi himself. Follow the stairs a little further, and you perceive it come to a sudden abrupt termination, without any balustrade, and allowing no step onwards to him who had reached the extremity, except into the depths below. Whatever is to become of poor Piranesi, you suppose, at least, that his labors must in some way terminate here. But raise your eyes, and behold a second flight of stairs still higher; on which again Piranesi is perceived, but this time standing on the very brink of the abyss. Again elevate your eye, and a still more aerial flight of stairs is beheld; and again is poor Piranesi busy on his aspiring labors; and so on, until the unfinished stairs and Piranesi both are lost in the upper gloom of the hall.⁴

At all events we are spared the tragic plunge, which would mar the tone of our present remarks. I might entitle this paper 'The Comic Climax'—for that is the

⁴ *Confessions of an English Opium-Eater*, ed. by Garnett, pp. 133–4.

subject I have mainly tried to illustrate; or ‘The Comic Climax and Anticlimax’ — since it is well-nigh impossible to collect instances of one and not of the other of these closely allied opposites. The title might also include the word *staircases*, for reasons already noted or yet to appear. Further, our topic is connected with that of rhetorical amplification and accumulation, and with the processes of magnifying and minifying in general. I have therefore wished to mingle some graver illustrations with the gay, and not to neglect the topic of proportion and disproportion. Accordingly, since the examples are gathered from varied sources, and since the climax is a rhetorical device of a general nature, not limited to comedy, the reader will please not challenge the title. Be it noted, however, that Comedy and Rhetoric in their history have been closely allied. And observe, after soaring aloft we are down again on solid, dry, prosaic ground. Let us start afresh, with a definition from the Oxford English Dictionary:

Climax. . . . Properly [in Rhetoric:] A figure in which a number of propositions or ideas are set forth so as to form a series in which each rises above the preceding in force or effectiveness of expression; gradation.

The Greek word *climax*, which stands for the rhetorical figure, means ‘a ladder’; and we thereby indicate, not the topmost rung alone, but all the rungs, including the lowest. When the orator or poet reaches the top of his flight, he is said to ‘cap the climax.’ When we reverse the process, and run down the scale, the figure may be called a ‘declension.’ The last step up or down naturally is the most important, and is likely to be more elaborate than the others — as when Homer’s Chryseis trips down the gang-plank: ἐκ δὲ Χρυσῆς νηὸς βῆ ποντοπόρῳ.⁵

⁵ *Iliad* 1.439.

The last step is also the most perilous. Pride goeth before destruction, and the orator or poet when attempting a lofty ascent is always in danger of bombast or bathos. In fact, the chances are at least two to one that a climax will be comic, for the humor may be either intended or unintentional. If, in large measure, true art lies in the concealment of art, the serious poet must be sparing in the use of this figure, for in making a climax he cannot conceal what he is doing.

The Latin term for this figure is *gradatio*, ‘the making of a staircase.’ The literary process is associated with one that has been called ‘accumulation.’ Later I shall illustrate with the accumulation of woes that fell upon Job. At the moment, however, let us turn to the first and greatest extant treatise on Rhetoric, that of Aristotle. In connection with ‘accumulation’ and ‘climax’ he says that all men make use of the categories of ‘more’ and ‘less.’ He means that we are constantly magnifying and minifying things. In a debate you try to make your own arguments look large, and those of your opponent small. In a tragedy the hero seeks to minimize the flaw in character, or the misstep in conduct, that will yet bring about his downfall, and to magnify the power of fate or circumstance as the cause of his misfortune. That is the way of men in everyday life. We tend to magnify the relatively unimportant, and to minify the great. Comedy accentuates the process, and helps us to see things in their true proportions. Now the reversal is more easily effected through a series of steps than all at once. I am, of course, not quoting Aristotle, but merely adapting his thought for those who do not read him.

He does discuss the figure called ‘climax’; and it probably is significant that he illustrates the figure from the dramas of Epicharmus, the greatest comic poet before

Aristophanes. Indeed, there is a 'climax' of Epicharmus that seems to have caught Aristotle's fancy. He cites it, or alludes to it, not only in the *Rheticor*, but also in his treatise *On the Generation of Animals*, and twice in the *Metaphysics*.⁶

In Aristotle's view, the best climax, comic or otherwise, seems to be one in which the successive steps are related to one another in a sequence of cause and effect. The items are not merely arranged in an ascending (or descending) scale, but each term grows out of the preceding, so that the end has its origin in the beginning. Thus he says in the *Rheticor*:

Accumulation . . . and climax — as used by Epicharmus — [serve to magnify a subject], . . . since the accumulation of details makes any pre-eminence striking, . . . and what you are magnifying appears to be the origin and cause of many things.

His point is readily seen in a few lines from Mother Goose:

For want of a nail, the shoe was lost,
For want of the shoe, the horse was lost,
For want of the horse, the rider was lost,
For want of the rider, the battle was lost,
For want of the battle, the kingdom was lost,
And all from the want of a horseshoe nail!

In dealing with the generation of animals Aristotle says that 'we speak of one thing coming from another in many senses'; so lastly, as in the climax of Epicharmus, 'from slander comes railing, and from this, fighting.' Here, and

⁶ The passages are collected in my volume, *An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy*, pp. 153–4; here I merely give the references: *De Gen. Animal.* 1.18. 724 ^a 28–33; *Metaphys.* 5 (Δ).1.1013 ^a 9–10; 5 (Δ). 24.1023 ^a 30–1. On its technical side the present article may be regarded as supplementary to that volume, where I failed to adduce examples of the comic climax, not then realizing its wide distribution in literature.

again in the *Metaphysics*, his words remind us of a fragment still surviving from Epicharmus, which (omitting the possible distribution of the speeches) we may thus translate:

From sacrificing comes feasting, from feasting drinking, . . . from drinking mockery, from mockery riot, from riot indictment, from indictment a sentence, from a sentence fetters, the stocks, and a fine.

The fragment doubtless was part of a lively dialogue, for the comedies of Epicharmus were marked by swift interchange of dramatic utterance. The successive replies drawn by Socrates from a reluctant adversary, often ending in some one tremendous admission, show an influence on the Platonic Dialogues from the method of this elder comic poet. His device must have had a line of imitators in Greek comedy also, and hence must have been followed in Roman; but I wish to illustrate the point in Epicharmus and Aristotle rather from modern writers.

We may start with the last play of Molière. In *Le Malade Imaginaire*, the brother of the hypochondriac Argan has dismissed the attendant of Monsieur Purgon, who has Argan's case in hand. The enraged physician himself appears on the scene to avenge the insult. His threats, only in part intelligible to the terrified patient, may need some explanation for the reader: *bradypepsy* is a slow and imperfect digestion; *apepsy*, an absence of digestion; *lientery*, an incipient form of dysentery.

MONSIEUR PURGON. Since you are a declared rebel to the remedies I have prescribed for you, . . . let me inform you that I give you up to your evil constitution, to the inclemency of your bowels, the corruption of your blood, the acridity of your bile, and the feculence of your humors. . . . And I will that within four days your state shall be incurable.

ARGAN. Have pity!
 M.P. That you fall into bradypepsy.
 ARG. Monsieur Purgon!
 M.P. From bradypepsy into dyspepsia.
 ARG. Monsieur Purgon!
 M.P. From dyspepsia into apepsy.
 ARG. Monsieur Purgon!
 M.P. From apepsy into lientery.
 ARG. Monsieur Purgon!
 M.P. From lientery into dysentery.
 ARG. Monsieur Purgon!
 M.P. From dysentery into dropsy.
 ARG. Monsieur Purgon!
 M.P. And from dropsy into deprivation of life, whither
 your folly will have led you.⁷

This sort of climax — or ‘declension’ — probably is very old; the subject of medicine has always offered opportunities for comic effect. A good parallel before Molière is furnished by Shakespeare, whose Polonius discovered the origin and cause of Hamlet’s madness in a supposed rebuff by Ophelia:

And he, repulsèd — a short tale to make —
 Fell into a sadness, then into a fast,
 Thence to a watch, thence into a weakness,
 Thence to a lightness; and by this declension
 Into the madness wherein now he raves,
 And all we wail for.⁸

As for Molière, a student of the Spanish, Italian, and ancient drama, he used the device of accumulation and climax in one of his earliest plays, *La Jalousie de Barouillé*. Here, again, much of the amusement is provided by a doctor, garrulous and bombastic, who runs up the ladder and down again as follows:

⁷ *Le Malade Imaginaire* 3.6.

⁸ *Hamlet* 2.2.146–51.

DOCTOR [*tucking up his gown behind his buttocks*]. You take me, then, for a man that would do anything for money, for a man governed by pecuniary interest, a mercenary soul? Know, my friend, that if you were to give me a purse full of pistoles, if this purse were in a costly box, this box in a precious case, this case in a wondrous casket, this casket in a curious cabinet, this cabinet in a magnificent room, this room in an agreeable apartment, this apartment in a stately castle, this castle in a matchless citadel, this citadel in a famous town, this town in a fruitful island, this island in a wealthy province, this province in a flourishing kingdom, and this kingdom stretching throughout the world; and if you were to give me the world in which should be this flourishing kingdom, in which should be this wealthy province, in which should be this fruitful island, in which should be this famous town, in which should be this matchless citadel, in which should be this stately castle, in which should be this agreeable apartment, in which should be this curious cabinet, in which should be this wondrous casket, in which should be this precious case, in which should be this costly box, in which should be this purse full of pistoles; I should care as little about you and your money as about that.⁹

As a final instance from Molière we may cite the domestic brawl which opens *Le Médecin Malgré Lui*; it renders concrete the sequence Aristotle noted in Epicharmus: out of drinking comes railing, out of railing abuse, out of abuse fighting between man and wife, and out of wife-beating a penalty for Sganarelle which is the motive of the whole play. But let us take a few more illustrations from Shakespeare. Falstaff's account of the men who robbed him and his fellow thieves grows in a numerical ascension:

Two I am sure I have paid, two rogues in buckram suits.
... Four rogues in buckram let drive at me — [PRINCE:

⁹ *La Jalouse, etc.*, scene 2.

'What, four? Thou saidst but two even now.] . . . These four came all a-front, and mainly thrust at me. I made me no more ado, but took all their seven points in my target, thus.¹⁰

On the other hand, Touchstone, in his argument with Corin, caps a logical process:

Why, if thou never wast at Court, thou never sawest good manners; if thou never sawest good manners, then thy manners must be wicked; and wickedness is sin, and sin is damnation. Thou art in a parlous state, shepherd.¹¹

His method is that of many popular jests. A bee-hive is a bad potato: for, a bee-hive is a bee-holder, a beholder is a spectator, and a specked 'tater is a bad potato. Touchstone likewise employs the numerical climax:

TOUCHSTONE. . . . I have had four quarrels, and like to have fought one. . . . We met, and found the quarrel was upon the seventh cause.

JAQUES. . . . How did you find the quarrel on the seventh cause?

TOUCH. Upon a lie seven times removed, . . . as thus, sir. I did dislike the cut of a certain courtier's beard; he sent me word, if I said his beard was not cut well, he was in the mind it was; this is called the 'retort courteous.' If I sent him word again, it was not well cut, he would send me word, he cut it to please himself; this is called the 'quip modest.' If again, it was not well cut, he disabled my judgment; this is called the 'reply churlish.' If again, it was not well cut, he would answer, I spake not true; this is called the 'reproof valiant.' If again, it was not well cut, he would say, I lie; this is called the 'countercheck quarrelsome.' And so to the 'lie circumstantial,' and the 'lie direct.'

JAQUES. And how oft did you say his beard was not well cut?

¹⁰ *i Henry IV* 2.4.194-204.

¹¹ *As You Like It* 3.2.39-43.

TOUCH. I durst go no further than the ‘lie circumstantial,’ nor he durst not give me the ‘lie direct’; and so we measured swords and parted.¹²

As in comedy, the play of men, so in the play of children the climax is a resource against tedium. Is there one of my readers who never decorated his school-book thus? —

John Henry Smith
1 Main Street
Kalamazoo
Michigan
United States
Western Hemisphere
World
Universe

A boy will say to his friend: ‘See that hill over there?’ Friend: ‘Yes; the highest one, in the middle.’ Boy: ‘The hill with three trees on it.’ Friend: ‘Yes; one tree is higher than the others.’ Boy: ‘It has a big branch at the top.’ Friend: ‘Yes; on the end of the branch there is a bird.’ Boy: ‘The bird with the long tail.’ Friend: ‘Yes; the middle feather is the longest.’ Boy: ‘You mean the feather with a bug on it.’ Friend: ‘Yes; the bug with the flea on his back.’ And so *ad infinitum*.

The preceding example no doubt will recall a song that once was a favorite with American students, about the tree and the branch and the nest and the bird and the flea, and the green grass growing all around. This latter is one of many; for college boys are charmed when verse and notes build up a climax or staircase. In their song-books we observe *Excelsior* and *Upidee*; ‘ten little, nine little, eight little Injuns’; the diminishing forty-nine bottles, and the dwindling jolly sixpence; cumulative jingles telling of

¹² *As You Like It* 5.4.47-87.

Johnny Schmoker and the instruments he can play; and the animals marching by two's, by three's, and by four's into Noah's ark — *and so on*:

They rammed, jammed in twenty by twenty (*bis*). . . .
And they all slammed, crammed into the ark for to get out of
the rain.

That is the figure of accumulation.

Similarly in folk-tales, whether for children or for child-like primitive humanity, we have *The House that Jack Built*, *Jack and the Bean-stalk* (in which the ascent to fortune proceeds from a single bean), *Hans in Luck*, and Andersen's *What the Old Man Does is Always Right* (which in *The Ladies' Pageant*, by E. V. Lucas, is entitled *The Wife Perfect*). With the line of cause and effect we saw arising from the want of a horseshoe nail may be compared the sequence in *The Old Woman and Her Pig*. 'As soon as the cat had lapped up the milk,'

The cat began to kill the rat;
The rat began to gnaw the rope;
The rope began to hang the butcher;
The butcher began to kill the ox;
The ox began to drink the water;
The water began to quench the fire;
The fire began to burn the stick;
The stick began to beat the dog;
The dog began to bite the pig;
The little pig in a fright jumped over the stile;
And so the old woman got home that night.

When an efficient cause begins to work, the whole sequence is put in motion. Note that the sequence interlocks verbally, too. The word-echo between the end of one statement or member and the beginning of the next is

typical of the comic climax from Epicharmus down. *Ein Wort giebt das andere.*

A regular process, with a tendency to climactic order, belongs to the very essence of story-telling and literary composition. Tragedies naturally exhibit a climactic accumulation of woes, one following another in a sequence of cause and effect, or at all events in a probable order; each prepares us for the next, however swift and unexpected the *dénouement* may be. Even a chapter of accidents looks reasonable if the arrangement is climactic; witness the story of Job (1.13-21):

And there was a day when his sons and his daughters were eating and drinking wine in their eldest brother's house; and there came a messenger unto Job, and said: 'The oxen were ploughing, and the asses feeding beside them; and the Sabeans fell upon them, and took them away. Yea, they have slain the servants with the edge of the sword; and I only am escaped alone to tell thee.'

While he was yet speaking, there came also another, and said: 'The fire of God is fallen from heaven, and hath burned up the sheep, and the servants, and consumed them; and I only am escaped alone to tell thee.'

While he was yet speaking, there came also another, and said: 'The Chaldeans made out three bands, and fell upon the camels, and have carried them away, yea, and slain the servants with the edge of the sword; and I only am escaped alone to tell thee.'

While he was yet speaking, there came also another, and said: 'Thy sons and thy daughters were eating and drinking wine in their eldest brother's house; and, behold, there came a great wind from the wilderness, and smote the four corners of the house, and it fell upon the young men, and they are dead; and I only am escaped alone to tell thee.'

Then Job arose, and rent his mantle, and shaved his head, and fell down upon the ground, and worshipped, and said:

'Naked came I out of my mother's womb, and naked shall I return thither. The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away: blessed be the name of the Lord.'

But we are not here much concerned with real tragedy. The story of Job has been introduced in the main because it helps us on to other instances of accumulation and climax in which stories of ill luck are turned to comic effect. Many a climax ends in such fashion that we laugh with surprise at a disclosure ordinarily painful. The pain is eliminated by the steps through which the end is reached. So in the story noted by T. F. Crane as a variant of a mediaeval preacher's exemplum. It is called:

BAD NEWS

MR. G. Ha, Steward! How are you, my old boy? How do things go on at home?

STEWARD. Bad enough, your honor; the magpie's dead.

MR. G. Poor Mag! So he's gone. How came he to die?

STEWARD. Over-ate himself, sir.

MR. G. Did he? Indeed! A greedy dog! Why, what did he get that he liked so well?

STEWARD. Horse-flesh, sir; he died of eating horse-flesh.

MR. G. How came he to get so much horse-flesh?

STEWARD. All your father's horses, sir.

MR. G. What, are they dead, too?

STEWARD. Ay, sir; they died of overwork.

MR. G. And why were they overworked, pray?

STEWARD. To carry water, sir.

MR. G. To carry water! And what were they carrying water for?

STEWARD. Sure, sir, to put out the fire.

MR. G. Fire! What fire?

STEWARD. Oh! sir, your father's house is burned down to the ground.

MR. G. My father's house burnt down! And how came it on fire?

STEWARD. I think, sir, it must have been the torches.

MR. G. Torches! What torches?

STEWARD. At your mother's funeral.

MR. G. My mother dead!

STEWARD. Ah! poor lady, she never looked up after it.

MR. G. After what?

STEWARD. The loss of your father.

MR. G. My father gone, too?

STEWARD. Yes, poor gentleman, he took to his bed as soon as he heard of it.

MR. G. Heard of what?

STEWARD. The bad news, sir, an' please your honor.

MR. G. What! more miseries? More bad news?

STEWARD. Yes, sir. Your bank has failed, and your credit is lost; and you are not worth a shilling in the world. I made bold, sir, to come to wait on you about it, for I thought you would like to hear the news!¹³

This type of climax is related to one that advances with a seesaw motion, in which the mind of the reader is drawn up and down, and up again — or vice versa — somewhat as in De Quincey's account of Piranesi's staircase. There is a series of discoveries, each one of which, after conveying a bit of information, leaves us in a partial ignorance that delays the final revelation. But for fear of wearying the reader I must not myself put off the close and climax of this paper:

A friend of mine was married to a scold;
To me he came, and all his grievance told.
Says he: 'She's like a woman raving mad.'

¹³ From *The Common School Speaker*, by Noble Butler, Louisville, Kentucky, 1856, p. 57, as quoted by T. F. Crane in *The Exempla of Jacques de Vitry*, pp. 217-8. Crane refers to a story, *Ein Wort giebt das andere*, in Hebel's *Schatzkästlein des Rheinischen Hausfreundes*, 1811 (Peter Hebel's Werke, ed. by Behagel, Berlin, 1883, 2. 137).

'Alas!' said I, 'that's very bad.'

'No, not so bad,' said he, 'for with her, true,
I had both lands and houses — hard cash, too.'

Said I: 'My friend, then that was well for thee.'

'T was not so well,' said he;

'For I and her own brother
Agreed to go to law with one another.
We did so; I was cast; the suit was lost;
And every single penny went to pay the cost.'

'That was bad,' said I.

'Well, not so bad,' said he;

'For we agreed that he the lands should keep,
And give to me four score of Yorkshire sheep;
Fair, fat, and fine they were to be.'

'Well, surely that,' said I, 'was well for thee.'

'T was not so well; for when the sheep I got,
They every single one died of the rot.'

'That was bad,' said I.

'Well, not so bad,' said he;

'Into an oaken vat
I thought to scrape the fat,
And melt it for the winter store.'

'Well, surely, that,' said I, 'was better than before.'

'T was not so well; for, having got a clumsy fellow
To scrape the fat, and melt it into tallow,
Into the seething mass the fire catches,
And, like brimstone matches,
Burns the place to ashes.'

'That was bad,' said I.

'Well, not so bad,' said he;

'For harkee what was best:
My scolding wife was burnt among the rest.'¹⁴

We must not end, however, with the note of comic cynicism. Rather, I shall finish off this accumulation with a sample from wholesome romantic comedy, capping the

¹⁴ From *Notes and Queries*, 12 S., No. 1, p. 136.

climax with a slight discovery touching Shakespeare. Will the reader kindly swing back to Polonius and Touchstone? That the dramatist was acquainted with rhetorical terms for the figure of *gradatio* — the staircase or figure of degrees, or, as his contemporary Puttenham names it, ‘the marching figure’ — we learn not only from the ‘declension’ noted by Polonius. Jaques specifically inquires of Touchstone: ‘Can you nominate in order now the degrees of the lie?’ Touchstone replies: ‘I will name you the degrees,’ and repeats his climbing list of seven items.¹⁵ But the poet’s diction is even more suggestive of technical knowledge in Rosalind’s account of the love-making between Oliver and Aliena:

There was never anything so sudden but the fight of two rams, and Caesar’s thrasonical brag of ‘I came, saw, and overcame’: for your brother and my sister no sooner met but they looked; no sooner looked but they loved; no sooner loved but they sighed; no sooner sighed but they asked one another the reason; no sooner knew the reason but they sought the remedy; and in these degrees have they made a pair of stairs to marriage which they will climb incontinent.¹⁶

¹⁵ *As You Like It* 5.4.88–97. .

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 5.2.30–8.

HAEMON AND JOCASTA ADVISING¹

(*Rhetoric* 3.16.1417^b 16–20)

The passage I here discuss occurs in Aristotle's treatment of Narration (*διήγησις*), and of the way in which Narration may be used by a speaker who is giving advice. Since advice concerns the future, there will be less room for Narration in this kind of speaking than in either of the other two kinds (epideictic and forensic); still, you may need to mention things that have already occurred, so that the persons you are advising may take better counsel for the future. In so doing, you possibly will relate something that you think your hearer may not believe; and in that case you must proceed as follows — I quote the text of Roemer, which (save for a comma, instead of a period, after *νιόν*) is that of Bekker in the Berlin Aristotle, 1831:

ἀν δ' ἢ ἄπιστον, ὑπισχνεῖσθαι τε καὶ αἰτίαν λέγεν εἰθύς, καὶ διατάττειν οἷς βούλονται, οἷον ἡ Ἰοκάστη ἡ Καρκίνου ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι ἀεὶ ὑπισχνεῖται πυνθανομένου τοῦ ζητοῦντος τὸν νιόν, καὶ ὁ Αἴμων ὁ Σοφοκλέους.

My own translation will be given later; here we shall use that of Roberts (in *The Works of Aristotle*, translated into English under the editorship of W. D. Ross, Vol. II, Oxford, 1924), who thus renders the passage:

If any statement you make is hard to believe, you must guarantee its truth, and at once offer an explanation, and then furnish it with such particulars as will be expected. Thus Carcinus' Jocasta, in his *Oedipus*, keeps guaranteeing the truth

¹ From *The American Journal of Philology* 50 (1929).170–80; by permission.

of her answers to the inquiries of the man who is seeking her son; and so with Haemon in Sophocles.

In a note referring to the words ‘and then furnish it with such particulars as will be expected,’ and to ‘the Scholia (Rabe, p. 248),’ Roberts gives an alternative translation: ‘Or possibly, “and then arrange your reasons systematically for those who demand them.”’

This passage has troubled commentators and translators; in general they wish some change in the words διατάττειν οἷς βούλονται. There has been trouble, too, over the reference to Haemon in the *Antigone* of Sophocles; Cope, for example, gave it up as hopeless. Thirdly, no sound attempt has been made to explain the reference to the *Oedipus* of Carcinus. I shall take these three points up in this order, after prefacing my treatment of them with the notes of Freese, whose edition of the *Rhetoric* in the Loeb Classical Library, 1926, conveniently assembles a number of opinions to which we must refer.²

Freese writes:

The difficulty is διατάττειν, which can apparently only mean ‘arrange.’ Jebb retains τε, and reads ως for οἷς: ‘The speaker must make himself responsible for the fact, . . . and marshal his reasons in a way acceptable to the hearers.’ The old Latin translation *vadiare quibus volunt* suggested to Roemer διαιτηταῖς, ‘to the arbitrators they approve.’

The last remark really is extracted by Freese from the editorial note of Sandys (in Jebb’s translation of the *Rhetoric*, posthumously published, 1909, p. 190): ‘which [i.e., the Latin] suggests διαιτᾶσθαι or διαιτητᾶς (as observed

² I neglect his omission (following Cope) of τε after ὑποχρεῖσθαι, an unwarranted change, and arbitrary save on the gratuitous assumption that the paraphrast (as above, Rabe, p. 248) had better manuscript evidence than ours, and used it.

and hence the conjecture *ώς* (= *διατάττειν* *ώς* *βούλονται*), by Jebb, seems plausible. We might, indeed, accept *ώς* off-hand but for the anonymous paraphrast of the *Rhetoric* (ed. Rabe, Berlin, 1896, p. 248), who has read *οἷς* *βούλονται* in the manuscript he used as a basis for his commentary:

ἐὰν δὲ ἢ ἀπίστον τὸ διηγούμενον, δεῖ ὑπισχνεῖσθαι εἰπεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν δι’ ἣν ἀπίστον δοκεῖ, καὶ διατάττειν καὶ διακοσμεῖν τὸ διηγούμενον ἐκεῖνο οἷς βούλονται οἱ ἀκροαταὶ, ἵνα ἐκ τοῦ λέγειν ὅσα βούλονται οἱ ἀκροαταὶ ἀληθῆς δοκῆς καὶ ἀποδεχόμενος τοῖς ἀκροαταῖς· λέγεις γὰρ τὰ θυμήρη αὐτοῖς.

The paraphrase of the references to Carcinus and Sophocles will be given later. In the part now given, the anonymous writer has justified *οἷς* by inserting *διακοσμεῖν* as a gloss for *διατάττειν*. And he immediately glosses *οἷς βούλονται* by *ὅσα βούλονται* (etc.):

If what you relate (in your speech of advice) is not likely to be credited (by the persons you are advising), you must promise to tell the reason why the thing seems incredible, and arrange and embellish the thing you relate with details the hearers wish, so that, by saying what (all that) the hearers wish, you may seem true and acceptable to the hearers; for what you say is pleasing to their hearts.

It strikes me that, if we had to alter *οἷς*, we might well take a hint from the paraphrast, and read *ὅσα*; and I might recommend *ὅσα* but for the suggestion of my friend Mr. W. F. McDonald, who instead of *οἷς* would like to read *οἴα*. As I am only considering possibilities, let me say that in *διατάττειν οἴα βούλονται* we have the change that does least violence of all to the traditional text. Either *οἴα* or *ὅσα* makes good syntax; *οἴα* perhaps squares better with the speech of Haemon. Be it added, however, that the paraphrast thinks that 'Haemon is a drama,' in spite of

his other references to *Antigone* (see Rabe, *op. cit.*, Index Nominum, *s. vv.* Αἴμων, Ἀντιγόνη, Κρέων), has confused the issue about the play of Carcinus, and has led us astray with his injunction, ‘You must promise to tell why the thing seems incredible.’ Here as in similar cases, according to Aristotle, the reason is to be given *instanter*.

As for διατάττειν, we must explain it by Haemon’s speech of advice to his father. Whatever Haemon says in addition to vouching for the truth of his story, and showing why the statement his father may not believe is, nevertheless, true, that additional process in his speech is διατάττειν [?οῖα (or ὅσα) Κρέων βούλεται]. And so we come to our second point, a speech in the *Antigone* of Sophocles. Let us not forget that the speech must be one of advice or counsel, an illustration of the deliberative branch of Rhetoric; that it must contain something in the way of narration; and that the alleged fact may concern the very recent past, just as the advice may concern the immediate future. We should recall, too, what Aristotle more than once recommends in the *Rhetoric*, that you make a narration dramatic by bringing the past before our eyes, representing it as if it were now occurring, and using the actual words of the persons about whom your story is told. That is precisely what Haemon does.

Cope, as we have seen, gave up the example as hopeless. He says (*Introduction to Aristotle’s Rhetoric*, 1867, p. 354):

Αἴμων . . . must, I think, be corrupt. Haemon in the *Antigone* appears in only one short scene, 635–765. The βῆστις which must be referred to, if the reading is sound, is v. 683–723, in which Haemon endeavors to persuade his father Creon to give way, and remit his sentence of death against Antigone.

There is nothing that can be called *διήγησις*, ‘narrative,’ at all; nor, as far as I can see, any ‘explanation of a paradox or obscurity,’ in the sense intended by Aristotle.

But Aristotle does not here talk of a general ‘paradox,’ or of something obscure to the reader. The speaker is Haemon, and it is his father who is *ἀπιστος*, and must be persuaded. It may help if we are a little more exact than is Cope. Actually, Haemon first appears in line 626, where the Chorus mark his coming; they assume that he is well-informed, and indeed he has heard more than he at first divulges. They continue their utterance through line 630. Then Creon speaks four lines, of which the last two are two questions. Then Haemon makes his first speech, of four lines, not a speech of advice, and containing no narration. Then Creon makes a speech of forty-two lines (639–80); this *is* a speech of advice, but, being Creon’s advice to Haemon, is not the one we are seeking. After this there are two lines from the Chorus — and then Haemon gives a speech of advice to Creon, in forty-one lines, ‘v. 683–723,’ as Cope says. Then the Chorus utter two lines, Creon utters two, and thereafter Haemon makes sixteen short speeches in altercation with his father, the first of two lines, fourteen of one line each, and the last of four lines (762–5), his exit being marked by the Chorus in lines 766–7. Any one of Haemon’s utterances is a ‘speech’ in Aristotle’s sense. But there can be no doubt that Cope was right in settling on the speech of forty-one lines (683–723) as containing Aristotle’s illustration; this illustration, however, seems to end with line 704. Yet, despite the fact that Haemon’s opening speech of four lines (635–8) is one of defence, not of deliberation or counsel, Jebb and others involve it in the illustration; even Roberts does so, if I rightly understand him, though he also cites lines 701–4 in Hae-

mon's speech of advice. But I take it that Roberts has connected the two speeches in order to show that in lines 701-4 of the second Haemon 'keeps guaranteeing the truth of' his 'answer' to Creon in the first (635-8). Roberts, then, apparently shares the view that the statement made by Haemon which his father is not prepared to believe is that Haemon will be dutiful, and acquiesce in Creon's condemnation of Antigone.

Is it precisely so? When Haemon enters, the Chorus are perhaps not very doubtful, though they use their characteristic mode of inquiry:⁸ 'Comes he grieving for the doom of his promised bride, Antigone, and bitter for the baffled hope of his marriage?' 'We shall know soon,' answers Creon: 'My son, . . . art thou come in rage against thy father? Or have I thy good will, act how I may?' It must be understood that father and son thus far have loved each other, and that Creon's second question is not idle. It shows that he is half-prepared to believe that the son will continue dutiful. Creon, a supremely confident tragic hero, is in fact unprepared to believe that any one will doubt his justice and wisdom. Of course he is relieved by Haemon's answer: 'Father, I am thine; and thou, in thy wisdom, tracest for me rules which I shall follow. No marriage shall be deemed by me a greater gain than thy good guidance.' But Creon's long speech immediately shows that to him Haemon's answer was not incredible. He was hoping for that answer, and himself dilates on the reasons why it is good. It is the father himself who vouches for its propriety. In other words, Haemon's statement is not *ἀπιστον* to Creon, nor is Haemon required to vouch for it. We must look in Haemon's speech of advice for the thing that Creon is not prepared to believe.

⁸ Here and hereafter I use Jebb's translation of Sophocles.

Thus approached, the matter becomes simple. The thing that will strike Creon as incredible, the thing that will be *ἀπιστον* to him, is that people have been upbraiding this model of wisdom and justice—I was going to finish the sentence with ‘behind his back,’ but that is the reason (*αιτίαν*) why he will not be prepared to believe it. Haemon rightly thinks that his father is unprepared for the story. So he vouches for it, and promptly gives the reason why it is credible, so promptly indeed that the reason and the incredible thing are given together: ‘It is my natural office to watch, on thy behalf, all that men say, or do, or find to blame. For the dread of thy frown forbids the citizen to speak such words as would offend thine ear; *but I can hear these murmurs in the dark*, these moanings of the city for this maiden; “no woman,” they say, “ever merited her doom less.”’ And he goes on to narrate the talk he has heard. The story is put in the present for vividness, but obviously is the piece of ‘narrative’ (*διήγησις*) for which Cope, and apparently every one else, looked in vain. Having vouched, and given the reason, and told his story, Haemon vouches again (line 700), repeating the ‘reason’: ‘Such is the darkling rumor that spreads in secret.’

And then, if he has not already begun the process, the next step is *διατάττειν οἷα Κρέων βούλεται*: ‘For me, my father, no treasure is so precious as thy welfare. What, indeed, is a nobler ornament for children than a prospering sire’s fair fame, or for sire than son’s?’ Here, it seems, with line 704, the process ends, for the rest of the speech is counsel, not narration; but perhaps it started the moment Haemon began to tell the incredible thing, or at all events when he began to put what his father would *not* like to hear into the mouth of a third person, ‘the city.’ Aristotle in the very next chapter (17.1418^b 31-3) cites

this speech of Haemon to illustrate the way in which you can render unacceptable words more acceptable, by quoting them from another, and thus shifting the responsibility from yourself. This rhetorical device, then, may be a part of the process διατάττειν οὐα [or ὡς] βούλονται.

As for renderings like that of Freese, ‘You should immediately promise both to give a reason for it at once and to submit it to the judgment of any whom the hearers approve,’ obviously no such thing is done by Haemon. This luckless interpretation goes back beyond Roemer and the ‘διαιτᾶσθαι vel διαιτητᾶς’ which he inferred from the thirteenth-century Latin translation (*vadiare quibus volunt*) by William of Morbecka. ‘Promise to give a reason’ is an inheritance, through a line of commentators and editors, from the twelfth-century Greek paraphrast, who for ὑπισχνεῖσθαι τε καὶ αἰτίαν λέγειν εὐθύς offers the gloss ὑπισχνεῖσθαι εἰπεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν. But the reference to Haemon, as we have seen, means nothing to the paraphrast; he got nothing from his sources (in the Scholiasts) on that. For us, however, the interpretation of the passage in the *Rhetoric* may well begin with the speech of Haemon, and from this and the text of Aristotle go on to the speech of Jocasta.

Thus we come to our third point, which concerns a speech of advice (or perhaps more than one) in the *Oedipus* of Carcinus. Is the paraphrast more helpful on this? Let us see. The information he gives does not come from the antiquity that knew the play. Our sole reference of any sort to the play from that antiquity is the passage from Aristotle. The paraphrast writes:

ὁ Καρκίνος τραγικὸς ποιητής. ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι ἤτοι τῷ δράματι τις ἔχει τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπυνθάνετο καὶ ἡρώτα περὶ αὐτοῦ τὴν Ἰοκάστην, ἡ δὲ ὑπισχνεῖτο ἀεὶ εἰπεῖν. καὶ ὁ Αἴμων δρᾶμά ἔστι· καὶ ὑπισχνεῖται οὗτος ἀεὶ εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὸν ἐρωτῶντα.

Carcinus, tragic poet. In the *Oedipus*, that is, in the drama, some one was seeking his son, and was inquiring and asking about him of Jocasta; and she kept promising to tell (the reason why her story was credible). And Haemon is a drama; and he keeps promising to tell (the reason) to the person who is asking.

Need we assume that this travesty of the known situation in our speech of advice from Haemon is worse than the interpretation of some speech of advice in the lost *Oedipus* of the younger Carcinus? And yet as a travesty of Carcinus it may not be worse than some modern translations of the passage from Aristotle. Thus Welldon: 'as the Jocasta of Carcinus in his *Oedipus* perpetually promises in answer to the man who is looking for her son.' And thus Freese: 'as, for instance, Jocasta in the *Oedipus* of Carcinus is always promising, when the man who is looking for her son makes inquiries of her.' In these cases, 'promising' always implies 'to give a reason later.' Also the *τις ἔχεται* seems to have left a trail of bad influence in the Renaissance, and down to our own time.

What can we infer about the play from Aristotle? First, that it contained a speech of counsel from Jocasta; she is advising a man to do something, or, perhaps more probably (as Haemon advises Creon), to refrain from doing something. The modern translators do not seem to have kept this first requisite clearly in mind. Nor am I convinced that they all are clear about the second, namely, that Jocasta, in advising this man, used narration; she made a statement that concerned the past. Thirdly, either the statement was one which she thought her hearer might not believe, or else, and more probably, the hearer showed that he did not believe it. Fourthly, she kept vouching for the truth of her statement; and we may assume that she promptly gave the reason why the story which might

not or did not strike the man she was advising as true nevertheless *was* true, and that she tried further to win him by saying things she thought he would like to hear, with which she hoped to secure his belief. Aristotle's first and more explicit example surely would illustrate all the successive steps in the process, or all three parts of it if they were not strictly successive but interlaced; and in his very condensed style 'Ιοκάστη . . . ὑπισχνεῖται would stand for the other two parts of the process as well; such is his custom, he seems hurried in this chapter, and he is particularly hurried when dealing with narration in deliberative speeches, where it has least room. Fifthly, the tale Jocasta told concerned her son, and she related it to an inquisitive man who wanted to find out something about that son; we shall later discuss the possible meanings of *ξηροῦντος*. All that she said, let us again observe — her story, her vouchings for it, her explanation why it is true, her efforts to secure the trust and good will of her hearer — all this was designed to persuade him to a course of action, to get him to do something else than the thing he seems bent on doing (*ξηρεῖν*); that is the function of deliberative speaking.

I pass to conjecture, but to a conjecture that looks very certain to me, and one that is borne out by all my preceding points. Who was this inquisitive man? Aristotle says of Jocasta: *ἀεὶ ὑπισχνεῖται*. How often did she have to vouch for the truth of her story? Haemon directly vouches for his story twice. The Jocasta of Carcinus apparently had to do so oftener than that. And the paraphrast, having a sense for the implication of Greek words, says of the man who is *ἄπιστος*, and whose curiosity is so hard to still: *ἐπινθάνετο καὶ ἡρώτα περὶ αὐτοῦ τὴν Ιοκάστην*. When Aristotle is in the rest of the passage so compact and curt, there should be a reason for his little pile

of words πυνθανομένου τοῦ ζητοῦντος τὸν γιὸν. Further, *ζητοῦντος* does not necessarily mean ‘the man who is seeking her son’ (Jebb, and Roberts), or ‘the man who is looking for her son’ (Welldon, and Freese); quite apart from any contingent probability it may just as well mean, ‘who is trying to find out about her son,’ investigating the question what became of her son, a far more likely situation in a plot concerning Oedipus. This man would hardly be her first husband, Laius, asking Jocasta, ‘What have you done with our infant?’ If that were the situation, the play would not be called *Oedipus*.

We do not, indeed, know why Aristotle specifies the play by its title. When referring to Haemon he does not in the *Rhetoric* specify the *Antigone* by title; in *Poetics* 14. 1454^a 1 he does so specify; in *Poetics* 17. 1455^a 27 he makes Carcinus’ ‘Amphiaraus’ the subject of a sentence, and scholars have taken *Amphiaraus* as the title of the play there in question (see, for example, Nauck, *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, 1889, p. 797). In such cases, specification by title may be a matter of chance, but in the case of the *Oedipus*, when the style of the context is so condensed, there probably is a reason for the use of the word. The reason may be, as in other citations by Aristotle, that the name helps out the sense of what follows, and not merely that, with the addition of its author’s name, it distinguished the play from those by other dramatists on the same subject, or from some other play by Carcinus. This poet is said to have written 160 plays, of which we know perhaps nine by title; the *Oedipus* is the only one we know of on its part of the Theban Cycle. But even if Carcinus had written a play involving Jocasta’s sons by Oedipus, the tradition hardly admits of a situation in which a man would be asking her, ‘What has become of Eteocles?’ or

'What has become of Polyneices?' Nor again is it very likely, in the tale of Oedipus, that a messenger from Corinth would persist in asking Jocasta, 'What has become of the infant?' or that she would be counseling the messenger. Nor yet again, so far as we know the legend of Oedipus from Sophocles, would the old herdsman who was to expose or kill the infant on the mountain ask Jocasta such a question.

It seems to me that everything points to a situation, like that in the *Oedipus Rex* of Sophocles, in which the hero, now married to his own mother, has got an inkling of the true state of affairs, and has learned of the son Jocasta had by Laius. As in Sophocles' play, he is feverishly pursuing his inquiries, and trying to find out, not necessarily from Jocasta alone, but perhaps mainly from her, what became of the infant. She tells him some such tale as the Jocasta of Sophocles' play tells the hero, and counsels him *to desist from the search*. In her narration there is something she thinks he will not believe, or that he obviously does not believe. (In *Oedipus Rex* 1175 the hero is not prepared to believe that Jocasta had been so cruel as to give the child to the herdsman to be killed.) She vouches for the fact, and offers a reason why it is not incredible — say, because the oracle had foretold that the child would slay his father; and then she adds things that Oedipus would be pleased to hear — say, that since the child is dead, and could not have slain his father, the oracle Oedipus has heard, that he must wed his mother, is also unlikely to be true. As Sophocles wrote no long speech of advice from Jocasta to Oedipus, Carcinus may have grasped the opportunity to do so. We may imagine from Sophocles that it would be loving advice, summed up in words of wifely devotion.

There is, however, a relatively short speech by Sopho-

cles' Jocasta that will exemplify the doctrine of Aristotle; but the story concerns the death of Laius (*Oedipus Rex* 848–58):

Nay, be assured that thus, at least, the tale was first told; he [the herdsman] cannot revoke that, for the city heard it, not I alone. But even if he should diverge somewhat from his former story, never, king, can he show that the murder of Laius, at least, is truly square to prophecy; of whom Loxias plainly said that he must die by the hand of my child. Howbeit that poor innocent never slew him, but perished first itself. So henceforth, for what touches divination, I would not look to my right hand or my left.

Oedipus answers: 'Thou judgest well. But nevertheless send some one to fetch the peasant, and neglect not this matter.' We may allow that sending for the herdsman does look something like 'submitting it to the judgment of any whom the hearers approve,' and Jocasta promises to do so. But that happens to be what Oedipus wishes, and what she, the adviser, also wishes; and she closes the episode by saying such things, or as much, as he would wish:

I will send without delay. But let us come into the house: nothing will I do save at thy good pleasure.

Let me now append from my own subsequent translation the close of *Rhetoric* 3.16. Chapter 16 deals with Narration in all three types of speaking, the close with Narration in Deliberative speaking:

In Deliberative speaking there is least room for Narration, since no one can 'narrate' what is yet to be. Here, if there is Narration at all, it must be of the past, and its object to remind your audience of what happened in the past, with a view to

better plans for the future. It may be used in condemning people, or in approving them; but whenever you do that, you are dropping the function of adviser. If, in advising, you tell something your hearer does not believe, you must vouch for its truth, at once explain why it is credible, and array such statements as may win him. Thus in the *Oedipus* of Carcinus, when [Oedipus] is trying to learn what became of her son, Jocasta at each inquiry avouches the truth of her story. [? She gives a reason why it is true, and counsels Oedipus to desist from the search.] The Haemon of Sophocles does the like. [In *Antigone* 683 ff. Haemon makes a speech of advice (= deliberative oratory) to his father, Creon. He says (= Narration) there have been murmurs among the people against Creon's condemnation of Antigone; since this statement will appear unlikely to Creon, Haemon vouches for the truth of it, and explains: people are afraid openly to object, but he himself has had private opportunity to hear the murmurs. He then vouches again, and proceeds to marshal reasons that should appeal to Creon (*Antigone* 700-23): 'Such is the darkling rumor that spreads in secret. For me, my father, no treasure is so precious as thy welfare. What, indeed, is a nobler ornament for children than that a father's good name should flourish? . . .']⁴

⁴ *The Rhetoric of Aristotle; an Expanded Translation, with Supplementary Examples for Students of Composition and Public Speaking* (New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1932), p. 232.

THE *RHETORIC* OF ARISTOTLE, AND ITS RELATION TO THE *POETICS*¹

It is a pleasure to be here, to see so many friends, and others who, let us hope, will be friendly when this address is over. According to ancient rule, no doubt, and surely according to modern democratic example, a speaker can afford to be more personal in his remarks when he is invited to speak to an audience because it will contain more than a sprinkling of his former pupils and some well-nigh lifelong friends. And I am going to talk about a lifelong friend of mine who is a friend of yours well-known to most of you, a friend to all of us whether we all realize it, or some do not. This friend of all writers and speakers, and all teachers of speech and writing, is Aristotle, author of an *Art of Poetry* and a *Rhetoric* which have had a great influence throughout the ages; so much influence, in fact, that every student of discourse is sure to be a debtor to these treatises of Aristotle whether the student is aware of it, or never has read either of the works. No one can be a reader of books, and not read some one who has profited by reading Aristotle. Accordingly, his influence is pervasive.

Again, no one is likely to advance beyond the point which Aristotle reached in studying the arts of poetry and eloquence unless he has gone with Aristotle as far as the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* will take him. Plato and other members of the Academy went far in this study, and the eclectic

¹ From *The Quarterly Journal of Speech* 21 (1935).10-19; by permission; an address delivered at the Eastern Public Speaking Conference in Atlantic City, April 6, 1934.

Aristotle knew how to utilize what his fellows gave him, and how to advance beyond it. Of course, we may as well admit at once, and once for all, that there are spiritual realms where Aristotle is not comfortably at home; where Plato, for example, is more at home; and yet higher realms, since the birth of Christianity, where pagans generally are not at home and comfortable. And one may say, of course, that Aristotle's theory does not fully explain the pagan art of Aeschylus or Sophocles, or the eloquence of Plato. That is true. No theory of art ever fully accounted for any work that is but partly the result of art, and partly results from inspiration. But Aristotle on the arts of poetry and eloquence comes nearer to explaining ancient tragedy and Attic eloquence than to accounting for the Bible, the Greek and Latin hymns of the Church, and the *Commedia* of Dante.

Even with respect to these, however, to Dante for example, nobody is likely to go far in studying eloquence and structure if he is unwilling to see how far the ancient Greek will carry us. And Dante knew that. If I am not mistaken, the most important commentary on *Inferno*, *Purgatorio*, and *Paradiso* that is now in preparation is the one Professor Wilbur Samuel Howell of Princeton has in hand. This commentary is a systematic research into Dante's theory of eloquence and his practice of the Aristotelian rhetoric. Howell's unpublished work² has helped me more, and helped my students more, than any other recent thing on Dante. And it shows that Dante used the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle, consciously, with great effect; in a capital instance it shows that no other inquiries into the nature of composition are so practically useful when you directly apply them to a literary masterpiece. At all events, that is our considered judgment with respect to

² Typewritten doctoral dissertation in Cornell University Library.

Dante's masterpiece. For Dante, Aristotle is in Limbo, without suffering, but without hope; but even in the *Paradiso*, which incidentally is much indebted to Aristotle's treatise *On the Heavens*, even in a realm of Christian poetry where the spirit of Aristotle would not find itself at home, in comfort, and where modern pagans find themselves, to say the least, uneasy, there the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle is the surest guide to Dante's method and aim in constructing the speeches of the persons he represents.

And so we must go on saying, until some one else believes us, that while Aristotle did not give the final utterance on poetic art and spoken prose, and no one ever will succeed in giving it, nevertheless the individual student is not likely to come nearer to it than Aristotle did unless he patiently goes with Aristotle as far as Aristotle will guide him. If the student goes as far as that, he will have nothing to unlearn, and will have a head full of real knowledge about literary art. One fine quality in Aristotle is his excellent perspective, so that those who go to school to him become less likely to mistake the trivial for the important. Another is his wonderful fertility in germinal thoughts. The number of interesting remarks on human nature in the *Rhetoric* is amazing. Take the one, for instance, on the reason why the ordinary person in his ordinary mood—I am not quoting—is not afraid of death. Or turn to his *Poetics*. Ross, editor of the great Oxford translation of Aristotle's works, has not in his time been mainly interested in the side of Aristotle's thought to which the *Poetics* belongs, and hence may count for an impartial witness; and it is Ross who thinks that it contains 'a greater number of pregnant ideas on art than any other book.'³

It is easy to see that my friends and I are enthusiastic

³ W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*, p. 290.

about Aristotle, though not enthusiastic without measure or reason. Some of them probably used to think me highly enthusiastic about the *Poetics* at a time when I knew far too little about the *Rhetoric* to understand the *Poetics* as fully as one ought. And some may now consider me lukewarm about the *Rhetoric* since I have more recently turned to Plato, and have translated his dialogue *Phaedrus*; I have been trying to do for it and other things of Plato what was done for Aristotle in the version of the *Rhetoric* which Messrs. Appleton were good enough to publish. But, in the history of my friends and me, the work on Plato is all one with that on Aristotle, save for this, a point which may be brought out in a species of confession. The point is mentioned, not because the story is of something that happened to one person, but because many persons must have had the like experience. Further, I may dwell upon the following bit of personal history because it should promote my special aim at this time. That aim is to make those who have read the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle read it more, along with the *Phaedrus* of Plato, and to make those who are not yet friendly with it as friendly as may be.

The bit of personal experience is this. When I somewhat unexpectedly took up the teaching of English, as they call it, over thirty years ago, I found experimentally that young people could be thoroughly interested in the better novels like Scott's *Bride of Lammermoor*, or George Eliot's *Romola*, or Hawthorne's shorter stories of New England, along with Homer's *Odyssey*, if the teacher helped himself and his pupils with concepts that may be discovered in the works of Aristotle, but at the time I did not know enough about the *Rhetoric*. I found that our Freshmen could examine any first-rate specimen of imaginative fiction to advantage when you introduced those

Freshmen to the principles of imaginative structure that one may read in Aristotle's work on poetry, if you didn't lay undue stress on the source from which the principles were drawn. There are still some people, since the time of Bruno and Francis Bacon, who cannot unite what may be gained from Plato and Aristotle in conjunction, and do not like the name of Aristotle; and traditional scholarly prejudices somehow find their way into the undergraduate mind. At all events, you could dodge the prejudice by letting the ideas of Aristotle pass for any one's ideas, even your own. Being principles, not rules, they worked quite well irrespective of their source. When tested by examples they seemed to have validity, made the Freshmen think the instructor more original than he was, and, what is very important, gave the pupil faith in his teacher, and *vice versa*.

The source, however, could not long be hid. Very soon, and very often, the truth about the source came out, and a strange matter began to be talked of. There was a teacher, and there were students, before long actually graduate students, who believed that Aristotle's *Art of Poetry* was something more than a mere historical document to be looked at with a cooler eye than an entomologist turns upon a bug. The honest entomologist, I fancy, does not think himself superior to the bug or other work of nature he is studying. But you know there are a good many persons who think themselves superior to Aristotle, and if they are right it is a hopeful sign in our times, for long and careful study has convinced me that Aristotle, while altogether human, and not incapable of mistakes, was a very intelligent person, with the uncanny habit of being right at least nine times out of ten. He is above all right where the study of human relations is concerned, for this is a study in which the Greeks from Homer down to

Aristotle and Menander excelled the department of noble name at Yale. Because Aristotle is, so to speak, invariably right in studying human relations, the loving scholarship which the Italian and French Renaissance lavished upon his *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* was just, while the envy of Giordano Bruno and of Francis Bacon provides the model which our enlightened day must undertake not to follow. Read Bacon's envious notes on the *Rhetoric*, and blush at his ingratitude when he was so heavily indebted to this work, the ingratitude of Bacon, that head without a heart.

But let us be more precise in our confession. My error with regard to the *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric* lay where any one can guard against it, once it is pointed out. The error lay in sometimes paying more attention to a commentary than I paid to the work on which the comments have been written. Let us keep calling it an error rather than a fault. Students of a modern literature who feel the need of learning about Greek ideas and the background of culture that endures, which is Biblical as well as Hellenic, necessarily go to the books on ancient history and literature that pass for reputable scholarly helps. Such a reputable book is the one I am about to mention, and I have no doubt that with respect to it the views of some have undergone the change that mine have undergone, while perhaps some continue to think as well of it as I once did. It is the well-known work called *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, by the late Samuel Henry Butcher. For many years it has held the field as, for our time, the standard commentary on the *Poetics* of Aristotle to be had in English. Even among classical scholars outside the circle of those who specialize in the study of Aristotle, the far superior work of Bywater has not made the right headway against Butcher. Let us add that the volume of Butcher still remains a stimulating work. For myself, I still refer my

classes to it, but every year now with increasing caution. What is wrong with it? Well, for example, Butcher has an essay, his Chapter 8, entitled *The Ideal Tragic Hero*, supposedly interpreting what Aristotle says of tragic character, and full of lively reference to Shakespeare, Schiller, and Corneille, to ancient and modern tragedy in general. But the word 'hero,' the Greek word *ἥρως*, does not occur in Aristotle's *Poetics*; in fact, it does not occur in the singular number throughout Aristotle's extant writings; and the emphasis Butcher lays upon one agent in an action where several agents are required obscures the real demand of Aristotle with regard to tragic character. What Aristotle says of *ethos* in a tragedy applies to all the agents that engage in the action of the play — they must be good, true to type, true to life, and consistent; and he specifically says that having one [man⁴] for the story does not produce a unity of action. You could have perfect unity of action in the tale of the fifty daughters of Danaus running from wedlock with the fifty sons of King Aegyptus; the *Agamemnon* of Aeschylus requires four main persons, the *Antigone* of Sophocles five or six. In various ways, and in the long run, Butcher does not put the emphasis where Aristotle puts it, or where we need it. The Briton is an honorable man, no doubt the soul of honor in his usual relations, who does not realize his own sophiscitation, and is all unknowingly infected with the modern love of paradox. Aristotle is a subtle, I do not mean 'slippery,' Greek, who on occasion will force a poor example to illustrate a principle that is sound; is absolutely free from the Greek Sophistical tradition; and is untainted by the Sophist's love of paradox. Trained in the school of Plato, he is the spiritual grandson of Socrates.

⁴ *Poetics*, opening of Chapter 8. Aristotle does not use a noun, but the adjective 'one' (*ἕνα*) in the accusative singular, masculine, which would do for man or woman — anybody.

I shall give one other illustration of false emphasis in Butcher, a point concerning the *Rhetoric*. Butcher says of the *Poetics*, quoting Goethe, that 'it needs some insight into Aristotle's general philosophy to understand what he says about the drama; that otherwise he confuses our studies.' The statements are given in the words of Butcher. The first is true, and would be equally true of any work of any other author you please. The more you know about the rest of an author's works, the better you can interpret any one of them. But the implication that in order to read Aristotle's *Poetics* with intelligence you need first to know his *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, for example, is nonsense. The assertion that without a knowledge of his *Physics* or *Metaphysics* the study of his *Poetics* is confusing is absolutely false. The knowing know that the ablest of the British students of this *Art of Poetry* in our time was Bywater, who properly links the *Rhetoric* with the *Poetics*, and says of the latter:

The book taken as it is, with perhaps an occasional side-light from some of his other works, is intelligible enough; after a brief introduction he gives us in outline all that he has to say on the subject immediately before him, the technique of the Drama and the Epic. He tells one, in fact, how to construct a good play and a good epic, just as in the *Rhetoric* he tells one how to make a good speech. And in doing this he has succeeded in formulating once for all the great first principles of dramatic art, the canons of dramatic logic which even the most adventurous of modern dramatists can only at his peril forget or set at naught.⁵

That is the utterance of one who had a very thorough acquaintance with all the works of Aristotle. Fortunately when Bywater's great edition of the *Poetics* appeared I

⁵ Aristotle *On the Art of Poetry*, ed. by Ingram Bywater, 1909, p. viii.

could recognize the superiority of a master hand to the somewhat amateurish Butcher. My version of the *Poetics* simply aimed to make clear the meaning of it to a Sophomore or Junior student, say, more especially by expanding the curt memoranda of examples in the text, and by adding more examples. I trusted Bywater, though not uncritically, and let the text and translation of Butcher alone. His smooth English somehow glides over the Greek, and does not come to grips with it. Yet thanks to him I did use the word 'hero,' which Aristotle does not use, thus: 'The unity of a Plot does not consist, as some suppose, in having one man as the hero.' I believe that word is the only one to be deplored in my Amplified Version of Aristotle's *Poetics*. And observe that after all it is not so bad, perhaps good enough, in effect, because of Aristotle's saving 'as some suppose.' Some still suppose it. The thing I really deplore is this. It is not a sin of commission, but of omission. I did not betimes go at the *Rhetoric* as a self-respecting teacher of literature should, and as Aristotle says you should, in order to understand the *Poetics*. Butcher says, if you wish to know this book, study Aristotle's philosophy; he nowhere shows the slightest interest in the *Rhetoric* as a substantial help with the *Poetics*, or as a help in studying literature. If Butcher had told my generation, 'By all means read the *Rhetoric*', we would have read it. Aristotle, we thought, wasn't always right, but Butcher was. How many of us in our time have felt that way? Let us give more heed to Aristotle and to those who interpret him as one superior to them than to the clever critics who think they rise above him.

Now, as compared with Butcher, what does Aristotle say? In effect he says: An epic poem or a tragedy is all made up of speeches. A poet, therefore, must be able to compose a speech, in fact a number of speeches, for each

and every kind of person which the plot or action may demand. By extension we could say with Aristotle: The writer of a comedy, as Aristophanes, or of a dialogue, as Plato, or of a novel, as George Eliot, is all the while composing speeches for the characters. That is precisely what the author has to do after he has made an outline of his plot or structure, and settled on his *dramatis personae*, and sits down with his pencil or his stylus in his hand, and takes up the actual business of composing his drama, or Platonic dialogue, or novel. He has to write just one speech after another. By way of preparation, therefore, let the poet, or the writer of dramatic dialogue in general, study Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. That, in brief, is what Aristotle thinks ought to be done. Because he treats the art of writing speeches, and treats it fully, in this work, therefore Aristotle deals cursorily with this matter in the *Poetics*, where he devotes to it but a few important sentences. These sentences lead directly to the *Rhetoric*, which thus to the student of the *Poetics* becomes, as it were, one great chapter of the latter work, a section bulkier than the *Poetics* as this stands. The advice of Aristotle is correct. If the poet, novelist, writer of short stories, is composing speeches all the time, he ought to study *Rhetoric*, and Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is a good one. My friends and I believe it is the best. And we have much the same advice for any one who really wishes to see how Dante goes about his task in the *Commedia*.

So for a number of years, and thanks to Butcher, I failed to understand the bearing of the *Rhetoric* as a whole on the *Poetics*. I thought that the part of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* that concerned my students and me was the Third Book, the one on Diction and Arrangement, but especially his remarks on Diction. And I put Welldon's rendering of the twelve chapters on Diction into a book

called *Theories of Style*, more than a quarter of a century ago. Then gradually my own pupils taught me better, Drummond first and chiefly, and later Caplan among others, latterly he above all. Finally I was converted, and tried to do an English version of the *Rhetoric* that would help my students of poetics, and would meet the need of public speakers, too. So it comes about that here I am, urging every one who cares for literature not to neglect the *Art of Poetry*, and to read, and keep rereading, Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Of course I should like it if people were to read my version. If they don't like that, then let them read the excellent translation by that fine scholar, the late Rhys Roberts; it is better than any other version that has been made in England. However, Roberts did not specially intend his version for the kind of student we meet in American classes, and I specially did. In translating, I tried to keep in mind the kind of student Herrick said he taught in Iowa, the kind I was at Rutgers, the kind we have met in Ithaca, New York, and Urbana, Illinois, and elsewhere. I hoped the book would find a use in larger classes than I think have used it, and believe that any one who tries it there will find, not my translation, but Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, the best book for written composition and as a practical guide to public speakers that ever was put forth.

This belief is not unusual. Others have shared it. A century or more ago, Bishop Copleston said of Aristotle and the *Rhetoric*:

If ever a writer labored more than another, in an age of sophistry and dogmatism, to establish the empire of common sense and reason, it was Aristotle. . . . It is unfortunate for the fame of Aristotle that he should be known chiefly as the author of the Logical Treatises. The Treatise on Rhetoric is a magazine of intellectual riches. Under an arrangement the

most accurate perhaps and the most luminous ever marked out, the diversified elements of thought, of feeling, and of taste, are presented in due order to the reader's mind. Nothing is arbitrary, nothing gratuitous. Long experience with mankind, attentive observation of human nature in public and in private life, the political history of past times, and the occurrences of his own age, furnished him with the materials of this great work. In the course of the inquiry, nothing is left untouched on which Rhetoric, in all its branches, has any bearing. His principles are the result of extensive original induction. He sought them, if ever man did seek them, in the living pattern of the human heart. All the recesses and windings of that hidden region he has explored; all its caprices and affections, whatever tends to excite, to ruffle, to amuse, to gratify, or to offend it, have been carefully examined. The reason of these phenomena is demonstrated, the method of creating them is explained. The Third Book contains a body of rules for good writing, traced to those natural principles out of which they all grow, and illustrated by examples which his own intimate acquaintance with the best poets and orators of Greece readily supplied. The whole is a text-book of human feeling; a storehouse of taste; an exemplar of condensed and accurate, but uniformly clear and candid reasoning.⁶

Voltaire said of the treatise and its author:

I do not believe there is a single refinement of the art that escapes him. . . . Nothing better proves the great sense and good taste of Aristotle than his having given each thing its place.⁷

The late Rhys Roberts said:

As in the *Politics*, . . . so here, he takes all due account of previous efforts and experience. . . . His repeated references

⁶ Edward Copleston, *A Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review against Oxford*, 1810, pp. 20, 26-7.

⁷ *Dictionnaire Philosophique*, art. Aristote (De sa Rhétorique), 1770, in *Oeuvres Complètes de Voltaire* 17 (Paris, 1878). 372, 374.

either to 'the present-day writers on rhetoric' generally, or to specified teachers and theorists, are enough to show that he has faithfully reviewed the rhetorical field of his own and previous days. And in the light of current shortcomings he lays down the true philosophical principles of rhetoric, considered as a branch of the science of man, and writes a treatise which has never been superseded, and is never likely to be superseded. The *Rhetoric* has been described as an 'isolated' work. Its true distinction is that it does not stand alone without predecessors or successors, but that it stands apart and pre-eminent even where the predecessors and successors are so numerous; it is the most philosophical (or, scientific) work ever composed on the subject.⁸

Ernest Havet said:

My task is completed if I have made the reader see that this Rhetoric, the oldest of all, nevertheless is the one that has aged the least, the one that to-day remains the most useful, because it is based upon principles higher and more universal than any other.⁹

Cardinal Newman was heavily indebted to the *Rhetoric* in his theory of composition, in his actual writings of the longer sort, and in his sermons. In his *Idea of a University*, having just quoted from the ancient treatise, he thus begins Part 5 of Discourse V:

Do not suppose that in thus appealing to the ancients I am throwing back the world two thousand years, and fettering philosophy with the reasonings of paganism. While the world lasts will Aristotle's doctrine on these matters last, for he is the oracle of nature and of truth. While we are men, we cannot help, to a great extent, being Aristotelians, for the great Master does but analyze the thoughts, feelings, views, and opinions of human kind. He has told us the meaning of our own

⁸ *Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism*, 1928, pp. 34-5.

⁹ *Étude sur la Rhétorique d'Aristote*, Paris, 1846, p. 119.

words and ideas, before we were born; . . . and we are his disciples whether we will or no, though we may not know it.

Finally, let us attend to what the best-known school-master of recent times, Arnold of Rugby, had to say of his school and of his hopeful Matthew who was about to leave it:

We have been reading some of the *Rhetoric* in the Sixth Form this half-year, and its immense value struck me again so forcibly that I could not consent to send my son to a University where he would lose it altogether.¹⁰

¹⁰ From a letter to Mr. Justice Coleridge, June 26, 1841. Apart from the quotation from Cardinal Newman, the passages which have just been cited, beginning with that from Copleston, can easily be compared with some other testimonies to the permanent value of the *Rhetoric* in my translation of that work, 1932, pp. xi-xiii. To the passage from Newman we may append this from Thomas Mozley, writing to his mother in December, 1826: 'After that I shall stay in Oxford a week to read Dr. Whately's *Rhetoric* preparatory to making a careful study of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* at home, which Newman, my tutor, strongly recommends.'

GALILEO AND SCIENTIFIC HISTORY¹

Quite unexpectedly to me, some heat appears to have been aroused by a little book of mine called *Aristotle, Galileo, and the Tower of Pisa*, published in the year 1935 by an emergent University Press of Cornell University. The object of the book was to present the evidence concerning the alleged experiment or experiments of Galileo about the year 1590 from the tower of Pisa in public demonstration of an alleged mistake by Aristotle with regard to falling bodies — namely, the supposed misstatement by him that, in falling, heavier bodies will move faster in proportion to their weight. The evidence, so far as it appears in languages other than English, is presented in translation and also in the original tongues; and, in particular, the requisite passages from works of Aristotle, passages which have hitherto not been confronted with the evidence from Galileo's writings, or *vice versa*, are made accessible to the kind of reader I had in mind — the teacher, say, of mathematics, physics, or the like, or the reader of 'scientific history' who has no ready access to the ancient and the modern foreign languages, or at all events none to the original sources of this tale concerning an ancient Aristotle and a modern Galileo.

The passages I thought desirable to translate from the Italian of Galileo's first *Dialogue Concerning Two New Sciences* (1638) and the Latin of his earlier treatises *De Motu* (about 1590) are duly recorded and opened for the reader in my book. But in *Nature* (London), January 4, 1936, pp. 8–9, Professor A. S. Eve calls attention to passages

¹ From *The Scientific Monthly* 43 (1936). 163–7; by permission.

from Galileo's dialogue which might well have been quoted in my volume. I should gladly consider including some part of the added quotations if another edition were called for, but must now remind the reader, first, that the passage on falling stones in the dialogue of 1637 echoes a much earlier passage of *De Motu* (see page 50 of my book) in which Galileo ironically talks of what would happen if two spheres of lead were let go from the moon. Would they behave, he asks, as Aristotle says they would in their fall to the earth? Secondly, the 'Sagredo' of the dialogue, who says that he has 'made the test' with falling bodies, and who represents views entertained by Galileo, is not to be identified with him. Galileo is referred to in the dialogue as an authority outside of it, 'our Academician' (cf. the *Edizione Nazionale* of Galileo's Works, Volume 8, page 54); here is an often neglected hint that the quarrel between Galileo and his opponents was a quarrel between Platonists and Aristotelians, generally a needless quarrel that descends to our own day. 'Sagredo' in the dialogue bears the name of an actual person, a friend of Galileo. He is a Venetian. Thinking of Pisa, Eve says: 'It is certainly disconcerting to find Sagredo altering the height from 100 to 200 cubits,' that is from the 100 cubits of 'Salviati,' the other interlocutor who entertains similar views on the fall of bodies from a height; we may note that whereas the tower of Pisa is 178 feet high, the well-known tower at Venice is, or was, 323.

If we are to go behind the imaginative dialogue in search of historical fact, should we not argue that the historical Sagredo at Venice, and not Galileo at Pisa, had in this instance 'made the test'?

It is better not to press the point; we may yet find the utterances of 'Salviati' and 'Sagredo' more vulnerable than some have supposed. Contrary to the statement of

'Salviati,' Aristotle does not say that 'an iron ball of one hundred pounds falling from the height of one hundred cubits reaches the ground before a one-pound ball has fallen a single cubit.' He does not use that kind of language at all. He does not say fall or ball or one hundred cubits or anything of the sort; he states general laws of motion, using the Greek words to express the concepts of magnitude, shape, weight, and proportion, and the letters of the Greek alphabet as we use A, B, C, D, rather than the quantities of arithmetic; and it is important to study what he does say before supplying any of his generalizations with an example. 'Salviati' goes on: 'I say they arrive at the same time.' That is not true, as he immediately shows: 'You find, on making the experiment, that the larger outstrips the smaller by two finger-breadths, that is, when the larger has reached the ground, the other is short of it by two finger-breadths; now you would not hide behind these two fingers the ninety-nine cubits of Aristotle.'

Behind those two fingers there are said to lurk laws, about the movement of heavier bodies through viscous media, out of which the qualified student of physics can make some defence of Aristotle, considering his time and circumstances, in his statements about lightness and weight, media and motion. Aristotle says that the heavier body moves faster over an equal space than the lighter; that they move differently in proportion to their magnitudes or sizes and the density of the medium. As he expresses the proportion, it does not necessarily mean either ten to one, or a hundred to one, though it has been taken to mean both. Can it be both? After all, 'Salviati's' *two fingers* and 'Sagredo's' *span* express a proportion. And what about the ratio of 120 to 395 which is noted at the end of the present article?

Aristotle says that a moving object cleaves the medium

either by its shape or by the impulse which the body that is carried along or is projected possesses; the assertion sounds reasonable in these days of Big Berthas and stream-lined cars and airplanes. He says that the downward motion of a mass of gold or lead or of any other body endowed with weight is quicker in proportion to its size, a statement to which we shall return, for a diving airplane is clearly a body endowed with weight. He says that would not be true in a void; the Greek word is commonly taken to be the equivalent of our 'vacuum'; it surely implies the absence of any medium to retard the moving body. Professor E. K. Rand tells me that Aristotle's reasoning on the conduct of objects of different weights in a vacuum brought about a change in the atomistic theory: 'After his remarks it was no longer possible to imagine that objects of different weights falling in parallel lines in a void would ever catch up with one another.' Aristotle's utterances as they have just been outlined are in support of his contention that the void, a perfect vacuum, is impossible. They have been assailed as if they were main, and not subsidiary, positions with him. They are supplied with references to chapter and verse in my book; and I hope that some master in physics will study them there or in Aristotle's works, not with respect to the tower of Pisa, but, let us say, with respect to the fall of a dummy man from mid air out of a diving airplane. Since Aristotle does talk in *De Caelo* of letting something go from mid air, let us say it might mean from a height of 18,000 feet.

As for Eve's citation to show that Galileo knew what he was criticizing, there is ample evidence that Galileo read Aristotle. On this head, I resisted the temptation rather to quote extensively from the early treatise *De Motu*, which belongs to Galileo's interval of teaching at Pisa, and reveals his study of Aristotle, anticipating his later attacks,

and also to go into the question whether he consulted the *Physics* and *De Caelo* in Greek. Viviani says that Galileo took up the study of Greek in youth. Since he wrote Latin, however, Galileo doubtless often followed a procedure not without a parallel in our day, and, for economy of time, mainly referred to the works of Aristotle in quite available Latin translations.

A harsher critic, the learned Aldo Mieli, in a recent number of *Archeion*, pages 303-7,² takes my book to task for an ignorance of physics which it freely admits.³ Since I am supposed to be a student of language and literature, my personal interest lay in tracing the growth of a myth from a posthumous story about 'repeated experiments' said to have been made in public by Galileo as a young teacher at Pisa, yet never referred to by him or any one else in all the controversies of his career; its growth, that is, into the now widely accepted tale that by a single dramatic experiment he worked a revolution in physical science. No such miraculous change has been brought about in one day in any age by Galileo or another. Signor Mieli is perhaps unduly severe through a misunderstanding of some parts of the book which were hopefully meant to be humorous, but have fallen without prosperity on a Continental ear. But, apart from that, in Italian eyes of to-day it no doubt was a mistake to call a German, Wohlwill, the best authority on Galileo's experiments at Pisa, or to join with him and Hugo Dingler in finding something odd about a passage where Galileo, at the approximate date, 1590, of the alleged experiments, does speak of his observation of falling bodies; where, in fact, he says he has 'often tested this' — namely, that, in free fall, *wood starts off*

² The pages, not the whole number, have reached my publisher.

³ Professor E. N. da C. Andrade is more considerate in his valuable and stimulating lecture of Feb. 18, 1938, *Science in the Seventeenth Century*; see *Proceedings of the Royal Institution of Great Britain* 30 (1938).

faster than lead! It seems to have been a queer traditional notion that certainly did not disappear as the result of 'experiment' or 'experience' by Galileo. The Latin word *experientia* embraces both concepts. Can the passage on wood and lead rightly be used in support of the tale about the alleged experiments from the leaning tower?

Favaro so uses it in an article on the credibility of Viviani's Life (our source for the story of Galileo and the tower), in *Archivio Storico Italiano*, anno 73 (1915), Volume 1, pages 340-3, where he attacks the position of Wohlwill. Bending to the criticism of Mieli, I cheerfully direct attention to this article, but must call attention also to Favaro's article, not mentioned by Mieli, upon 'some inexactitudes' of Viviani, *ibid.*, anno 74 (1916), Volume 2, pages 127-50. Much as we respect the learning and devotion of Favaro, chief editor of the great National Edition of Galileo, we still recommend the scepticism of Wohlwill and Dingler on the point at issue. The credibility in the main of Viviani's Life does not depend upon our accepting one tale with an inherent improbability — that Galileo *repeatedly* made experiments from the tower in the presence of *all* the teachers and students at his university.

If reputable authors of our generation accept this tale one from another, repeat it with absurd variations, take words from a dialogue of Galileo for the words of Aristotle, and never look into Aristotle to see what he says and in what connection, how are we to think of the critical standards of Viviani in the year 1654? More than a century later, the competent William Bartram, American botanist and zoologist, can thus describe one party in an alligator-fight (*Travels*, 1794, page 116): 'His plaited tail brandished high, floats upon the lake. The waters like a cataract descend from his opening jaws. Clouds of smoke issue from his dilated nostrils. The earth trembles with

his thunder.' Was his tail brandished high, or did it float? Aristotle in his *Poetics*⁴ notes how a story grows. He says that people like to add interesting details in the belief that it will gratify the listeners. Lives of Galileo and histories of science bear him out. The end of the present article may likewise illustrate that impeachment.

Eve remarks: 'No doubt Lane Cooper is correct in saying that Galileo was flogging a dead horse, and that many had already attacked the rash statement of Aristotle.' And the passage from *De Caelo* about 'the downward movement of a mass of gold or lead, or of any other body endowed with weight,' that it 'is quicker in proportion to its size,' he calls 'very suggestive of [Aristotle's] erroneous view of falling bodies.' Now my book tells of persons both before and after 1590 who are said to have made the like test, though I was not bent on mentioning any after 1606 save Coresio and Renieri; Eiffel is said to have experimented with all sorts of objects from his tower 984.25 feet high. I did not talk of 'a dead horse,' nor call any statement of Aristotle's 'rash,' nor think that what he says about the downward movement even of gold, to say nothing of *any other body endowed with weight*, would be erroneous if the medium through which it moved were dust and not air. But in my book I did go too far in holding that it is quite erroneous with respect to air, or such is my present notion in my very imperfect knowledge of physics. When writing my book, I believed with Galileo, Gregory, Hart, and many another, that if you went to the top of the leaning tower and dropped a ten-pound weight and a one-pound weight, or a hundred-pound weight and a one-pound weight, when they reached the ground together, or nearly so, it would prove Aristotle wrong with

⁴ 24. 1460^a 17-22.

respect to the downward movement of bodies through air. I went along with the experts who would let a teacher of English believe that it made no difference whether the proportion between the bodies was ten to one or one hundred to one, whether the tower was 100 cubits or 200 cubits high, whether the bodies hit the ground simultaneously or with a slight interval in the times of alighting, and whether that interval was two fingers or a span. I do recall being troubled by a discrepancy between Aristotle's use of algebraic symbols in *De Caelo* 3. 2 and the subsequent reduction of them to arabic numbers. Now I wish to leave the question in the most capable hands, and refer all readers to the section entitled Aristotle's Dynamics, pages 26-33, in the admirable edition of Aristotle's *Physics* by W. D. Ross, Oxford, 1936, who says (page 29):

In fact, having observed accurately that motion through a denser medium is slower than through a rarer one, he makes the natural enough mistake of supposing that velocity and density *ceteris paribus* vary inversely; failing to notice that the relation which connected them might be more complex than that of inverse proportion. A better mathematician might, even in the absence of evidence, have noticed the possibility of this.

The same writer mentions the correspondence of Hardcastle and Greenhill in *Nature* 92 (1913-14).584-5; 93 (1914).428, on the terminal velocity of projectiles, and on the bearing of that problem upon the statements of Aristotle and Galileo. These letters came to my attention after I had virtually finished the present writing; so also an unverified reference to motion-pictures of falling rain-drops, with the tempo of the pictures slowed so as to show how the larger and heavier drops pass the smaller and lighter in mid-air.

Meanwhile are they who, in the face of weak evidence, still suppose that a theatrical Galileo might well have ascended the tower, after due advertisement, to perform modern experiments with free fall before the mob — are they really honoring that great and good man? If Stokes and Rayleigh had lived in Galileo's day, would either have lent himself to a display of the sort? As a person necessarily unversed in the latest physical research, I yet humbly ask what significance should attach to an episode like that? Since publishing my book, I have heard of something mentioned above, namely, laws respecting the movement of heavier and lighter bodies through viscous media, one of which laws apparently could be tested for 'the downward movement of a mass of gold or lead, or of any other body endowed with weight,' through air, somewhat better if you took the objects up in an airplane and dropped them from a point several miles high than if you dropped them from any celebrated tower in Italy. For me, so far as I can understand the law, it goes better with the statements of Aristotle than with the story of Galileo; better, for example, with the passage about 'a bit of earth let loose in mid air' — 'the more there is of it the faster it moves.' Of course it is fun to feel wiser than Aristotle, though the fun commonly entails a loss of historical perspective. It is also fun to go faster than anybody could in the days of Galileo. Herewith we reach our proportion of 120 to 395, and our terminal velocity.

Our experimenter shall now be the late Mr. Collins, who wrote for *The Saturday Evening Post* (Philadelphia) of February 9, 1935, and knew about free fall from personal experience. His article, here quoted by editorial permission, is entitled *Return to Earth, Diving Ten Thousand Feet Straight Down*. We read (page 51):

I did five speed dives first. These were to demonstrate that the ship would dive to terminal velocity. Contrary to popular opinion, a falling object will not go faster and faster and faster and faster. It will go faster and faster only up to a certain point. That point is reached when the object creates by its own passage through the air enough air-resistance to that passage to equal in pounds the weight of the object. When that point is reached, the object will not fall any faster, no matter how much longer it falls. It is said to be at terminal velocity. A diving airplane is only a falling object, but it is a highly streamlined one, and therefore capable of a very high terminal velocity. A man falling through the air cannot attain a speed greater than about a hundred and twenty miles an hour. But the terminal velocity of an airplane is a lot more than that. . . .

I went to eighteen thousand feet for the final one. . . . I eased the throttle back, rolled the ship over in a half roll, and stuck her down. I felt the dead, still drop of the first part of the dive. I saw the air-speed needle race around its dial, heard the roaring of the motor mounting and the whistle of the wires rising, and felt the increasing stress and stiffness of the gathering speed. I saw the altimeter winding up—winding down, rather! Down to twelve thousand feet now. Eleven and a half. Eleven. I saw the air-speed needle slowing down its racing on its second lap around the dial. I heard the roaring motor whining now and the whistling wires screaming, and felt the awful racking of the terrific speed. I glanced at the air-speed needle. It was barely creeping around the dial. It was almost once and a half around, and was just passing the three-eighty mark. I glanced at the altimeter. It was really winding up now! The sensitive needle was going around and around. The other needle read ten thousand, nine and a half, nine. I looked at the air-speed needle. It was standing still. It read three ninety-five. You could feel it was terminal velocity. You could feel the lack of acceleration. You could hear it too. You could hear the motor at a peak whine, hold-

ing it. You could hear the wires at a peak scream, holding it. I checked the altimeter. Eight and a half. At eight I would pull out.⁵

⁵ Walter E. Burton in *Popular Science Monthly* 133 (1938).42-3, 99, tells of the proposed twenty-one-mile leap of Joseph E. Dunkel which is to begin with the dive from the stratosphere of a stream-line gondola that, Dunkel estimates, will be traveling at the rate of 2,000 miles an hour before it reaches a denser atmosphere.

hence is an adornment. Still more narrowly considered, there is an element of poetic diction which Aristotle has termed *κόσμος*. And this term according to Gudeman (see his page 361 as mentioned below) offers the utmost difficulty ('die allergrössten Schwierigkeiten') of interpretation, as witness the numerous attempts to throw some light on the obscurity ('die zahlreichen Versuche, das Dunkel zu erhellen').

In this technical sense, for diction, the word 'ornament' (*κόσμος*) occurs four times in the extant works of Aristotle: once in the *Rhetoric* (3.7.1408^a 14); and thrice in the *Poetics* (21.1457^b 2; 22.1458^a 33; 22.1459^a 14). The term is nowhere explained by him, though illustrated after a fashion in the *Rhetoric* (3.7.1408^a 10-16):

Your language will be appropriate if it expresses emotion and character, and if it is in proportion with the subject. By proportion is meant that weighty matters shall not be treated in a slipshod way, nor trivial matters in a solemn way; nor should ornament [*κόσμος*] be attached to a commonplace [*εὐτελεῖ*] word [or 'name-word,' *ὄνοματι*], or the effect will be comic, as in the poetry of Cleophon. He used phrases as absurd as it would be to say 'O Lady Fig!' [*πότνια Συκῆ*].

That would be about like saying 'O Lady Sukey!' instead of 'O Lady Psyche!' or 'Hera' or 'Circe.' Further, the manuscripts of the *Poetics* give no evidence of a lacuna where a copyist might have left an explanation out. So far as I know, the best if not the only way now left to explain the doubtful term never has been tried for it, although the method I now recommend has in other cases thrown light on Aristotle's meaning when his principle or statement has seemed dark, or partly so, either because we did not understand his illustration, or because no illustration from him is directly at hand.

The essence of the method here is to search the poets for instances, for positive examples; that is, after duly examining our author's text in order to learn as far as possible what the thing in question is not. So with the term 'enthymeme' in the *Rhetoric*. There is still on occasion some doubt in the minds of students what enthymemes may be, but all doubt should vanish as soon as we study a good speech, and see what the argumentative elements there, as distinguished from all others, really are. When you omit all else, then the arguments actually used by good speakers are the forms of utterance Aristotle has in mind to which he gives the name of enthymemes. That is the way I tried to explain the term 'enthymeme' in the introductory remarks to my translation of the *Rhetoric*. Accordingly, it is not hard to find enthymemes in profusion; they are as common as speeches because a speech of any length is sure to contain them.

Similarly, then, with the term *κόσμος*, the verbal 'ornament' in the *Poetics*. It must refer to something that Aristotle had observed in the diction of poets, and should be discoverable there. The searcher should take an ornate passage, as the description of Circe's palace, Alcinous' garden, or the landing-place of Odysseus at Ithaca, all in the *Odyssey*, or take an ornate passage in some other poem, ancient or modern; he should there find what Aristotle calls the current or usual words, the rare (or 'alien') words, if any, the metaphors as such, and the words, if any, invented by the poet, and also any compound, lengthened, shortened, or otherwise 'altered' words; eliminate all these seven kinds, and the remaining words would then be 'ornamental.' The other kinds are all defined or illustrated in the *Poetics*, and this one is not, but can be found by the aforesaid method of elimination. Our author thinks that poetic diction is made up of eight kinds of

words and phrases; he thinks this list exhaustive, and by his division he is right; if in a poem, or in poetry, we identify *a*, *b*, *c*, *e*, *f*, *g*, and *h*, the seven kinds which he identifies for us, he has, in fact, enabled us to identify *d* as well, the eighth. It comes fourth in his list, and certainly is not lower than fourth in importance. My method will not seem quite as cut and dried as that, for we have to remember that words are plastic, and change color with their surroundings; and yet at bottom that is my procedure.

Meanwhile let us translate and quote from the *Poetics* (21.1457^b 1-3): 'Every *onoma* is either (1) the Current Term for a thing; or (2) a Strange (or rare) Word; or (3) a Metaphor; or (4) an Ornament; or (5) a Newly-coined Word; or a word that is (6) Lengthened, or (7) Curtailed, or (8) Altered.' The Greek is: ἄπαν δὲ ὄνομά ἔστιν ἡ κύριον ἡ γλῶττα ἡ μεταφορὰ ἡ κόσμος ἡ πεποιημένον ἡ ἐπεκτεταμένον ἡ ἀφηρημένον ἡ ἐξηλλαγμένον. But what does *ὄνομα* mean? Does it mean 'noun' as Bywater has it, or 'word' as in Gudeman's excellent German translation? In 56^b 21 Bywater notes its distinction from *ῥῆμα*, 'verb'; in 61^a 31 he notes that the sense is extended to include *ῥῆμα*. In Greek sometimes it is wide enough to mean 'phrase' or 'locution.' We might here do well enough if we called it 'verbal element' — not necessarily restricted to single words. We must also note that *κόσμος* is not strictly rendered in Bywater's 'an ornamental word,' but is so rendered when we call it simply 'ornament.' In both *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* the Renaissance translator Riccoboni renders the term by the Latin fourth-declension noun *ornatus*. Through the kindness of Professor Franceschini of Padua I learn from his colleague Professor Valgimigli that the reading of the anonymous Latin translation of the year 1248 likewise is *ornatus* in all three passages of the *Poetics* here considered. For a discussion of

ornatus in a speech, see in particular Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria* 8.3; to this we shall return.

Gudeman makes fairly clear what *κόσμος* is not, though he fails to remark that it need not mean words taken singly. And between the first and the second occurrence of the term in the *Poetics*, so he thinks (with Robortelli, Maggi, and others), Aristotle must have explained it at 21.1457^b 33 after his discussion of metaphor. It is, however, possible that the lack of a definition in the text is not an accident of time; it may be that the word suggested its own sense fully enough to Aristotle and other Greeks of his day. He often hammers at a small point when he thinks that it may not be clear, and at a large matter if it was then in dispute. Here he may have felt no need to amplify upon the clear word *κόσμος*.

Gudeman draws no evidence from the Arabic tradition of a possible lacuna, about the existence of which he is in too little doubt. His comment (see his edition of the *Poetics*, 1934, pp. 361-2) sums up the history of Aristotelian scholarship on the point, and divides well enough between our traditional knowledge and ignorance about the word, save that he does not join with Vahlen in dwelling on the passage in the *Rhetoric* (see above) where Aristotle shows that he considers *πόρνια* an ornamental word; nor does he cite the highly important passage of Quintilian on *ornatus*.

We know pretty well what *κόσμος*, as an element in poetic diction, did not mean to Aristotle. It did not mean, for instance, *συκῆ* (*fig-tree*, or *fig*). According to Gudeman, it did not mean the *epitheton*, nor in particular the *epitheton ornans*, since the epithet so often takes the shape of metaphor, and metaphor, as one of the other seven elements listed by Aristotle, must be something different. Similarly we might argue that it cannot mean the current

or the compound word and so on. The argument sounds reasonable, but may need sharper inspection. The term receives no further explanation from Aristotle in his *Rhetoric*, unless in 3.2.1405^a 14 ff. — the passage runs to the end of Chapter 2 — where the verb *κοσμεῖν* ('adorn') is explained as the process of likening the object you wish to praise to a better object with a fine name; if you wish to belittle your object, compare it to a worse. This substitution of the better synonym represents the sense in which Bywater (ed. *Poetics*, 1909, p. 281) thinks that our term most probably should be taken. But why restrict the term to figurative language? Cannot the actual name of a thing be ornamental? Bywater does not go far enough. A word is 'ornamental,' not through the comparison, whether express or metaphorically implied, but intrinsically so. Vahlen (*Beiträge zu Aristoteles' Poetik*, 1914, pp. 134-7) feels that the term is somehow more inclusive, but in the end gives up the problem with the hope that others may yet find the solution. He could himself have found the solution by studying Quintilian, Book 8, Chapter 3, where this author passes from *Ornatus* in a general sense to *Ornatus* with respect to individual words and groups of words (8.3.15-16).

In the *Poetics* the verbal 'ornament,' as we have seen, must simply be distinguished from the other elements of poetic diction; and that is true whether the diction be epic or dramatic (see 22. 1459^a 10-14); but, particularly, one might think it ought to be distinguished from the ordinary word (*τὸ κύριον*) and the metaphor. Further, it is not a word by nature strange or rare ('alien'), compound, curtailed, or lengthened, or altered in some other way, nor yet a word invented by the poet; it is not by nature any of these others — unless it has a dual nature. Or perhaps a given illustration of this term might have a dual or a plural

nature? Like the usual or current word (*τὸ κύριον*), and like metaphors too, the ornamental word is found in prose as well as verse. But Aristotle also says that in hexameter verse — that is, in epic poetry — there is the greatest scope for an embellished diction, and hence to-day our surest hunting-ground for the verbal 'ornament' should be the work of a poet like Homer or Milton. Virgil also ought to be a poet fond of ornamental words. What poet would not sometimes use them, even if, like Skelton or Kipling, he often called a spade a spade or worse?

Meanwhile note that Aristotle does not separate what we call common nouns from proper, and that many proper names are beautiful, as Zephyrus, Boreas, and Maia. Some names, again, like Nymph and Naiad, are midway between the common and the proper noun. Note also that many names for things were once live metaphors, but now are common nouns, and many other metaphors, as Theodore and Margaret, no longer mean the 'Gift of God' and 'Pearl' and so on, but signify an individual man or woman. Moreover, Aristotle's categories need not all of them be mutually exclusive in their application. When we look for actual illustrations of them, an ornamental word might happen to be an epithet as well, or metaphorical, or lengthened or curtailed. Homer's *πολυφλοισθοῖο* seems to be compounded, lengthened, and also metaphorical, and if it be an *epitheton ornans*, is there any reason why we should not call it *ornamental*? J. D. Lester's 'poluphloisboisterous' epithet for Homer is further lengthened, altered, and turned to comic effect, and is not merely metaphorical.² Similarly, if you called a spade, not a spade, but by its finer name, or if by 'Spade' you

2

Poluphloisboisterous Homer of old
Dropped all his augments into the sea.

Cf. *Times Literary Supplement*, London, March 29, 1923, p. 217.

meant *Spada*, a sword, and had in mind the Ace of Spades, the fine name for the fine thing might well be ornamental. As Aristotle says in his *Rhetic* (3.2.1405^b 6-8), quoting from the *Rhetic* of Lycymnius, 'The beauty of a word, or its ugliness, will lie either in the sound or in the sense.' He goes on to speak of what we should call the associations of a word, and also holds that, when we aim at beauty, 'our metaphors must be drawn from the province of things that are beautiful in sound, or in effect, or to sight or some other of the senses. It makes a difference whether we say, for instance, "rosy-fingered morn," or "purple-fingered," or, still worse, "red-fingered."' As I take it, 'rosy-fingered' is a metaphor and a compound word, and 'morn' (in English) is a shortened word, and both of them, ῥοδοδάκτυλος Ἡώς (see *Iliad* 1.477 and elsewhere), are ornamental words in Greek. It would likewise make a difference, no doubt, to Aristotle, whether you said πότνια Συκῆ, or any of the following from the *Odyssey*: πότνια Ἡρη (4.513); πότνια νύμφη (5.149); πότνια Κίρκη (8.448, 10.394, 549). For us it makes a difference whether one is to say, 'Notre Dame de Paris,' or 'the Widow at Windsor'; one phrase is ornamental, and the other is not. Had Kipling said something like πότνια Νίκη for the Lady of Windsor, he might have received a garland of laurel. For him the damage was done by the first word, 'widow,' since 'Windsor' is or ought to be ornamental. 'Merry Wives' is better than 'Widow.' The courtly Spenser called good Potnia Bess 'the Faerie Queene' and 'Gloriana.' Aristotle nowhere implies that a verbal ornament need be a single word; on occasion it may be that, and at another time a phrase; just as his 'metaphor' may be one word, but his 'proportional metaphor,' for example, the 'shield of Dionysus' in the sense of a drinking-bowl, takes more than one. That can be true while it is

also true that, taken singly, every word in prose or verse falls into one of his eight classes.

So again, if you called a cup, not a cup, but a chalice, or called a crown a diadem, or a hawk a tercelet or a falcon, the name might be an epithet, or metaphorical, and an ornamental word as well. Why a word used as an epithet or a metaphor should not be thought of as ornamental in itself is hard to see:

Ethereal minstrel! pilgrim of the sky!

The idle question whether *κόσμος* does or does not mean an adjective or epithet is as old as Vettori and Castelvetro.³ It is as idle as to say, for instance, that an epithet could not be a compound word like 'rosy-fingered' or a shortened word like 'adventrous' in Milton's 'my adventurous Song,' or to say that for a metaphor a poet could not use a current word like 'hawk' or 'fox' ('Go ye, and tell that fox' — Herod), or a compound, dialectal, coined, lengthened, shortened, or internally altered word. Traditions do not readily die in scholarship, and I do not expect to kill the one I am shooting at unless I shoot at it repeatedly; so I must keep on repeating that Aristotle's eight distinctions do not overlap, but examples of them do. The same example often illustrates more than one of his divisions.

In our search, however, we may first aim at excluding ordinary words, and forms curtailed and lengthened, as also forms that are compounded, and simple metaphors. True similes, in which the likeness is express, and a word of comparison, 'as' or 'like,' is used, need not be excluded, for obviously one thing might be intentionally ennobled

³ Castelvetro is sure it does not (*Poetica d'Aristotele Vulgarizzata et Sposta*, Vienna, 1570, p. 254^a): 'Adunque non è agevol cosa a pervenire al vero di qual maniera di parole intendesse Aristotele per questa voce *κόσμος*, ma egli è bene agevol cosa a pervenire al vero si come si vede per le cose dette che egli non intese degli aggiunti secondo che vuole Pietro Vittorio.'

by direct comparison with another thing the name of which was to the author ornamental. Thus, among the ornamental passages in the Song of Solomon, we have the description of a beauty

Terrible as an army with *banners*.

With which compare Wordsworth:

Before me shone a glorious world —
Fresh as a banner bright, unfurled
To music suddenly.⁴

Further, though, to some, Aristotle seems to have 'name-words' in a narrower sense, that is, what we to-day call adjectives and nouns, primarily in view, still there is no reason why a verb (the name, so to speak, of an action) should not possess the quality of adornment; thus, if to Dante and others a circle is an ornament, the verb as well as the noun should be ornamental: 'A solitary falcon circled on motionless wing.' The very form 'adorning' is an ornamental word; thus Wordsworth on the boreal Aurora, in a passage of elaborate description, where the story is delayed (*Peter Bell* 91-5):

Haste! and above Siberian snows
We'll sport amid the boreal morning;
Will mingle with her lustres gliding
Among the stars, the stars now hiding,
And now the stars adorning.

The Aurora with its lustres, and the Siberian snows, are obviously drawn from two rich sources of poetical adornment, geography and the realm of light. This latter realm even more than the other should furnish the poets, Milton and Dante as well as Wordsworth and Homer, with many beautiful words. Thither we ought to betake us. It is

⁴ *Ruth* 169-71.

Aristotle himself who throughout the *Rhetoric* keeps letting us see that, if we wish to hunt a particular kind of animal or thing, or argument, we should go to the place, the *topos*, where it is likely to be found, its natural habitat. The natural home of beautiful words is not a critical treatise, but the critic may net them in flocks with his quotations. This article quotes enough of them to let the reader make his own induction concerning them.

Yet before all else let us see if another negative consideration will not help us on our way. Take a modern instance in which the poet shows an understanding of the ornamental word by his unexpected choice of one that is not. In Lewis Carroll's short and amusing Art of Poetry which he calls *Poeta Fit, Non Nascitur*, the elderly man of experience advises the budding poet to use words like 'wild,' 'lonely,' 'weary,' 'strange.' 'And will it do,' cries the enthusiastic young one, 'to take them in a lump?' —

As 'The wild man went his weary way
To a strange and lonely pump'?

'Lump' and 'pump' are not ornaments for face, ode, or garden. O Lady Lump and Potnia Pump! Nor is 'spade' likely to be a word in this class, nor 'hank' — 'A rag and a bone and a hank of hair.' These last three are in an opposite class, while also to be classed as metaphors. But they serve by opposition to remind us again that the names of ornamental things are likely to be ornamental. And that is the point, if I may say so, where my thinking of illustrations for this term began; the notion of consulting Quintilian was, unfortunately, an afterthought. I was reading Addison on a certain aspect of *Paradise Lost* which he makes bold to censure (*Spectator*, No. 297; Cook's *Addison's Criticisms on Paradise Lost*, pp. 40-1). He objects to Milton's use of technical words, and in-

stances as unsuitable these terms from architecture: 'Doric pillars,' 'pilasters,' 'cornice,' 'frieze,' and 'architrave.' He thinks that 'zenith' also is too technical.

But are not 'Doric,' 'pillars,' 'pilasters,' 'cornice,' 'frieze,' and 'zenith,' not only acceptable words in other ways, but also clearly ornamental? Instinctively defending Milton's well-considered practice against the less imaginative critic, I thought also of what Aristotle says in a general way about the embellishment of poetic diction, and especially about the proper place for it. That sort of place, presumably, is where we ought to hunt. In closing Chapter 24 of the *Poetics*, he speaks of the improbabilities in the episode (*Odyssey* 13. 70 ff.) where Odysseus is set ashore, still sleeping, by the Phaeacian crew at Ithaca. It is not likely that the returning hero would at this point be, or stay, asleep. The poet, says Aristotle, conceals the improbability by his other excellences, and from what follows it is clear that Aristotle has particularly in mind the excellence of elaborate diction. The poet should elaborate the *lexis* when there is no action, and no character or thought to be revealed. And since Odysseus is asleep, and there can be no action, nor display of *ethos* or *dianoia*, so far as his activity, and power of choice, and utterance or argument, are concerned, while the Phaeacians too are silent, we may infer that this passage of the *Odyssey* will make due use, in Aristotle's view, of ornamental words. Only the poet speaks in description.

What do we there find? We do find elaborate diction, and, among the words, some perhaps the usual names for things, as the rug (*ῥῆγος*) and linen sheet (*λίνον*) which formed the bed and covering for Odysseus as he slept upon the deck. And yet in our ignorance of the ordinary names for things in Homer's day we cannot be sure; in our day Oriental rugs and the Biblical 'fine linen' might adorn

either prose or verse. The two Greek words seem ornamental in comparison with Kipling's 'rag' and 'bone.' And 'linen' may be one of a numerous class of words which are the usual names for things, and ornamental too. In Aristotle's *Rhetoric* the distinction is not made between *κύριον* and *κόσμος*, but between *κόσμος* and *εὐτελή* (cheap, shabby, commonplace, mean). The associations of 'fig' may be worse than shabby. It is true, as he says in the *Poetics* (22.1458^a 18-20), that a style that is all made up of current words, while clear, will be *ταπεινή* ('mean,' 'on a low level'); he mentions the poetry of Cleophon in illustration. Likewise a style full of far-fetched metaphors will be like a riddle. It is also true that a style made up entirely of ornaments, as the style of Swinburne, will be cloying. But it is true as well that the words in the 'current' or any other class are not all on one level; the upper range of 'current' words will overlap with the range of the *κόσμος*. 'Frieze,' 'cornice,' 'rainbow,' 'lilies,' 'iris,' 'lilac,' 'laurel,' 'larch,' 'laburnum,' 'pomegranate,' and 'dulcimer,' are the usual words for all those objects, and every one of them is or can be ornamental. Even the classes of *κύριον* and *κόσμος*, then, may overlap, while yet the distinction between them holds. The word 'linen' would be *κύριον* because it is the usual name for something, and be *κόσμος* just because the clergyman, the choir-boy, and everybody else so find it. According to Mr. Wilfred J. Funk of the *Literary Digest*, his ten most beautiful words in the English language are these:

Dawn	Luminous
Hush	Chimes
Lullaby	Melody
Murmuring	Golden
Mist	Tranquil

Not one of them is uncommon.

Further, we note in the passage from *Odyssey* 13 some proper nouns, as also lengthened words and shortened, and comparisons rather in the shape of simile than metaphor. Some of the words in the comparisons must be among the ornamental words of the *Poetics*. The stern of the ship leaps under the force of the oarsmen, 'even as on a plain a yoke of four stallions [*τετράδοροι ἄρσενες*] comes springing all together beneath the lash.'⁵ The Greek adjective, a compound word, is also ornamental; the translators have aimed at an ornamental word in 'stallions.' In lines 85-7 the adjective (*πορφύρεον*) applied to the wave, and that (*πολυφλοίσβοιο*) applied to the sea, and the 'shortened' noun *ἴρηξ* for the circling (*κίρκος*) hawk less swift than the ship, seem all to be ornamental words. If we cannot always be sure what was an ordinary word to Homer, and what an ornamental, yet for Aristotle there must be many ornamental words in the lines (93-112) descriptive of the harbor of Phorcys where Odysseus was put ashore asleep: the star (*ἀστέρι*) that is brightest of all, the Cave of the Winds, the Nymphs, the Naiads, and (for we may now go on to include the adornment by proper nouns) the Dawn ('*Ηώ*'),⁶ Phorcys himself (*Φόρκυνος*), yes Ithaca ('*Ιθάκης*'), since we love the name of our own abode, and also Boreas (*Βορέαο*) and Notus (*Νότον*), the Winds by which the gates of the Cave are distinguished for mortals and immortals. So Chaucer beautifies the opening of his Prologue to the *Canterbury Tales* with the name of a wind, Zephyrus; and we recall the beauty of names and associations in the landscape of Plato's *Phaedrus*, and how Socrates is made to dwell on them before the argument begins, or when it pauses. Boreas (229 c) is there, and the Nymphs (230 b) soon follow him; but see the whole description of the resting-place of Socrates and

Phaedrus beside the stream Ilissus and beneath the lovely plane-tree. It is very important to include the ornamental proper names among ornamental words — Beatrice, Laura, Fiammetta, and all the Muses and Graces. See thirty-three names of the Nereids in ten lines of the *Iliad* (18.39-48), which destructive critics, Nauck and others, would like to exclude from the poem; the list does seem to outrun anything of the kind in *Paradise Lost*, yet consider the list of fallen angels with geographical names intermixed, 130 lines of them, in Book 1 (392-521), and other Miltonic lists in *Paradise Lost* and elsewhere; and compare the catalogue of the Achaeans and the Trojans in *Iliad* 2.484-877. The names listed by the Messenger in *The Persians* of Aeschylus illustrate the same device. The Hebrews also liked this sort of thing better perhaps than we do, as we see from the book of Numbers; yet we favor ornamental names, as the suffering children know.

My expository aim can now be advanced by quotation from what follows in the episode about sleeping Odysseus, again in the rendering of Butcher and Lang:⁷

And now the vessel in full course ran ashore, half her keel's length high; so well was she sped by the hands of the oarsmen. Then they alighted from the benched ship upon the land, and first they lifted Odysseus from out the hollow ship, all as he was in the sheet of linen and the bright rug [αὐτῷ σύν τε λίνῳ καὶ ρήγῃ συγαλόεντι].

Further, they placed in safety the rich gifts which the Phaeacians had bestowed upon him, the sight of which now specially angers Poseidon:

Gifts out of measure, bronze and gold in plenty, and woven raiment, much store [ἀγλαὰ δῶρα, | χαλκόν τε χρυσόν τε ἄλις ἐσθῆτά θ' ὑφαντήν].

⁷ *Od.* 13.113 ff.

Somewhat casually I have mentioned, or now mention, among words ornamental, suggestive and beautiful names geographical or out of mythology — how often in Greek thought and expression these provinces overlap! Further, add words for fine raiment, as 'purple,' and armor, as 'corslet,' 'glaive,' and 'hauberk,' and all the noble names for things that delight the senses, particularly sight and hearing, as Aristotle notes, but also touch, taste, and smell, and delight the higher sensibilities, and for things with which men and women adorn themselves, their servants, their animals, their houses, public buildings, ships; 'jewel' and the names of jewels — 'beryl,' 'topaz,' 'amethyst,' 'diamond,' 'coral,' 'pearl,' and 'ruby'; words for incense and perfume — 'frankincense,' 'spices,' and 'myrrh'; beautiful words from music, 'music' itself, 'melody,' 'harmony,' 'choral,' 'canticle,' 'alleluia,' and the names of instruments, the harp, the flute, the 'dulcimer' of Coleridge and Nebuchadnezzar with the rest of Nebuchadnezzar's Chaldaic orchestra (Dan. 3.5, 7, 15); words from dancing — 'dancing' itself and 'choric,' and many a word from Davies' *Orchestra* and Wordsworth's lines, 'I wandered lonely as a cloud'; from sunrise, sunset, and the starry heavens with their Zodiac and Zenith; from all the world of nature, birds, trees, flowers (including the cosmos!), clouds, the hawk, the peacock, and the eagle, from all that realm whence Aristophanes drew titles and the embellishment of comedy; from the architecture and landscape-gardening of God and man. Wherever we find beauty there we shall look for ornamental words; the word and its object belong together. Where shall we begin? With Milton's Oreb, Sinai, Ormus, Ind, and his longer lists of places from Renaissance maps and classic myth and Hebrew story? With Homer's Agamemnon and Achilles, Hector, Nestor, Clytemnestra, Helen?

And what of the names of the wonderful lands Odysseus saw in his travels? And was it not a geographical name, the blessed word Mesopotamia, with which Garrick or another said the preacher Whitfield could bring tears to every eye? For Coleridge the moving names are seen in this:

It was an Abyssinian maid,
And on her dulcimer she played,
Singing of Mount Abora.

Milton had a truer and more ornamental spelling for the mountain: 'Amara.' Or shall we take instances from the Song of Solomon? — 'Thy nose is as the tower of Lebanon which looketh toward Damascus' (7.4). Truly an Oriental adornation! And where end? With 'glory' for the Bible, Dante, Milton, Wordsworth? —

A privacy of glorious light is thine.

With light for blind Homer or blind Milton? —

Hail holy light, offspring of Heav'n first-born,
Or of th' Eternal Coeternal beam.

Or with light for Dante? Says Dean Church (*Dante and Other Essays*, 1889, pp. 163-5):

Light in general is his special and chosen source of poetic beauty. No poet that we know has shown such singular sensibility to its varied appearances — has shown that he felt it in itself the cause of a distinct and peculiar pleasure, delighting the eye apart from form, as music delights the ear apart from words, and capable, like music, of definite character, of endless variety, and infinite meanings. He must have studied and dwelt upon it like music. His mind is charged with its effects and combinations, and they are rendered with a force, a brev-

ity, a precision, a heedlessness and unconsciousness of ornament, an indifference to circumstance and detail [but there we may doubt Dean Church, for Dante is a most conscious artist, with a sure knowledge when to use, and when to limit ornament]; they flash out with a spontaneous readiness, a suitableness and felicity, which show the familiarity and grasp given only by daily observation, daily thought, daily pleasure. Light everywhere—in the sky and earth and sea, in the star, the flame, the lamp, the gem—broken in the water, reflected from the mirror, transmitted pure through the glass, or colored through the edge of the fractured emerald; dimmed in the mist, the halo, the deep water; streaming through the rent cloud, glowing in the coal, quivering in the lightning, flashing in the topaz and the ruby, veiled behind the pure alabaster, mellowed and clouding itself in the pearl; light contrasted with shadow, shading off and copying itself in the double rainbow, like voice and echo; light seen within light, as voice discerned within voice, . . . light from every source, and in all its shapes, illuminates, irradiates, gives its glory to the *Commedia*.

And as Church explains all this with a mixture of customary and ornamental words in prose, so Dante works with all the means at a poet's disposal, including a very large admixture of ornamental words. Or shall we simply end with the Biblical 'beauty of holiness'?

Since, however, we began with Aristotle, and have looked for 'ornamental' words especially in Homer's landscape, we may proceed with illustrations chiefly from that province.

Take, then, not the shield of Achilles in the *Iliad* (18.468–613), which Lessing used for illustration of another point in Homer's art, the method of description by having the divine blacksmith make the object before our eyes; but the passage is a happy hunting-ground for those who seek felicities of diction. Take rather the stream and

bank where Nausicaa and her fellows washed the already 'shining raiment' (*Odyssey* 6.85–90):

Now when they were come to the beautiful stream of the river, where truly were the unfailing cisterns, and bright water welled up free from beneath, and flowed past, enough to wash the foulest garments clean, there the girls unharnessed the mules from under the chariot, and turning them loose they drove them along the banks of the eddying river to graze on the honey-sweet clover.

Some of the ornamental words in Butcher and Lang's translation are adjectives and some are nouns ('shining raiment,' 'shining reins'), one ('honey-sweet') is compounded, and Homer's verb *τρώγειν* (for the two epic poems a *hapax legomenon*), rendered 'graze,' may or may not be included; the notion that 'ornamental' words should also be 'rare' in our modern sense need not be too heavily stressed. We safely infer from a remark in *Poetics* 22.1458^b 19–24, on Euripides' use of *θοινᾶται* in place of the usual word for eating, that Aristotle might well have regarded *θοινηθῆναι* in *Odyssey* 4.36 as ornamental; and, putting the cases together, we may also infer that when Aristotle calls Euripides' verb a *γλῶττα* or 'rare' word he is using this term more as we should, and not in the sense of 'alien.' In fact, I should set Euripides' *θοινᾶται* ('feasts on') pretty clearly among the examples of *κόσμος*.

The lovely bit of description above, in an episode where Odysseus again is asleep (in his tree), will remind us of other terrestrial paradises. The palace and garden of Alcinous, full of order and ornament, come in the next book (7.86–132); they are described while Odysseus 'stood and gazed,' that is, while the action also is pausing:

Brazen were the walls, . . . and round them was a frieze of blue [Shade of Addison!], and golden were the doors. . . .

Silver were the door-posts, . . . and silver the lintel thereupon, and the hook of the door was of gold. And on either side stood golden hounds and silver. . . . And without the court-yard . . . is a great garden. . . . And there grow tall trees blossoming, pear-trees and pomegranates, and apple-trees with bright fruit, and sweet figs, and olives in their bloom.

It was 'a sunny spot on level ground,' reminding us of Circe's home, the island of Calypso, and all the paradeses true and false preceding *Paradise Lost*, Book 4, and Cole-ridge's *Kubla Khan*. The Italian scholar Coli has made a great collection of them in his book on the terrestrial paradise of Dante. Nor may we omit to mention here the little paradise where Socrates and Phaedrus come to rest before the argument or action begins in Plato's dialogue. The reader seeking ornamental words will find abundance of them in the garden at the top of Dante's Purgatorial mount, as in *Paradise Lost*, and he will find the *Paradiso* proper of Dante rich in them. It begins with 'gloria,' is full of color, light, and incense, and beautiful motion, and ends with 'the stars.'

If the reader has been watching, and seen more of the ornamental words in the foregoing passages than I have specifically pointed out, I think he will now be ready to say with me that any word that is ornamental, whether adjective or noun or verb or adverb, is an ornamental word! Aristotle says that they are found in prose as well as verse. Doubtless they are more frequent in impassioned prose like that of Ruskin or De Quincey than in ordinary exposition. At a venture take the tricky paradise of Mark Twain in *A Double-Barreled Detective Story*, Part I, Chapter 4:

It was a crisp and spicy morning in early October. The lilacs and laburnums, lit with the glory-fires of autumn, hung

burning and flashing in the upper air, a fairy bridge provided by kind Nature for the wingless wild things that have their homes in the tree-tops and would visit together; the larch and the pomegranate flung their purple and yellow flames in brilliant broad splashes along the slanting sweep of the woodland; the sensuous fragrance of innumerable deciduous flowers rose upon the swooning atmosphere; far in the empty sky a solitary oesophagus slept upon motionless wing; everywhere brooded stillness, serenity, and the peace of God.

Are not April and October ornamental words for Chaucer and Mark Twain? And what of 'oesophagus'? It is not, as one of my colleagues seems still to regard it, the same as *λόηξ*, a *hapax legomenon*, and a kind of hawk; but surely it is ornamental.⁸ And perhaps this choice bit from Mark Twain will send some hunter of verbal ornaments to the Tale of *Sir Thopas* (Topaz—Chaucer's jewel):

The briddes synge, it is no nay,
The sparhawk and the papejay,
That joye it was to heere.

Or, in more serious vein, take Lincoln's 'We cannot dedicate, we cannot consecrate, we cannot hallow this ground.' Are not the ornamental words likely to receive a special stress, whether in prose or verse?—

With *malice* toward none, with *charity* for all.

Though I speak with the tongues of men and of *angels*.

Calm pleasures there abide, *majestic* pains.⁹

The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handiwork.

⁸ See also my article, *Mark Twain's Lilacs and Laburnums* in *Modern Language Notes* 47 (1932). 85-7.

⁹ Wordsworth, *Laodamia* 72.

If 'angel' is an ornamental word, and the combination 'Saints and Angels' is an ornament, should we tend to treat the word 'God' as one? It can be more so than the euphemistic substitute 'Adonai.' Yet 'Adonai' is by nature ornamental. It is, in fact, like a kenning, and the kennings of Germanic poetry, Old English and Old Norse, clearly share in the nature and purpose of ornamental words; or at least the beautiful kennings do. The kennings may grow too elaborate or trite. Students of Old English will recall that 'firmamentum' and 'rodor' are kennings for 'heofon,' the heaven, or variations of it.

If these words belong to prose as well as verse, we shall find others in the Bible, words like 'cherubim,' 'tabernacle,' and (Ps. 27.5) 'pavilion' (from the realm of architecture); in the Douai version, 'chalice,' which good Roman Catholics once preferred in Matt. 26.39 to 'cup':

Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from me.

In their Westminster version (1928) we now find 'cup.'

It may be argued that the ornamental quality of words is in part the outcome of our past associations or of their context at the moment, and again that in its setting a word may sound incongruous when by nature it is too ordinary or too ornamental. It might be over-ornamental in passages of great depth. No doubt Aristotle is right in expecting the poet to use the more elaborate diction when action, character, and thought are in abeyance. We can note the decorative words in preludes before the argument or action begins, in a texture like that of the prelusive strains of a musician, in dedications, eulogies, and psalms.

A term like *κόσμος*, 'ornament,' may, like other terms in the *Poetics*, be taken in a general sense, and also in a sense that is more specific. But even in its more specific sense it overlaps with other categories of poetic diction.

Thus a 'coined' word, the coinage of a single poet, might be ornamental; for instance, very likely the *ἐρυῖδας* ('horns') of *Poetics* 21.1457^b 35 might be so; and surely imitative words when they are beautiful, such as we find in Aristophanes' mimicry of birds and the like in external nature, are properly called ornamental; so also *θρεττανέο* *δ*, presumably the coinage of Philoxenus (see Aristophanes, *Plutus* 290, 296, and Rogers' translation, *Threttanelo!* *Threttanelo!*), and similar formations mimicking the sound of harps and other instruments. The fine word of one poet may often be accepted by another. Thus from Milton Coleridge takes the adjective 'cedarn,' while Wordsworth does not, and Scott takes it from Coleridge. The verbal gems and beauties of poetry are inherited from age to age, as the fraternity of poets levies on all other ornamental arts for the enrichment of poetic diction.

Paradoxically the usual name for a thing may on occasion be regarded as more ornamental than some finer word. It may be paradoxical to call 'cup' an ornamental word by the side of 'chalice.' But the familiar words for beauty, 'beauty' itself, 'array,' and the like, are ornamental. If you wish to bring a certain quality into your writing, use the words that mean that quality; do as painters do with pigments. Homer, says Matthew Arnold, is 'rapid.' Why not? His hero Achilles is 'swift of foot'; Hermes is speedy, and Iris, who is also the rainbow, is the 'swift' one (*ταχεῖα*). So when you wish to adorn Circe's palace (*Odyssey* 10.307-17, 348-72), do it with the words for gold and silver; do as Plutarch and Shakespeare after him (*Ant.* 2.2.196 ff.) have done with the Nile-arge of Cleopatra. Observe the Bible in its description of the verbal ornament (Prov. 25.11): 'A word fitly spoken is like apples of gold in pictures of silver.' Similarly, when you wish to convey the impression of beauty, use 'beauty,'

'grace,' and 'charm.' In Greek, use *κάλλος*; and when you wish to give the notion of 'adorning,' use *κόσμος* and *κοσμεῖν*. Homer uses *κόσμω* in the passage about Odysseus' final voyage and landing (13.77) in the sense of beautiful order. To Aristotle (*Poetics* 7.1450^b 37), beauty depends upon size and order. And when he, too, wishes to convey the notion of beautiful words, he uses *κόσμος* and *κοσμεῖν*; for him, I think, *τάξις* is an ordinary, not an ornamental, word. There may be the reason why this notably compact writer, thinking the point obvious and not in dispute, does not define *κόσμος* in his remarks on diction. The word defines and illustrates itself as other of his terms do not. Thus *κύριον* and *γλῶττα* (the customary and the rare word) being themselves Greek metaphors, perhaps not altogether dead, need definition, *μεταφορά*, the metaphor, needs and receives the longest explanation, and coined and compound, lengthened, shortened, and altered words need illustration. But what sort of words would one count on finding in poetry if not ornamental ones? The remark that they are found in prose as well is needed, and made.

If the *Poetics* as we have it is a set of lecture-notes, or notes for a seminarial discussion, then *κόσμος*, of all these terms for the elements of poetic diction, would most readily suggest the thing it signifies, and Aristotle could further illustrate it from his memory of other words in the descriptive lines about Odysseus brought to the Ithacan harbor asleep. The author of the *Poetics* would hardly expect this sketchy work to become the subject of textual debate and commentary by future scholars speaking and writing in alien tongues, or by persons who would try to explain his remarks on diction chiefly by his own curt usage without recourse to Homer. He probably would expect any who heard or read him to supply examples of

their own. At all events modern notions of him as an 'ancient' author, remote, unpractical, can make difficulties for us where no great cause of trouble exists in his text. We should think of him as a man of great good sense who kept his eye always on his object, and wishes us to do this with him.

And, frankly, it does seem odd to me now that anybody would try to make out what Aristotle meant by *enthymemes* without consulting more than one good speech for illustrations; or try to study syllogisms, or throw the Aristotelian account of them away, without considering them in the light of actual scientific writing; for I take it he got his theory of the syllogism by the inductive method, out of specimens of rigorous human composition. Just so I take it he found the ornamental word in ornate poetry and prose. Off-hand it would seem likely that poetry would teem with such words; that the one kind of word you might certainly expect to find, and could take for granted, in poetry would be this kind. 'Bait your hook with gaudy words,' says Kipling. Keats will 'load every rift with ore.' And 'Longinus,' with both prose and poetry in mind, says that 'beautiful words are the very light of thought.'

Aristotle's distinction between customary words and rare or alien, between *κύριον* and *γλωττα*, suggests one more consideration. To him, the 'rare' is an *alien* word. In one place, Thebes, let us say, the customary word is 'pool'; in another, Athens, it might be 'cistern.' A Theban poet, then, might embellish his style by using the alien or rare word 'cistern,' and in like manner an Athenian poet might use 'pool.' So our translators make Dante (*Inf.* 1.20) say 'in the pool of my heart,' where Wordsworth in the *Prelude* (5.327) uses 'cistern'; compare the reference to the heart in Ecclesiastes 12.6, 'the wheel broken at the cistern.' Our modern distinction between

rare and common words in poetry is rather that between the new (*now current*) and the archaic. This difference did not strike Aristotle in the *Poetics*. Why not?

Because, I think, so many words in the Homeric poems, while certainly not current in Attic Greek, were 'ornamental' and, through the popularity of Homer, not unfamiliar. The ornamental *ποτρία* of the *Rhetoric*, as used by Aristotle in deriding Cleophon, occurs some nineteen times in the *Odyssey* alone; it is characteristic also of the later Greek poetic diction. Every one would know such words. They would be ornamental, and yet neither current nor alien.

Meanwhile what of Quintilian? Let us merely give a part of Watson's analysis, and then quote here and there from Book 8, Chapter 3, in translation.

Of ornament of style; fondness for it in orators, § 1-4. It is, however, of service in gaining the attention of the audience, 5-6. What sort of ornament should be studied; some faults border on excellences, 7-10. Ornament must be varied according to the nature of the subject, 11-14. Ornament from the choice of words, 15-18. [There are ninety paragraphs in this chapter.]

But this ornament must, I repeat, be manly, bold, and chaste; let it affect no effeminate smoothness, nor the false hue of rouge, but glow with health and vigor. So true is this rule, that although, in the realm of ornament, virtue and vice are nowhere far apart, they who use a vicious style, disguise the vice with the name of virtue. (6-7.)

Should I regard a farm as better cultivated where the owner showed me lilies and violets and anemones, and fountains playing, than one in which there is a plentiful harvest, and vines laden with grapes? (8.)

Shall not beauty, then, be regarded in the planting of fruit-trees? Who will deny it? I would arrange my trees in a cer-

tain order, and observe regular intervals between them. What is more beautiful than the well-known quincunx, which, in whatever direction you view it, presents straight lines? (9.)

Since ornament, like clarity of language, will reside either in single words or in groups of words, we must consider what they require taken separately, and what in conjunction. . . . Since several words often mean the same thing (and such are called *synonyms*), some will be more becoming, or sublime, or bright, or pleasing, or euphonious, than others; for, as syllables formed of the better-sounding letters are nobler, so words formed of such syllables are more melodious; and the more vowels they contain the more agreeable they are to the ear. The same principle governs the joining of word to word; some combinations will sound better than others. (15-16.)

So much for Quintilian. Let me close with two passages, from Wordsworth and Milton, in which the gentle reader may hunt without pedantic interference for his verbal quarry — more species than one out of Aristotle's eight.

Mark how the feathered tenants of the flood,
 With grace of motion that might scarcely seem
 Inferior to angelical, prolong
 Their curious pastime! shaping in mid air
 (And sometimes with ambitious wing that soars
 High as the level of the mountain-tops)
 A circuit ampler than the lake beneath —
 Their own domain; but ever, while intent
 On tracing and retracing that large round,
 Their jubilant activity evolves
 Hundreds of curves and circlets, to and fro,
 Upward and downward, progress intricate
 Yet unperplexed, as if one spirit swayed
 Their indefatigable flight.¹⁰

¹⁰ *Waterfowl* 1-14; Wordsworth, *Poetical Works*, ed. by Hutchinson, p. 218.

Sabrina fair

 Listen where thou art sitting
Under the glassie, cool, translucent wave,
 In twisted braids of Lillies knitting
The loose train of thy amber-dropping hair,
 Listen for dear honour's sake,
Goddess of the silver lake,

 Listen and save.¹¹

¹¹ *Comus* 859-66.

PART II
REVIEWS

THE VILLAIN AS 'HERO'¹

(*Poetics* 13. 1452^b 36–1453^a 12)

Dr. Boyer's dissertation belongs to a class of 'studies' that of late have become more or less popular, in which the appearance of rakes, rascals, and other bad men in 'literature' is historically traced, with a wealth of examples arranged in an order that is partly chronological, and partly devised by the compiler. The present investigation gains dignity from its concern with the writings of Machiavelli and Seneca, and with characters of Shakespeare and Marlowe, and from its relation to the *Poetics* of Aristotle.

The table of contents (pp. ix–xii) gives a detailed analysis of the twelve chapters, of which the first is an Introduction (on the influence of Marlowe, the definitions of hero, villain, and 'villain-hero,' Aristotle's conception of the 'hero,' 'the spirit of the age,' and the like) and the other eleven bear the captions, Seneca, English Plays before Marlowe, Machiavelli, Marlowe and the Machiavellian Villain-Hero, The Ambitious Villain-Hero, The Ambitious Villain-Hero . . . the Perfected Type, The Revengeful Villain-Hero, Mixed Revenge Type, Changing Type, Later Ambitious Villains, and Macbeth. Four of the Appendices severally treat of *Charlemagne*, *The Merchant of Venice*, *Measure for Measure*, and *Appius and Virginia*; the fifth represents the Index or Table of Machiavelli's Maxims from Patericke's translation

¹ *The Villain as Hero in Elizabethan Tragedy*, by Clarence Valentine Boyer. London, George Routledge and Sons; New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1914. Pp. xii, 264.

From *The Journal of English and Germanic Philology* 15 (1916).443–51; by permission.

(?1577) of Gentillet. At the end of the volume there is a Bibliography of three pages, and an Index of fifteen.

Boyer is heavily indebted, it would seem, to Edward Meyer's *Machiavelli and the Elizabethan Drama*; in referring to authorities on the Senecan influence, he mentions Thorndike first — 'Cf. Thorndike, Cunliffe, etc.' (p. 13, note); among other sources of his ideas are Moulton, Bradley on *Shakespearean Tragedy*, and Butcher on the *Poetics* of Aristotle. His work reveals a sense of order, some power of combination, and not a little of the perseverance requisite to a progress through many of the plays he has read. In point of historical substance, the study is limited to the Elizabethan drama; but the mainspring of the dissertation is an attempt to examine a statement in Butcher's rendering of Aristotle, by applying it to various English tragedies; as a result, a generalization in the *Poetics* respecting the unfitness of the villain for the place of tragic 'hero' is pronounced to be not altogether valid. The present review will be mainly occupied with this leading thought.

But first, having alluded to the author's qualifications for his task, we may dwell for a moment upon what he chiefly lacks — an adequate knowledge of the Classics. Thus, professing to deal with the question of virtue and vice as they are discussed in the *Poetics*, he betrays no acquaintance with the *Nicomachean Ethics* or the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle, both of which must be consulted if one is to understand the Aristotelian theory of conduct and emotion in the drama. Further, he imperfectly comprehends the nature of the *Poetics* itself. Aside from the risk we run in detaching any one utterance therein and scrutinizing it without relation to the whole, we are to remember that the work is not a set of 'rules' (cf. p. vi, note), but a mixture of firm generalizations, and casual, sometimes conflicting,

suggestions; that it was composed, quite possibly as the basis for oral discussions with an academic group; and yet that primarily it was intended for the guidance of poets who might wish to construct, not second-best, but the best conceivable tragedies. Incidentally, Boyer is too deeply impressed by the article of Noyes which he cites on page 3; and he follows Butcher on *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, under an impression that this is the last word on the subject. Why did not the advice he received while studying at Princeton include a hint concerning the masterly edition (1909) of the *Poetics* by Ingram Bywater? Even so, he is forced to admit, in a postscript (Preface, p. vi, note) the discovery that Butcher anticipated the main point of the dissertation:

In stating (pp. 2-3) that Aristotle's dictum that the absolute villain was unfit for the part of protagonist had apparently been accepted without objection, I neglected by an oversight to call attention to the fact that S. H. Butcher, in the essay [*sic*] following his translation of Aristotle's *Poetics*, has pointed out . . . the inadequacy of Aristotle's rules when applied to such a tragedy as *Richard III*.

Finally, Boyer mistakes (by implicitly narrowing it) the range of phenomena that were open to the observation of a Greek critic who wrote sixty or seventy years after the death of Euripides:

Inducing his theory as he [Aristotle] did, however, simply from the Greek tragedies before him, the marvel is that, with the exception of one or two of Shakespeare's plays, his theory should prove to be universally applicable (pp. 94-5).

In point of fact, we know little about Greek tragedy after the time of Euripides,² though we may infer from Aristotle

² A. E. Haigh draws a melancholy picture of its decline, in *The Tragic Drama of the Greeks*, pp. 419 ff.

himself that Sisyphus and other 'villain-heroes' (to borrow the language of the dissertation) were not unpopular subjects in the decline of the serious drama. But the whole number of plays, beginning with the age of Aeschylus, or earlier, and coming down to that of Aristotle, must have been large enough to display a wide variety of themes and treatment. We have it on the authority of Suidas that the tragic poet Choerilus, who began to exhibit in the year 523 B.C., composed no fewer than one hundred and sixty plays,³ while Theodectes, born about 375, a friend of Aristotle, 'composed fifty plays with conspicuous success.'⁴ Speaking of the small proportion of Greek literature which has survived, and from which we too readily attempt to characterize the whole, Gilbert Murray writes:⁵

As for tragedy, there must have been, as far as we can calculate, well over nine hundred tragedies produced in Athens; we feel ourselves rich with thirty-three out of that number.

³ Haigh, *The Attic Theatre*, Third Edition, 1907, p 11

⁴ Haigh, *The Tragic Drama of the Greeks*, pp 424-425

⁵ *The Tradition of Greek Literature* in the *Yale Review* 2 (1913) 224

Compare what Murray says in the same article (pp 232-3) 'Suppose that as well as Aristotle's defence of slavery we had the writings of his opponents, the philosophers who maintained that slavery was contrary to nature. Suppose that, to compare with Plato's contemptuous references to the Orphics, we had some of that "crowd of books" which he speaks of. Suppose instead of Philodemus we had all Heracitus and Empedocles and the early Pythagoreans. Suppose we had Antisthenes and the first Cynics, the barefooted denouncers of sin and rejectors of civilization. Suppose we had that great monument of bitter eloquence and scorn of human greatness applied to history, the *Philipica* of Theopompus. Suppose we had the great democracy of the fifth century represented, not by its opponents, but by the philosophers who believed in it—by Protagoras, say, and Thrasymachus. Suppose that we had more of the women writers—Sappho, above all, and Corinna, and Nossis, and Leontion. Suppose we even had more literature like that startling realistic lyric, Grenfell's Alexandrian Erotic fragment, in which the tragedy is, that between a man and a woman *Cyprus* has taken the place of *philia*'. See also R W Livingstone, *The Greek Genius and its Meaning to Us*, p 16. 'Many books about the Greeks have stumbled, and many criticisms on them blundered, because their makers have either tacitly stopped at Aristotle, and omitted developments subsequent to him, or have forgotten that there were movements in Greece which have left no literature behind, or at best only a literature of fragments.'

This is conservative arithmetic, if Aeschylus wrote ninety plays, Sophocles one hundred and twenty-three, and Euripides ninety-two, and if many of the other poets listed by Nauck and Haigh were half as fertile.⁶ A rough estimate of the number of Elizabethan and Jacobean plays (not tragedies alone) might give a figure not greatly in excess of one thousand. But in Greece the range of subjects, as well as the number of plays, was larger than at first sight would appear. 'Though the poets began by accepting *any tragic story that came to hand*', says Aristotle,⁷ '*in these days* [that is, in the later Attic drama] *the finest* tragedies are always on the story of some few *houses*, on that of Alcmeon, Oedipus, Orestes, Meleager, Thyestes, Telephus, or *any others* that may have been involved, as either agents or sufferers, in some deed of horror.' I have printed several phrases, including the words 'or any others,' in italics, so as to shift the emphasis to some of the implications. Even with reference to the best dramatists of his own age, the language of Aristotle is elastic; and one might suggest that the legends of these few and a few other 'houses' in mere outline fill some three hundred pages of condensed narrative in Grote's *History of Greece*. A glance at the first volume of Grote is salutary when one is tempted to think that from first to last the tragic poets had but limited materials to work with.

For certain misconceptions regarding the *Poetics* Boyer no doubt is less to blame than are various books which the student of English may be urged to read, in lieu of the Greek Classics themselves, when he wishes to compare the modern with the ancient drama; and that is why one may bear heavily upon what might appear to be adventitious mistakes in a thesis of this kind. The talk about Aristotle's

⁶ Haigh, *The Tragic Drama of the Greeks*, Appendix I (pp. 463-72)

⁷ *Poetics* 13 1453^a 17-22, Bywater, p. 37

'rules' dies hard — will it ever wholly cease? And the supposedly narrow range of subjects that were within the reach of the Greek poet, and of the tragedies known to Aristotle, is probably inferred from Butcher or Thorndike. But it is Boyer's own fault, and a serious one, that, whereas there are two cardinal passages in Aristotle on the 'villain-hero,'⁸ his study of the *Poetics* has not carried him beyond the first. Is it his misfortune that, even for the single passage which he uses, he has followed the interpretation of Butcher, and has not examined the edition of Bywater?

The trouble, of which Boyer is unaware, lies in the meaning of a term that occurs in both passages. In each case Butcher, in deference to the authority of Twining, and not to the facts of experience, misinterprets the word *φιλάνθρωπον*, with which Aristotle describes the feelings evoked in us by the overthrow of an extremely bad man, or of extremely bad men (plural), in tragedy. In the first instance, then, we have the translation quoted on page 5–6 of the dissertation:

For the downfall of the utter villain, although it 'would doubtless satisfy the moral sense [*φιλάνθρωπον ἔχοι*], would inspire neither pity nor fear.'

In other words, Butcher makes Aristotle say that the effect upon us is *not* akin to the emotions of pity and fear; it touches our sense of justice, since we feel that the bad man in his overthrow obtains what he deserves. We shall shortly turn to Bywater's rendering of both this first passage and the second, where we may find a proper understanding of *φιλάνθρωπον* as 'the human feeling in us'; that is, the downfall of a villain may be represented in such

⁸ *Poetics* 13 1452^b 36–1453^a 7 and 18 1456^a 19–25. A third passage, 25 1461^b 19–21, is important, but I can make only incidental use of it in this article.

a way as to stir our emotions, but not pity and fear as Aristotle defines them.

Meanwhile let us note one or two of Boyer's own observations, and first what he thinks of gratuitous villainy. On page 58 there is an allusion to the attempt of Marlowe's Barabas to poison his daughter as something 'manifestly contrary to human nature' — which is virtually the Aristotelian objection to the use of such an incident. What is contrary to human nature is not 'probable' or 'typical' in the sense of the *Poetics*. But Boyer has already defined this kind of hero on page 6:

When a character deliberately opposes moral law from wilfulness, and for the purpose of advancing his own interests, recognizing at the same time the sanction of the law he defies, we call him a 'villain.'

Such a person, of course, might have redeeming qualities, as, for example, courage. Aristotle, in the first passage, speaks of 'an extremely bad man,' or of 'extremely bad men'; he cannot refer to men so remote from human sympathy that a tender-hearted spectator would have no 'human feeling' for them. If pressed, the author of the *Poetics* would, I suppose, be compelled to admit that, as distinguished from 'an extremely bad man,' the 'utter villain' (see Butcher's translation) was bereft of every virtue discussed in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and in the matter of vices had those that were farthest removed from the golden mean. Wanting the intermediate virtue of true courage, such a character would be, not rash or foolhardy, but a coward. And so on through the list of vices recorded in the *Ethics*; a character utterly remote from virtue (unless some of the vices are incompatible) would be, perhaps, cowardly, intemperate, niggardly, vulgar, mean-minded, ambitionless, spiritless, surly, boastful, boorish, shameless,

and spiteful. On the contrary, any one possessed of 'autonomy of will' cannot in the Aristotelian scheme be regarded as wholly without virtue.

It appears, however, that such 'villain-heroes' as arouse for Boyer, not the Aristotelian pity and fear, but some kindred emotion or emotions (pp 92-4) are not without qualities to recommend them. Macbeth, for example, has, not the Aristotelian courage, but something more nearly approaching it than does cowardice.

We are now, I believe, in a position to take up the passage in Aristotle which Boyer thinks is not in keeping with the successful treatment of the 'villain-hero' in a very few out of the many Elizabethan plays where 'the type' appears, and to append the passage which he has neglected to consider. I have little more to do than to quote the translation of Bywater and two of his notes, and shall content myself with a few subordinate explanations. The Greek text is presumably accessible to those who may wish to consult it. In Bywater's version *Poetics* 13.1453^a 1-7 reads:

Nor, on the other hand, should an extremely bad man be seen falling from happiness into misery. Such a story may arouse the human feeling in us, but it will not move us to either pity or fear; pity is occasioned by undeserved misfortune, and fear by that of one like ourselves; so that there will be nothing either piteous or fear-inspiring in the situation.

The passage which Boyer has neglected, *Poetics* 18.1456^a 19-25, Bywater thus translates:

Yet in their Peripeties [representations of a reversal of fortune], as also in their simple plots, the poets I mean show wonderful skill in aiming at the kind of effect they desire — a tragic situation that arouses the human feeling in one, like the clever villain (e. g., Sisyphus) deceived, or the brave wrongdoer

miseration even for the wicked in misfortune; this feeling, however, is not pity proper, since it lacks the moral basis of all pity, the belief that the misfortune is not deserved. This interpretation of $\tau\delta\ \phi\iota\lambda\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\sigma\tau\sigma$ accords with the use of the term in the context, . . . as well as with the ordinary Greek conception of $\phi\iota\lambda\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\lambda$. . . A certain affinity between $\phi\iota\lambda\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\lambda$ and pity is recognized in *Rhetoric* 2.13 1390^a 19. . . . A very different sense has been attached to the word by Twining and others, who suppose that the situation described as $\phi\iota\lambda\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\sigma\tau\sigma$ is one that satisfies our sense of poetical justice, a true lover of mankind being bound to rejoice at the punishment of evildoers. Any one who remembers what $\phi\iota\lambda\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\lambda$ meant to a Greek will at once see the improbability of this somewhat artificial rendering of $\tau\delta\ \phi\iota\lambda\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\sigma\tau\sigma$ in Aristotle⁹

Such is Bywater's comment on the first of the two passages; in a note on the second he recurs to the same point:

Aristotle's theory is that the tragic situation should be ἐλεευόν [pitiful]—which implies that the sufferer does not deserve his misfortunes; . . . he incidentally admits, however, that it may be only $\phi\iota\lambda\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\sigma\tau\sigma$, . . . as it is, for instance, when the sufferings of the wicked are put before us in such a way as to arouse a certain commiseration or human feeling for the sufferers. The later Tragedy would seem to have affected this inferior form of tragic motive¹⁰

Boyer has set up a man of straw that he calls 'Aristotle,' and has laid him low—in vain. Far from disagreeing with the *Poetics*, his interesting analysis of the emotions aroused by the villains of Shakespeare and Marlowe tends in the main to illustrate the inferences of the Greek critic, and on the whole to substantiate the correctness of Bywater's interpretation. For example, on page 52 he says of Marlowe's Barabas:

⁹ Bywater, p. 214.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 254

The hero commences his tragic career out of hatred and revenge, pursues his plot by guile, but oversteps all bounds of justice and reason in the cruelty of his deeds, and is finally taken in his own toils and destroyed.

That the fall of such a man should fail to stir in us either pity or fear is to be expected; but that a man in whom are to be found the above characteristics, calculated to produce only hatred, should at any stage of his career touch our sympathy, nay, more, rouse a wondering admiration, as Barabas does, is a matter for serious consideration. The explanation lies in the fact that Barabas is not *simply* evil; along with the evil he has elements of greatness in his character, such as courage, intellect, and marked ability.

Again, we learn on page 84 that before the murder of the children Shakespeare's Richard 'has our sympathy just as Barabas has — not the sympathy of pity, unless it be for his physical deformity, but sympathetic understanding'; for (p. 85) 'Richard, like Barabas, not only has bad qualities, but admirable qualities, and admirable in the highest degree.' Or again (pp. 91-2): 'We do not admire the villain in him, but the great talents [that is, Greek 'virtues'] which he turns to villainous ends.' Or finally (p. 92): 'And yet the word pity, because we usually apply the term to the individual, does not adequately express the nature of the emotion aroused by the tragedy of *Richard III*.' As for the revulsion which we feel in the presence of gratuitous villainy with no bearing on the progress of the story, Boyer's language is essentially at one with the position taken in the *Poetics*. If the fag-end of Greek tragedy contained as many instances of badly 'motivated' wickedness and horror as Boyer has collected from the Elizabethan drama outside of Shakespeare, we need not grieve over the Alexandrian criticism that sifted them away into oblivion, and has spared us the necessity of studying them. There

is revolting horror enough in Seneca, who clearly reflects, though he doubtless exaggerates, most, or all, of the faults which we find condemned by Aristotle in some of the poets of his day. One need not risk an answer to the question whether the taste of the Athenian audience was ever on quite the same plane as the early Elizabethan with respect to similar faults. But we hope that this dissertation does not altogether represent the taste of our own day in the conclusion (p. 219) that *Macbeth* 'fulfils all the requisites of great tragedy' 'May we not without high treason,' asks Dowden, 'admit that Shakespeare at times could write in a tumid style?' May we not also admit that the poet here shows wonderful skill in aiming at the kind of effect he desires — a tragic situation that arouses the human feeling in one, where the brave wrongdoer is worsted — but that for the arousing of true pity he chose a better story in *King Lear*, and certainly has shown not inferior skill (one thinks of the bad fourth act in *Macbeth*) in elaborating it?

I have given this review its special shape partly in order to bring to the attention of students of English the edition of Bywater, for they still cling to the suggestive, but at times artificial and even sophistical work of Butcher. In the preparation for my own rendering of the *Poetics*, I learned that Butcher can be misleading where Bywater is safe and direct. Still, it would not be just to leave the reader with the impression that Boyer's essay is unworthy of notice. On the contrary, it is a promising study, and in many ways should be recommended to his fellow laborers in a field so diligently cultivated at the present time as is the Elizabethan drama. For one thing, the author has not been content merely to follow the development of a particular phenomenon without considering the end or purpose of it in relation to some general stand-

ard of value. That I may not seem, however, to neglect the more restricted interests involved, let me add one or two minor suggestions

The origins of the villain in the English drama are not to be looked for in history alone, nor, outside of that, only in the Machiavellian and Senecan tradition. There is, for example, a bond of affinity between the scheming Ancient, Iago, who sets things in motion in *Othello* in order to plume up his will in double knavery, and the scheming slave, derived from Greece, who pulls the strings in Plautus and Terence. Besides this, as my friend Professor Adams reminds me, one must consider the delight of the Elizabethan audience in representations of the Jew and the Turk as such, when both Jew and Turk, if they were to be in character, must be delineated as villains. Finally, we may note that *Richard the Third* is classed with the Histories, and that, as King James traced his descent from Banquo, and as Shakespeare's troupe had been taken under the royal patronage, there was a strong historical interest attaching to the story of *Macbeth* at the time of its composition. These are matters which should not be lost sight of when one is dealing with the tragic catharsis in Shakespeare.

Since the criticism of Boyer was first printed we have had special studies made at Cornell University of points related to the foregoing; and with respect to the conjoint problem of the extremes of goodness and badness in tragic character, and persons of the drama at various levels between, special mention may be made of the following three typewritten essays that have been submitted for the degree of Master of Arts, thus listed in the catalogue of the University Library: *Aristotle's Poetics and the Tragic*

Art of Sophocles, . . . by Winifred Comstock (June, 1926, pp. 102); *The 'Villain' in Greek Drama*, . . . by Bernard Stambler (June, 1932, pp. 72); *Tragic Hamartia in the Iliad, the Odyssey, and Sophocles' Antigone*, . . . by Mary Fuertes Boynton (June, 1935, pp. iii, 65).

Miss Comstock (now Mrs. Wilfred Bowman) has much to say of the character of Sophocles' Antigone, wherein it is good, wherein not so good, and its relation to the outcome of the play bearing this name. She does not make the mistake of assuming that Antigone is too good for tragedy, but agrees with Aristotle that tragic *ethos* must be good. Butcher in his chapter on the character of the tragic 'hero' (p. 309) thinks that only by a 'misplaced ingenuity' is it possible to argue that Antigone displays a tragic *hamartia*, or in anything falls short of superlative goodness. In similar vein Elizabeth Woodbridge, in *The Drama, its Law and its Technique* (p. 40) says of Antigone: 'She chooses to break the law of the State, and by the State she dies' — as if her death in no degree arose from a flaw in character. The truth is that she dies by her own hand, as Haemon her betrothed and Eurydice his mother die by theirs; that she dies when the State in the person of her uncle is on the way to save her; and that the Greeks looked at suicide with more horror than did the Romans and the age of Elizabeth in England, or than does the callous present age in America.

Miss Comstock does seem to think that Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* applauds the character of Antigone throughout when he applauds the fine appeal she makes to universal or natural law as distinguished from arbitrary and written law.¹¹ Elsewhere in the *Rhetoric*¹² Aristotle perceives a queer thing in Antigone — that she should put her duty to her dead brother before her duty to the living Haemon.

¹¹ *Rhetoric* 1.13.1373^b 3-11

¹² 3.16.1417^a 27-33.

Her position, in the view of modern betrothed maidens as well as Aristotle, is 'unlikely,' and according to Aristotle the incredible element in it must be argued away by her saying that, since her parents are dead, she can have no more brothers, whereas possible husbands are numerous! Aristotle is not discussing the play, but a point in rhetoric, and hence would have no reason for saying, what is true of the play, that the choice of death instead of life pervades it, and helps to make it tragic; another instance is Creon's later decision to bury the dead Polyneices before he goes to release the living Antigone from her tomb.

Miss Comstock does see that the first burial of Polyneices by Antigone better exemplifies obedience to the higher law than does the second. Few others see it too well. Sophocles saw it, and tried to make the spectator do the like; since there are dramatic grounds for repeating the episode of the burial, and a second burial is not put in merely to lengthen the play. In the first she is protected by divine intervention. In the second she is not; it reveals her passionate persistence, mingled with love. The symbolic rite once accomplished, she need not have jeopardized her life again. Here, as in her trial by Creon, she is a virtual suicide. In the trial, when it is her duty to defend her life before Creon, her uncle as well as king, she proceeds to infuriate him, though not to the point where he will carry out his original edict that the person who shall dare to bury Polyneices shall be stoned to death. With respect to the second rite Miss Comstock (pp. 45-6) makes the proper inquiry:

Here let us see whether this second burial could be removed without destroying the unity of the plot. If it were removed, there are two alternatives. Either Antigone would escape the first time, as she actually does in the play, and hence there would

be no tragedy, or she would be captured the first time. But in that case we should not see that it was an error in judgment that caused her downfall. We cannot say that she erred in burying her brother, and hence her death would be revolting to us, as it would represent a faultless person falling from happiness to misery.

A great merit in Mrs. Boynton's work is her study of the term *ἀμαρτία* (*hamartia*) and cognate words before and after Aristotle, together with its use by him; her quotations from Homer, the tragic poets, Plato, Thucydides, and others, are of high value.¹³ For her interpretation of Sophocles' *Antigone*, she begins with August Boeckh and his translation of the play, and his two dissertations thereto appended, 180 pages of commentary, from which she quotes, on Antigone and Creon:¹⁴ 'Waren beide . . . völlig besonnen und hielten das Mass, so habe die Tragodie auf.' ('If both Antigone and Creon had been perfectly considerate, and observant of due measure, the tragedy would disappear.')

She is aware that it takes more than one person (heroine or hero) to make a tragedy, and that the more persons there are in a drama who are good (with a flaw), true to type, true to life, and consistent, or with inconsistencies rightly portrayed, the more tragic will be the outcome of their interacting errors and deeds. She adds (p. 40):

Let us see what would happen to the tragedy if Creon alone were to become completely sweet, reasonable, and temperate, and Antigone [were to] remain as passionate as she is. Then let us assume the reverse; let Creon remain as Sophocles created

¹³ See also O. Hey, *Philologus* 83 (1927) 1–17, 137–63, his views regarding *hamartia* are impaired by an unwarranted distinction between 'moral' and 'intellectual' concepts. The distinction between deliberate and impulsive wrongdoing is more important.

¹⁴ *Des Sophocles Antigone, nebst zwei Abhandlungen*, Berlin, 1843, p. 161.

him, and Antigone be altogether self-controlled and observant of due measure.

Mrs. Boynton proceeds to work out these hypothetical situations in a very illuminating way. It is a most telling study for the light it throws upon the right degree of goodness in tragic persons, and the extent to which they must fall short of goodness through error, but not through the deliberate choice of evil ways.

Mr. Stambler began with approximately the view entertained by Butcher and Boyer, and studied all the instances of bad men or 'villains' that he could assemble from ancient tragic story, his sources being (p. 3) 'the ancient mythographers, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, the extant Greek tragedies, and the fragments of the lost plays.' These instances include Aegisthus, Agrius (as in the fragments of Euripides' *Oeneus*), Amycus, Antaeus, Astydamia, Atreus, Autolycus, Diomedes, Eriphyle, Eurystheus, Ixion, Lamia, Laomedon, Lycaon, Lycurgus, Medea, Menelaus, as presented by the later poets, Odysseus, as similarly presented, Pelias, Polymnestor, Polyphontes, Procrustes, Salmoneus, Sciron, Sinis, Sisyphus, Tantalus, Tereus, Thersites, Thyestes, and others. Aegisthus and Clytemnestra in the Oresteia of Aeschylus receive special treatment in the essay. Of the bad men and women in general Stambler says (pp. 43-4):

Of the 114 villain-dramas herein listed, seventeen, including four satyr-dramas, were written by Aeschylus; twenty-three by Sophocles, with three satyr-dramas, and twenty-six by Euripides, including seven satyr-dramas. Of the works of the minor dramatists, five villain-dramas were written by poets belonging to the school of Aeschylus; and, with the exception of one or two, the rest were written by poets contemporary with or posterior to Euripides.

The increase in villain-dramas from Aeschylus to Euripides is shown not so well in the number each wrote as in the extent to which each dramatist made his persons evil. . . .

But best of all, this change is shown in the characters of Odysseus, Menelaus, and others as conceived, on the one hand, by Homer and Aeschylus, and, on the other, by Euripides and his followers. . . . Symonds describes the altered conception of the dramatic art. 'In passing to Euripides we feel how much we have lost. The religious foundation has been broken up; the clear intuitive morality of Sophocles has been exchanged for sophistry, debate, hypothesis, and paradox.'¹⁵ . . .

One tendency of the villain-drama is best shown in the *satyricum*. So far as can be ascertained, the depiction of villainy overthrown was by far the most popular theme of the satyr-drama. In consequence, this tendency, while characteristic of the satyr-drama as a whole, does seem to be intimately related to the presence of evil persons in these plays.

So the upshot was that Stambler found villains as frequent in ancient as in later dramas, and that his study of 'the brave wrongdoer worsted' and 'the clever villain outwitted' made him a little less tolerant of the plays built around them than is Aristotle in the passages for which Boyer took him to task. I can but recommend in very high terms the last forty pages or so of Stambler as the final utterance on his subject, and only regret that so far they have not been printed.

And now, having discussed Antigone who is often thought to be too good for tragedy, and the villains who are too bad, I find no better place than this to bring together from the *Poetics* a number of passages on tragic *ethos* in a revised translation. In the chief passage, from Chapter 13, there may be some special reason why Aris-

¹⁵ John Addington Symonds, chapter on Greek Tragedy and Euripides, in *Studies of the Greek Poets*, American edition (Harper) 2.23

totle in talking of the good and the bad should pass from the plural to the singular number, and back to the plural again; in translating, Bywater, among others, tends to use the singular throughout. It is unsafe to do that. We note that in English one is often virtually forced to supply the word 'man' or 'men' where the Greek may use an adjective for a noun, as 'good'; note also that the Greek is elastic enough to mean male or female person of whatever time of life. I have put 'man' or 'men' in brackets when the word is supplied in the translation, and is not found in the original; some other interpolated words have likewise been included within brackets; but not all, for reasons obvious to any one who has attempted translating from Aristotle.

2 1448^a 1-5, 16-18 The objects of artistic imitation are [human beings] in action, [men performing or undergoing something] And the agents must be either of a higher or a lower type; for virtually all the distinctions in human character are derived from the primary distinction between goodness and badness which divides the human race It follows that [in the imitation] the [agents] must be represented as better than we ourselves, or worse, or some such men as we . . . Now, so far as the objects of the imitation are concerned, [the nobility of the agents] is what distinguishes Tragedy from Comedy. Comedy tends to represent [the agents] as worse, and Tragedy as better, than the [men] of the present day.

8 1451^a 16-25. A plot is one, not, as some think, when it is about one [man]; for the number of accidents that befall the individual [person] is endless, and some of them cannot be reduced to unity So, too, during the life of any one [man] he performs many deeds which cannot be brought together in the form of a unified action. We see, therefore, the faulty choice of subject by such poets as have written a *Heracleid*

or a *Theseid*, or the like; they suppose that, since Heracles or Theseus was a single [person], the story of Heracles or Theseus must have unity. Homer, on the contrary, whether by conscious art or native insight, evidently understood the correct method, for he excels the rest of the epic poets in this as in all other respects. Thus, in composing a story of Odysseus, he did not make his plot include all that ever happened to Odysseus.

^{13.1452 b 28-1453 a 17.} Following what has been said up to this point, we must next discuss the ideal structure of the plot which will bring about the fullest measure of tragic effect. (1) What is the poet to aim at, and what is he to avoid, in the construction of his plots? In other words, (2) what are the specific sources of tragic *catharsis*?

In the best tragedy . . . the synthesis of the incidents must be, not uninvolved, but involved, and the synthesis must be imitative of events that arouse pity and fear; for therein lies the distinctive function of this kind of imitation. When we take this function as a standard, it is clear that there are three forms of plot to be avoided. (1) Good and just men are not to be represented as falling from happiness into misery; for such a spectacle does not arouse fear or pity in us—it is simply revolting. (2) Nor must the bad [plural] be represented as rising from ill fortune to prosperity; for this is the most untragic situation of all. It does not stir our general human sympathy, nor arouse tragic pity or tragic fear. (3) Nor, again, may an excessively wicked [man]¹⁶ be represented as falling from prosperity into misfortune. Such a course of events may arouse in us some measure of human sympathy, but not the emotions of pity and fear. For, to define: Pity is what we feel at a misfortune that is out of proportion to the faults of a man; and Fear is what we feel when misfortune comes upon one like ourselves. [Now the excessively wicked man deserves misery in proportion; and since his wickedness

¹⁶ There is a question whether we should here read a singular with Bywater, or a plural with Gudeman.

exceeds the average, he is not like one of us.] Accordingly, in this third situation there is nothing to arouse either pity or fear. There remains, then, (4) the case [of the man] intermediate between these extremes. [a man] of the sort not superlatively good and just, nor yet one whose misfortune comes about through vice or depravity; but one who is brought low through some *hamartia* [error or shortcoming], one from the number of the highly renowned and prosperous — such a [person] as Oedipus [of the line of Thebes], Thyestes [of Pelops' line], and the eminent men of other noted families.

To be perfectly tragic, accordingly, the plot must not, as some hold, have a double issue, fortunate for the good, unfortunate for the bad, but a single one. And the change of fortune must be, not a rise from misery to happiness, but just the contrary, a fall from happiness to misery; and the fall must come about, not through depravity, but through a great *hamartia*, in a [person] such as we have described [either as good as the average of mankind], or better than that rather than worse.

15 1454^a 16-36. We turn to the moral dispositions [of the agents]. In respect to these, there are four things for the poet to aim at. First and foremost, they must be (1) good. The ethical element will be present in a tragedy if . . . by speech or act, [the agents] manifest a certain moral bent in what they choose to do or avoid; and the *ethos* will be good if the habit of choice is good. ['Good,' of course, means good in its kind, performing its function, good for something; but off-hand it here means tending to be kind, and loving justice.] Such goodness is possible in all types of humanity; so a woman may be good, and a slave, though a woman may be thought an inferior type, and the slave an altogether low one. (2) They must be true to type. There is, for example, a type of manly valor and eloquence; but it would be inappropriate for the poet to represent a woman as valorous in this way, or as masterly in argument. (3) Thirdly, they must be true to life, which is something different from making them good or true

to type, as these terms have just been defined (4) Fourthly, they must be consistent, [true to their own nature throughout the play] Even if the person whom the poet is representing [as Achilles] should happen to be inconsistent, and should be taken as an example of that type, still the representation should be consistently inconsistent. [It must have unity] . . .

As in combining the incidents of the plot, so also in representing the character of the agents, the poet must seek after a necessary or probable relation between one thing and another. That is, a certain kind of person must speak or act in a certain fashion as the necessary or probable outcome of his inward nature; and thus one thing will follow another in a necessary or probable sequence

15.1454^b 8-14 Since Tragedy is an imitation of [men] better than the ordinary, it is necessary for the tragic poet to observe the method of good portrait-painters, for they reproduce the distinctive features of the original, and yet, while preserving the likeness of a man [plural adjective], ennable him in the picture So, too, the poet in imitating [men] who are quick to anger, or are easy-going [careless, slack], or have other infirmities of disposition, must represent them as such, and yet as kind and honorable [*ἐπιεικεῖς*], as Homer makes Achilles an exemplar of hard-heartedness, and yet as good [*ἀγαθὸν*].

18.1456^a 19-25. Contemporary poets, however, show marvelous skill in constructing Reversals, and also uninvolved situations, with a view to producing the effects they desire, their aim being to arouse the tragic emotions, and a general human sympathy. This sympathy is aroused when a man combining intelligence with villainy, like Sisyphus, is outwitted, or when one is brought low who is brave and does wrong. In these cases, however, the outcome is probable only in Agathon's sense it is likely, he says, that many unlikely things will occur.

25.1461^a 4-8. As for the question whether something said or done by some one in a poem is proper or not; to answer

this we must not merely consider the intrinsic quality of the act or utterance, to see whether it is noble or base in itself, we must also consider (a) the [person] who does or says the thing, (b) the [person] to whom it is done or said, or (c) when, or (d) in whose interest, or (e) with what motive it is done or said.

25 1461^b 19-20 The censure of the critic is just, however, when it is directed against improbability [in the plot], and, similarly, against depravity [in the agents]; that is, when there is no inner necessity [for a base agent], and when the irrational element serves no purpose.

GUDEMAN'S TRANSLATION OF THE *POETICS*¹

When Bywater's masterly edition of the *Poetics* appeared in 1909 (followed by a smaller edition, restricted to the text, in 1911), to many scholars it must have seemed that, for our time, we now had something definitive, upon which all subsequent interpretation of the work must mainly rest. But in 1920 Professor Gudeman, who needs no introduction in America, published a subtle and in most ways convincing article, *Die Syrisch-Arabische Uebersetzung der Aristotelischen Poetik*,² in which he showed the value of a means to textual criticism that Bywater had virtually — not quite wholly — neglected. In *The Classical Weekly* for January 16, 1922,³ I referred to Gudeman's acute investigation, and its amazing results. With the help of modern Latin translations from the Arabic, he has found that the wretched Arabic tradition goes back, through the Syriac, to a Greek manuscript, otherwise unknown to us, of a date not later than the fifth or the sixth century, and hence earlier by four or five centuries than any manuscript of the *Poetics* now extant; that manuscript, he is convinced, was better than the best we now possess; and the results of his study include more than 400 variant readings, many of which he is ready to accept for the critical edition of the *Poetics* he intends to publish as soon as he can.⁴

¹ *Aristoteles Ueber die Dichtkunst*, Neu Uebersetzt, von Alfred Gudeman Leipzig, Felix Meiner, 1921. Pp. xxiv, 91.

From *The Classical Weekly* 17 (1923) 55–6, by permission

² *Philologus* 76 (1920) 239–65

³ 15 (1922). 95–6.

⁴ See below, p. 219.

When, however, he was asked to revise the German translation by Ueberweg (1869), he was able to utilize much of his new information regarding the text, discarding the work of Ueberweg altogether. His new rendering, he tells us, differs from the text of Vahlen (1885) in nearly 300 places, chiefly because of the studies we have mentioned. The article in *Philologus* would give us some basis for judging the differences, but of course what we need for this purpose is his actual text; that we shall await with interest — let us hope, not too long.

Even as matters stand, the new translation strikes one as conservative, more so than Ueberweg's, more so than Bywater's. Gudeman sticks to the Greek. Whether German, with its highly developed philosophical and technical vocabulary, makes a better medium than English for a modern translation of Aristotle, I cannot say. At all events much credit should be given to the skill of the translator, to his cosmopolitan training and command of languages, and to a constant desire not to misrepresent his author. This German rendering gives a reader the truest impression of the original I have seen in any modern tongue. Paragraph after paragraph, so far as I can judge, with great fidelity to the Greek idiom it also reads like natural idiomatic German, save for the occasional direct borrowing of a Greek word — for example, 'Auletik und Kitharistik' (p. 1), where Bywater writes 'flute-playing and lyre-playing.'

The book is in every way helpful. First come four pages or more giving a schematic survey of the treatise — an analytical Table of Contents. Fourteen pages of Introduction, compressed but interesting, deal with the significance of the *Poetics*, the *Poetics* in antiquity, a history of the text, the *Poetics* in modern times, and the sources of information, in other technical or non-technical works, that were

open to Aristotle. The translation occupies sixty-seven pages. Here footnotes give references to passages in Homer, the tragic poets, and the like, which are quoted or alluded to by Aristotle, and make clear, as far as may be, various doubtful details. Following the practice of Jebb and other experienced translators, Gudeman spells Greek words and phrases in Latin letters when a point should be made clear in that way to the modern reader. At the end we have two explanatory indexes of great utility — an Index of Names (fifteen pages), and an Index of Subjects (nine pages); they are in fact small encyclopedias.

All in all, one could hardly give too much praise to this compact and lucid volume. Yet I think that the translator should have paid more attention to Bywater's Commentary; he imagines that Bywater was too definitely influenced by Vahlen, and seems to regard the latter as the standard for views hitherto accepted; but surely Bywater makes a notable advance upon Vahlen; his edition, thus far the best, is among the finest pieces of classical scholarship in our day.

I shall mention but a few of the points I have marked for private reconsideration. In the Index of Names (p. 68) it is stated that Aristotle pays very little attention to Aeschylus, and actually ignores the structure of the trilogy. But the Aeschylean structure may be alluded to in *Poetics* 24.1459^b 20-2. Again, on page 69, we find the influence of a notion, held by Meineke, and, so far as I know, by every one else on the Continent except Emil Brentano, that Aristotle underrated Aristophanes and his form of comedy; the notion goes back in some way to the Renaissance, and probably is one of the numerous mistakes of pioneering scholarship in Italy. There seems to be not a shred of tangible evidence for this prevalent belief; for a discussion of the point I must refer to my volume published in 1922, *An*

Aristotelian Theory of Comedy. The outstanding fact is that Aristotle, in *Poetics* 3.1448^a 25-7, mentions Homer, Sophocles, and Aristophanes in one breath as the respective leaders of epic poetry, tragedy, and comedy. The present translation might well have included the so-called *Tractatus Corinianus*, and a page or two of discussion on that interesting analysis of comedy. Vahlen gives the text in his edition of the *Poetics*, Bywater slights the importance of it; in my volume referred to above, I join with Rutherford and Starkie, and go beyond them, in rehabilitating that analysis as a part of the Aristotelian tradition. Whatever its ultimate source, the Tractate is of value in the study of the Greek drama.

Finally, Gudeman holds that the more extended account of the term *catharsis*, which the *Politics*⁵ leads us to expect in the *Poetics*, has fallen out of the latter work immediately after the celebrated definition of tragedy.⁶ No evidence is given for the unqualified assertion. Since the Arabic version does not indicate a gap at this point, I suggest that the extant *Poetics* satisfies the reference in the *Politics* as well as many other references from one work of Aristotle to another are satisfied. To take only the references between two parts of the same work, we note that his method is often loose enough. Thus at the beginning of the *Rhetoric* he calls this art a counterpart (*ἀντίστροφος*) of dialectic; rhetoric and dialectic are related to each other like the antiphonal songs of a chorus. In the very next chapter we read: 'For rhetoric is a part of dialectic, and an image [*δημοίωμα*] of it, *precisely as we said at the beginning*'! Similar cases could be multiplied — not to mention the efforts of Shute to prove that the 'cross-references' found in Aristotle's works were to a large extent introduced by subsequent Greek editors.

^a 87 1341^b 38-40 ^b 6.1449^b 31, Gudeman, German translation, p. xi.

After reading some part of the numberless explanations of the term *catharsis* and its treatment in the *Poetics*, I have reached the following belief. A modern writer on therapeutics, when he dealt with cathartics, might not describe in great detail the physiological act of purging, but would dwell upon the means by which the act is produced. So Aristotle, having announced in the *Politics* that a more exact account of *catharsis* would be found in the *Poetics*, need not be expected in the latter work to dilate upon the aspects of the tragic purgation itself, but does treat extensively of the means by which the effect is produced. The major part of the treatise bears, directly or indirectly, upon this topic, though the allusion to the tears of pity, and the shivers of fear,⁷ may seem rather casual. But *catharsis* is an observed fact, as in the *Rhetoric* persuasion is an observed fact, and can be taken for granted; and the right sort of *catharsis* may be taken for granted; and the right sort of *catharsis* will be effected by the proper means. These means, however, are *not* matters of common knowledge; it is the function of the specialist, the function of his art, to discover them. Let us suppose that in the *Politics* Aristotle had incidentally mentioned the term 'persuasion,' adding (I adapt his own language): 'The word *persuasion* we use at present without explanation, but when hereafter we speak of rhetoric, we shall treat the subject with more precision.' Should we expect to find in the *Rhetoric* a long account of the act of being persuaded, and of the way we feel inside when we are convinced? Should we not expect, what we actually find, a systematic account of the means by which persuasion, and persuasion of the right sort, is effected?

Gudeman's volume belongs to a series known as Die Philosophische Bibliothek. Let us end with our compli-

ments to writers in one or another American review, who, with little or no experience of their own in research, glibly decry Continental scholarship, calling it 'German.' The publisher, Meiner, gives us the following quotation from *La Cultura* (Rome), doubtless first printed before the war:

The Philosophical Library is a truly wonderful instrument of investigation and culture, for which Germany is to be envied by all nations in whom a taste for the deepest intellectual questions is present or in process of awaking.

THE OXFORD TRANSLATION OF
ARISTOTLE¹
RHETORIC AND POETICS

This noble enterprise went on apace; though, oddly enough, while Volume 11 should have closed the series, Volume 1, containing the logical treatises, had yet to appear. It is a tribute to the interwoven pattern of Aristotle's thought that, for example, we still missed the *Topics* and *Sophistical Refutations* — not to say the *Nicomachean Ethics* — as we approached the end of the series, and took up the *Rhetoric*.

The translation of the *Rhetoric* is masterly. Professor Roberts was eminently well-fitted for his task; and those who are acquainted with his fine work on 'Longinus' (1899), Demetrius (1902), and Dionysius (1910), will agree that, in view of the difficulties, he now surpassed himself. The treatise *On the Sublime*, if it challenges a modern writer to equal its style, is at all events by nature readable. The treatise of Aristotle is not. In long stretches it is terribly condensed, at its worst it is abrupt and thorny, and at best it is seldom smooth Greek for the specialist however mature. The present writer, who is no adept, had translated one-half of the *Rhetoric* before learning that Roberts had begun and virtually finished his work, even to the reading of proofs. My estimate there-

¹ *The Works of Aristotle*, Translated into English under the editorship of W D Ross. Volume 11 (pp 1354–1462), *Rhetorica*, by W Rhys Roberts; *De Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, [by] E S Forster, *De Poetica*, [by] Ingram Bywater. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1924.

From *The American Journal of Philology* 46 (1925) 190–2; by permission.

fore is not haphazard. Jebb's version, posthumously issued, is often admirably terse and true, but the editor, Sandys, failed to compare it systematically with the text; and the number of omitted phrases is disconcerting. Welldon's, which is ampler in style, and at times a better rendering, nevertheless on the whole is not so good; and it is out of print. There was room for a new translation. Roberts aimed at a golden mean, which is not quite midway between Jebb and Welldon, and he is so careful and felicitous that, without having consulted either (while engaged with this undertaking), he has made a significant advance upon both. Like King Alfred, he translates word for word when that is desirable, and sense for sense when there is need to amplify. He has come near to making the *Rhetoric* a readable English book as a whole. This notable achievement gratified and disturbed the reviewer — who nevertheless, thanks to private encouragement from Professor Roberts, completed a labor which has a different aim from that of the Oxford translation.

We may note one or two special points. It was a happy thought to render the recurrent word *τόπος*, not by 'topic,' or 'commonplace,' but by 'line of argument,' and to clarify the subject yet more in the Index (*s.v.* 'argument, lines of'). Helpful footnotes contain alternative translations of other words, explain various difficulties that are not purely verbal, and give the necessary references to works and persons that are mentioned or cited by Aristotle. Indeed, the space here accorded to footnotes and introductory matter is more generous than has been usual in the series. An excellent abstract (pp. vii–xv) is given by way of Contents. There are thirteen pages of Index.

Of the few adverse criticisms we might record, only one is important enough for mention. In 1411 "18–20 we read:

'There is also the iambic line of Anaxandrīdes about the way his daughters put off marrying —

My daughters' marriage-bonds are overdue.'

Jebb and Sandys made the same mistake. As I long ago pointed out,² 'The daughters ($\tauῶν θυγατέρων$) are the maidens ($ai παρθένοι$) of Anaxandrīdes only in the sense that they figured in a comedy by this poet'; they might well be the daughters of Danaus in a comic treatment of the Suppliant Maidens. Elsewhere, in a note on 1412^a 34, Roberts cites my article as it was reported to him by Mr. Greenwood for its bearing on the joke about Nicon the harpist, and emends the Greek in accordance with my suggestion; it would have been well to consult my article in the *American Journal of Philology* at first hand.

For want of technical knowledge I must rapidly pass over the translation by Professor E. S. Forster of *De Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*. The translation is clear and smooth. The translator may be reminded that 'first' is a good English adverb; there is no call in 1434^b 33 to write 'firstly.' Here again there is a useful Index, though we can make little of the reference to 'Enthymemes' under 1440^b II.

The last unit in the volume, and in the series, is Bywater's well-known translation of the *Poetics*. The general editor, Ross, has supplied it with a brief abstract (Contents), footnotes, and an Index; otherwise he leads us to think that it has been exactly reprinted from Bywater's monumental edition of 1909. I have noted but one, slight, deviation, at 1447^a 18, and this is toward a more precise following of the order of words in the Greek; the change does not occur in the reprint of 1920 — the booklet with a Preface by Gilbert Murray. The reverence in which the

² *American Journal of Philology* 41 (1920).50; see above, p. 37.

memory of Bywater is held at Oxford is naturally great; but it is a question whether the truest reverence for the scholar and his effort might not have been shown in further deviations. The former co-editor of this series, J. A. Smith, might well have asked for one or two; see his illuminating article in the *Classical Quarterly* 18 (1924).165–8, and see also my article (which, if he had known of it, would have saved him from writing his) in *Classical Philology* 13 (1918). 251–61, revised in *An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy* (1922), pp. 290–305.³ Further, the brilliant emendations of Gudeman in *Philologus* 76 (1920). 239–65, and his German translation of the *Poetics* (Leipzig, 1921), must be reckoned with by any one who undertakes to publish an English translation; his article in *Satura Berolinensis* (1924), pp. 50–60, probably reached England too late to be of service. We may be sure that Bywater himself, had he lived, would have made due use of work that appeared in the fifteen years between 1909 and 1924, or at all events in the interval since 1911 when he separately issued his Greek text of 1909. In particular, he doubtless would have repented his own chief violence to the traditional order of the text, namely, his transposition, in the English rendering, of four lines, 1456^a7–10, to a point after $\mu\acute{e}χρι\tauοῦ\tau\acute{e}λον$ in 1455^b32, wherein he followed the bad opinion of Susemihl. It seemed to me in 1913 that my Amplified Version (p. 62) made clear the sequence of thought in 1456^a3–10, and absolutely vindicated the traditional order of the four lines in question; and I have since found no person, and no argument, to shake my interpretation of the sequence. This interpretation, after all, has the best of arguments on its side, in that it makes sound sense, sustains the manuscripts, and is sustained by them. Bywater's translation is so good — such an improvement,

³ See above, p. 18

for example, upon that of Butcher — that it deserves to be made a little better. And some members of the school he set in motion at Oxford are so competent in the text of Aristotle that, like him, they should be very wide-awake for hints that may reach them from other small corners of the world.

This seems the best place to add some remarks which appeared in *The Classical Weekly* for Jan. 16, 1922,⁴ on the booklet of Gilbert Murray mentioned above. The remarks followed a notice by Charles Knapp⁵ of Murray's Preface in which Knapp had failed to mention Harcourt, Brace and Company as the present publishers of my Amplified Version of the *Poetics*.

As it seems to me, Murray overstates the difficulty of translating the *Poetics* — that is, once we know in a given case precisely what Aristotle means, and when we can be sure whether he is using a term like 'prologue,' or 'discovery,' or 'myth,' in a loose and general, or in a stricter and more technical, sense. As we have seen (above, p. 83), Bywater himself says in his edition of the *Poetics*: 'The book, taken as it is, with perhaps an occasional sidelight from some of his other works, is intelligible enough.'

I agree, then, that sometimes, as Murray says, 'we must not attempt to draw very closely to the meanings of Greek words'; and I disagree by adding that, when we render the *Poetics* of Aristotle into a modern language, we must sometimes draw as close to them as we can. Gudeman in his German translation⁶ is often surprisingly true to the Greek with no sacrifice of the modern idiom.

⁴ 15 (1922).95-6: *Translations of Aristotle's Poetics*, by permission

⁵ *Ibid.* 15 (1921) 39-40 (October)

⁶ See above, p. 155

And how can Murray assert that in Aristotle's day 'the only living form of drama was the New Comedy'? Aristotle was born in the year 384 b.c. According to Roland G. Kent,⁷ Aristophanes died in 375 b.c. or later (when Aristotle was a boy nine or ten years old); his fame, however, did not die then. In 330-29 b.c., when Aristotle was at the height of his powers, there is indication of a revival of the earlier comedy on the Athenian stage, compare the inscription in *Urkunden Dramatischer Aufführungen in Athen*, edited by Adolf Wilhelm, pp. 27-9. Probabilities favor the notion that at least one play of Aristophanes was thus revived. In the *Didascaliae*, Aristotle seems to have been preoccupied, as far as comedies are concerned, with the period of Aristophanes. And whenever his *Poetics* was written, as may be seen from the conjoint allusion there to Sophocles, Homer, and Aristophanes,⁸ the last-named was then regarded as the supreme figure among comic poets. If there was any period of 'Middle' Comedy, Aristotle lived through that. But, Meineke and others to the contrary notwithstanding, there is no real evidence that his favorite among comic poets was Anaxandrides; I have gathered all the evidence, I believe, on this and related points,⁹ and find no reason at all for thinking that Aristotle would underrate Aristophanes. Both the evidence and general probability point to the opposite conclusion. Well then, did the comic poet Anaxandrides produce a more 'living form' of the drama than the tragic poet Theodectes, Aristotle's own friend? The answer is, No.

And what of the 'New' Comedy in our sense? Philemon began to exhibit plays at Athens about 330 b.c., when Aristotle was over fifty years old, and Menander in 322-1, a

⁷ *Classical Review* 20 (1906) 153-5.

⁸ 3 1448 a 26-7.

⁹ See *An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy*, esp. pp. 28-37.

year or so after Aristotle left the city — doubtless after his death. It is reasonable to suppose that Aristotle had formed his notions of literary art before 330, and very unreasonable to think that he was influenced by the stripling Menander. He may well have known Menander, who was a pupil of Aristotle's friend and pupil Theophrastus; and Menander may have learned something from the *Poetics*.

Is there no presumption in saying that Aristotle 'misunderstands' the word *muthos*? I have seen it stated that in his day *muthos* was used for 'plot' in tragedy, and *logos* for 'plot' in comedy. He himself, when mentioning Crates' success in constructing comic plots, says that Crates made '*muthoi* and *logoi*'. Aristophanes uses *logos* to describe the substance of a comedy; and the comic poet Antiphanes, contemporary with Aristotle, applies *logos* to the tragic story of Oedipus or Alcmeon!¹⁰ We know too little of the terms used in Greek treatises on literary art and the like to assume that Aristotle misunderstood them; in the *Poetics* he repeatedly refers to other authorities or technical works in the same field. He seems to have been reasonably well-acquainted with what others had said or written on the subject; we cannot be. And nobody now knows ancient Greek as well as did Plato's ablest pupil.

The utility of the *Poetics* to the student of modern literature is a subject too large and varied for discussion here; I have dealt with the question in my 'amplified' rendering, and more fully in the book in the series called Our Debt to Greece and Rome. But on this point, again, Murray seems to be at odds with Bywater, who says¹¹ that Aristotle 'tells one, in fact, how to construct a good play and a good epic, just as in the *Rhetoric* he tells one how to make a good speech.'

¹⁰ The question of these terms is more fully discussed in *An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy*, pp. 48–51.

¹¹ See above, p. 83.

On this point we may add the following from Alfred Croiset:¹²

Of late, certain scholars, perhaps through a natural reaction against the former idolatry long accorded to the *Poetics*, have seemed to take pleasure in depreciating the work. This new exaggeration is not more reasonable than the other. The *Poetics* is a masterpiece, in which the fundamental traits of Greek poetry, considered in its evolution as well as in its essence, are noted with a precision which gives the work a value well-nigh eternal.

¹² Alfred and Maurice Croiset, *Histoire de la Littérature Grecque* 4 739-40

ROSS ON ARISTOTLE¹

Where does Professor Ross² find the time, not to speak of the energy, for so much exacting and excellent work? Latterly almost single-handed he has edited the Oxford Translation of Aristotle, volume after volume, in which the separate translators constantly bear witness to his helping hand. He has also prepared his own edition of the *Metaphysics*,³ a notable undertaking even among those that have issued from the school of Bywater. Either task would seem to be enough for one scholar within the space, say, of a decade. He has also had the duties of a teacher, and other duties by no means light. Nevertheless, as a mere side-issue, he writes for a London publisher an extensive and detailed survey of Aristotle — of the man and his writings — that is the best account of its subject in English. It is a solid, competent, extremely useful volume. In fact, so far as I know, there is nothing comparable to it, for aim and scope, in any language; it obviously outruns the measure of the encyclopedias, adheres more rigorously than the older books to the actual statements of Aristotle, and, of course, takes advantage of the more recent special investigations. The author says in his Preface:

There are several types of book about Aristotle which it would be interesting to write, and perhaps not unprofitable to read. In one, it might be shown how almost the whole of his

¹ *Aristotle*, by W. D. Ross. London, Methuen and Company, 1923. Pp vii, 300.

From *The Classical Weekly* 18 (1925) 180, by permission.

² Now Sir David Ross, Provost of Oriel College

³ More recently he has brought out an edition of the *Physics*, see above, p. 97.

thought is a mosaic of borrowings from his predecessors, and yet is transformed by the force of his genius into a strikingly original system. In another, the attempt might be made to trace the chronological development of his thought; this has recently been done with marked success by Professor Werner Jaeger,⁴ in a book to which I should have owed much more had it reached me before mine was in the press. In another, the penetrating influence of Aristotle on subsequent philosophy might be followed down the centuries. I have not attempted any of these tasks, but have tried simply to give an account of the main features of his philosophy as it stands before us in his works. I have written little by way of criticism . . . What is true in Aristotle has become part, and no small part, of the heritage of all educated men; what is false has been gradually rejected, so that explicit criticism is now hardly necessary.

The extant writings of Aristotle in the main are highly condensed, and their style is often crabbed; the medium is a technical and scholarly language, highly specialized, and well-suited to its original purpose of concision; any elaboration in these writings is likely to concern some minor point, and not a major principle that was familiar to his students. An attempt to condense them further does not promise easy reading; and hence this new book faces the inevitable charge of aridity — above all, in its exposition of the treatises on logic. It is, however, admirably arranged, and as lucid as it well could be, and is readable enough in places where the firm and manly style of the interpreter has a margin of freedom — as in the opening chapter, which is entitled *Life and Works*.

The remaining eight chapters successively deal with individual works of Aristotle, or with groups of them, under the headings Logic; Philosophy of Nature; Biology; Psy-

⁴ Jaeger's work has been well translated into English by Professor Richard Robinson of Cornell University.

chology; Metaphysics; Ethics; Politics, Rhetoric and Poetics. These are followed by a short Bibliography, a Chronology of the Peripatetic School, and, we are thankful to say, an Index.

In this review I shall not attempt to condense a condensation of Aristotle. But I do not wish to imply that the book is nothing more than an ordinary work of reference. It is a better one than the older, smaller one of Sir Alexander Grant; and that is saying a great deal, for Grant's little volume, like Edwin Wallace's *Outlines* with select passages from Aristotle in Greek, has a permanent value. The more ample work of Ross will serve various ends. Thus it will be good for occasional consultation; it will likewise be useful to the student who, with a special interest in some one of Aristotle's writings, needs to see that part against the background of other activities, and of the activity as a whole, of the master of them that know. It may be recommended also to the queer people who publish books called 'non-Aristotelian' this and that — 'non-Aristotelian Logic' and the like. Let them read this work, and then turn to almost any work of Aristotle, a thing they apparently seldom or never do; let them turn, say, to the *History of Animals*. Let them actually read some of it, and then ask themselves, and fairly answer, this question: Who is the better observer, Aristotle, or his 'non-Aristotelian' reader? And then this: Which man actually used the inductive process to advantage, Francis Bacon, or Aristotle? I mean, which used it in actual scientific investigation? So many, in fact, are unaware, not merely that Aristotle described the inductive method, but that he constantly used it.

My own special interest would lead me to pick flaws, if there were any, in the last chapter of Ross, on the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics*; but that would be ungracious and mainly

unwarranted. At the end,⁵ it is rightly said that the *Poetics* contains perhaps a greater number of pregnant ideas on art than any other book; the vital quality of the treatise is duly noted. And there is something to be learned from Ross on the subject of the tragic *catharsis*, though I doubt if there ever existed an explicit discussion of the term in a lost book of the *Poetics*. Nor do I believe that Antigone was fated to hang herself before she could eat up the food she had with her in the tomb.⁶

Meanwhile the brief and grudging treatment that is accorded to the *Rhetoric*, and the reasons that are given for this brevity, will strike many of us with dismay. In rejoinder we may cite the excerpt from Copleston that is prefixed to the translation by Jebb.⁷

One may well imagine that Ross himself has changed his mind, and no longer questions whether the *Rhetoric* 'has now less life in it than most of Aristotle's works'; for more recently he has edited the vital translation of this work by Rhys Roberts that has appeared in the Oxford Translation of Aristotle.

⁵ As we have seen above, p. 78

⁶ See below, p. 178

⁷ See above, p. 86

SMYTH ON AESCHYLUS¹

The Eliot Professor of Greek Literature is known at Harvard University as a philologist; in his published works he has revived antiquity through investigations into Greek grammar, Greek dialects, and the like. As a visiting lecturer in California he shows himself a philologist of the broader sort; his command of details and perspective, his command of life, enables him to relive for us the life of a great poet who is for all time. The volume before us is a learned and popular book of the right kind, done by a scholar; it is such a work as we expect from the best French and German authorities, and now are to expect less seldom than before from the keenest scholars in America and England. It is a book to delight the hovering spirit of Gildersleeve, which warns America that there must be no divorce of literary study and linguistics.

The style and method are those of a man who handles his learning with an easy touch. He is vivacious and sparkling. He scatters allusion rather freely, yet with telling effect. Sundry oral digressions, of humorous intent, could have been omitted from the printed book to the advantage of the reader; but we may condone the excrescences of a large vitality that has formed the lectures into a moving series.

A sane introductory chapter fights shy of strange dramatic origins which have been read into Aeschylus by modern anthropology; our author wisely prefers to build

¹ *Aeschylean Tragedy*, by Herbert Weir Smyth Berkeley, University of California Press, 1924 Pp. viii, 234
From *The Nation* (New York) 120 (1925).630-1, by permission.

upon the cautious remarks of Aristotle concerning the rise of the ancient drama. Like Aristotle, he is both industrious and select in his reading; and though he has flung a net into modern as well as ancient literature and criticism for whatever may illuminate his subject, he begins and ends with the tragedies of Aeschylus as they stand. He writes with his eye on the object. The second chapter takes up the earliest extant Greek drama, *The Suppliants* of this poet; the next three discuss in order *The Persians*, *Prometheus*, and *The Seven Against Thebes*. The last three are severally devoted to the parts of that Oresteian trilogy which was the crowning effort of a long artistic career. Judicious treatment throughout is accorded to our scanty evidence on the lost works of a prolific author who in the forty years between young manhood and age composed perhaps ninety tragedies and satyric dramas.

Yet I believe that Smyth might have learned more, not from but through Verrall, and again with the help of ancient principles. Of the marvelous racing beacon-fires described by Clytemnestra, her Watchman has seen but one; and this one, stationary, doubtless was visible to the audience, as it is to the Chorus. If the wily, fierce, inventive heroine lies about the rest, Aeschylus has done the trick in the Homeric way, and by the method of fallacy that is later recommended in the *Poetics* of Aristotle, Chapter 24. Even so, the Chorus is sceptical, they know the lady and the gossip, these doubting old men.

When the details are assembled there stands forth the living figure of an artist, endowed with a noble poetic energy, who grew in dramatic wisdom to the end. Is he in the main to be classed with Aristotle's 'enthusiastic' poets, while Sophocles falls among the 'plastic' or consciously mimetic dramatists? Sophocles himself may have said that Aeschylus 'did right, not knowing why.' Yet

sheer elemental genius could not exhibit fourscore and seven plays in the Attic competitions without a gain in conscious art for the final trilogy. Smyth shows that Aeschylus did learn, all along, and not only from earlier competitors like Choerilus and Phrynicus, but in the end from Sophocles. We infer as much from reading Aristotle in conjunction with the plays. A deliberate innovator, Aeschylus improved upon the work of others; and he later adopted Sophocles' innovation of a third actor, as in the *Agamemnon*.²

Smyth is at once conservative and bold when dealing with modern hypotheses in Aeschylean criticism proper. Against Verrall he presents the welcome theory of 'double time' in the *Agamemnon* — a device well-known to the student of Shakespeare, and one that has been used by epic and dramatic poets from Homer down. The lapse of time outside of the story, and before the opening of the action, is of small concern to the audience. But ways and means of retarding and speeding the action itself are very important; there must be rushing and suspense alike; the author cannot effect either rapidity or delay without suggesting both, and each by contrast gives the other its pace.

Holding to the drama as it stands — distinguishing, for example, between the delineation of Agamemnon by Aeschylus and that by Homer — our interpreter still has not utterly freed himself from a vice of the traditional commentators. It is hard, but imperative, to make antecedent events as they are discussed at length in the play subordinate to the deeds and motives of the instant that is represented; for the motive of the speaking agent warps or colors every statement of alleged fact in the past, every citation of former wrongs. Thus each particular reference to the death of Iphigenia at the behest of Agamemnon

² At a pinch he would draw upon the Chorus for yet a fourth.

must be studied as a speech of some individual person, or of the Chorus, occurring within the action, but relating to an event that happened long before it. The lovely Cassandra sitting in the chariot, while near her stands a wicked and hence all the more vindictive wife; the effrontery of Agamemnon in bringing Cassandra to his home — these are present facts, obvious as the single beacon, and, for the spectators, needing no great elaboration in words. Smyth makes too little of the irritating presence of Cassandra, the rival, as an incentive to the murder of both her and Agamemnon by his adulterous wife. The average reader makes far too little of it, for lack of a Greek sensitiveness to the decorum of Greek family life. One should compare the home-coming of Odysseus, unattended, to relieve a faithful Penelope from unwelcome suitors, with the home-coming of the faithless Agamemnon to the brazen Clytemnestra and her sly Aegisthus lurking in the background. One should visualize the situation of Agamemnon and Cassandra, Clytemnestra and Aegisthus, as this quadrangle would appear in to-morrow's journal. Aeschylus is true to life — yet with what reserve has he depicted the cold, hard sparring between wife and husband when they meet!

The forebodings of the luckless Cassandra must also be interpreted in character, and in relation to the actual events of the drama. A large part of what she says deals with matters that are known to all. Another part reveals her mature feminine intuition. While silent in the car, this gifted creature has read her loquacious enemy from the surface to the heart; and her own solicitude for Agamemnon should receive very careful scrutiny. As for her direct prevision of death, if no one else believes her, it is highly important for the action that she believes herself. She is a fatalist: 'The day is come; small gain for me in flight.' Of her own volition she goes indoors to be slain.

It is important, then, to see precisely how any reference to fate, or any utterance of an oracle, is brought into an ancient Greek drama. How, for example, do we learn of the oracle in the second play of the *Oresteia*? Not at first hand, nor by direct quotation, but through the excited report of Orestes, who already begins to show an unbalanced mental state, and through an argument of three lines (*Choephoroe* 900-2) by Pylades urging on the act of matricide which is soon to occur. Nowhere in Orestes' report is it specifically enjoined upon him that he shall slay his 'mother'; neither this word nor her name is used. And he ends his list of reasons for killing both her and her paramour, unnamed, with a reference to his own rights and to the kingdom of which Aegisthus and Clytemnestra have deprived him. He says more about his father and the past in what precedes, but Aeschylus with dramatic correctness allows the short argument about Orestes' loss of his kingdom to come at the end of this speech. The final emphasis links the matter of the loss with a reference to Aegisthus, not by name; and Orestes says that the deed must be done whether the oracle is to be trusted or not!

In oracles such as these must I not put my trust? Nay, even if I trust them not, the deed must still be done, for many impulses conspire to one conclusion. besides the god's behest, my keen grief for my father, and withal the pinch of poverty—that my countrymen, the most renowned of mankind, who overthrew Troy with gallant spirit, should not thus be at beck and call of a brace of women; for woman he is at heart; or, if he is not, he shall soon put it to the test.³

A good actor would bring out all the force of this concluding argument. For us, the point now is that Orestes, like the general run of public speakers, is made to say that

³ *Choephoroe (Liberation-Bearers)* 297-305; Smyth's translation.

mingle his own sentiments in his plays, and tends toward the fatalism of Seneca and the Romans which so often reappears on the modern stage and in the modern novel.

'In Greek tragedy the contest of the hero is primarily with outside forces' (p. 147). Is not the struggle of Agamemnon primarily with Clytemnestra? Is it not a domestic struggle? 'Force,' as used by Smyth, and not by him alone, is a modern concept, taken from the science of matter, and intruded upon dramatic criticism. Aristotle rightly thinks of the tragic drama not as a struggle between a man and a 'force,' but as an action of human beings that do and suffer, meditate violence, carry out or reverse their intent. 'Fate' is a Roman notion, and how much more like a dramatic agent is its Greek counterpart! But, strictly considered, Latin *fatum* means 'something said,' and *fata* 'things said.' When people believe them, what an influence 'things said' can exert upon human action! As for 'Force,' there is a personage of that name in *Prometheus*; Force and Strength do come to grips, in the proper dramatic way, with the hero.

In dealing with alleged Greek fatalism, it is a good plan to ask oneself what Odysseus would do were he placed in the situation of Antigone, Cassandra, or Agamemnon. If confined in a tomb, like Antigone, would he hang himself ere the food was exhausted? Had she waited, she would have been saved. How *did* he act when he was trapped in the cave of the Cyclops? And, with the fear of death upon him, would he, like Cassandra, cry 'Small gain for me in flight!' and pass indoors to be slain? Agamemnon debates, not whether he shall go in or remain without, but whether he shall go in on a purple carpet. Odysseus slips home in disguise, partly in order to observe the behavior of his wife. It is not for nothing that the return

of Agamemnon is sketched as a parallel but contrasting *Nostos* at the opening of the *Odyssey*.

The reviewer naturally professes no such acquaintance with Aeschylus as might vie with the knowledge of ancient tragedy displayed in this excellent book. Yet we may question the emphasis of treatment with regard to one more episode in the *Oresteia*. If our author has grasped the dramatic value of the trial-scene in the *Eumenides*, he lays undue stress upon its local and temporal interest in connection with the Court of the Areopagus. When the antiquary dilates upon this external, contemporaneous interest, the enduring quality of that tremendous dramatic contest tends to slip from our view.

The author plans to include these lectures in 'a further study of the mind and art of Aeschylus'; we have high hopes for this future enterprise. There are slight defects — little touches of patavinity — in the diction and in the printing, some attributable, like the French of Chaucer's *Prioress*, to one school, and some to another. We do not relish the employment of the verbal forms of 'voice' and 'voicing' in the sense of dramatic utterance, nor of 'tragedians' for tragic poets, nor of 'protagonist' for chief agent in a drama. Surely in a work on Aeschylus 'protagonist' should be restricted to the meaning of 'first actor.'

All told, however, this fine, sound, lively book is one which it does a reviewer's heart good to commend. If the volume is not freely read the fault will lie with the reading public.

STOCKS' 'ARISTOTELIANISM'¹

In the last few years² there has been a great activity in the study of Aristotle, manifest in numerous valuable publications, as the general survey of Aristotle by Ross; the version of the *Rhetoric* by Roberts, and a more recent version, not so good, but of importance, by J. H. Freese, in the Loeb Classical Library; Gudeman's German translation of the *Poetics*, and Werner Jaeger's work, *Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung* (Berlin, 1923), which serves as a point of departure for John Burnet's 'Lecture on a Master-Mind,' *Aristotle*.

As a student of the *Poetics*, and in making a Bibliography of it,³ I have been struck with a cleavage between those scholars who are interested in the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics*, and those who investigate Aristotle without much reference to either. Of course there are those in whom the cleavage does not appear; yet it does exist, running back to the Middle Ages, when the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* somehow drifted away from the body of Aristotle's works.⁴ They were not included in the first printed edition of Aris-

¹ *Aristotelianism*, by John Leofric Stocks. Boston, Marshall Jones Company, 1925. Pp viii, 165 [Now, 1939, published by Longmans, Green and Company, New York, who have taken over the series entitled Our Debt to Greece and Rome].

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² In the years before 1928, in the subsequent ten years the activity has not diminished.

³ The joint work of Alfred Gudeman and myself, since issued as No. 11 in the *Cornell Studies in English*, see also a *Supplement* to this by Marvin T. Herrick in the *American Journal of Philology* 52 (1931).168-74.

⁴ More recently a Latin translation of the *Poetics* has been discovered in two manuscripts, one at Eton, the other at Toledo. See the reference above (p. 104) to the date, 1248, and see also Ezio Franceschini, *La Poetica di Aristotele nel Secolo XIII* in *Atti del Reale Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere, ed Arti* 94 (1934-5) 523-48.

tote. And in our day Ross and Burnet, for example, evince no great interest in the two works, nor does Jaeger; nor in his time did Grote. A preoccupation with the *Metaphysics*, the *Ethics*, and the logical treatises, is, in its way, a survival, a mark of the continued vitality of the Middle Ages. From these, as Étienne Gilson properly maintains,⁵ the development of modern philosophy advanced in an unbroken line.

Professor Stocks' volume, *Aristotelianism*, is a vigorous and informing book. Very likely his emphasis upon the metaphysical, physical, biological, ethical, and political writings of Aristotle partly comes from the fact that the series in which his book appears already has a volume on the *Poetics*, and is to contain another (since published) on *Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism* in which Rhys Roberts will do justice to the commanding position of Aristotle in this realm. Yet one cannot help thinking that the new book still in a measure illustrates not only the cleavage just mentioned, which really is one between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance with regard to Aristotle, but also the more ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy to which Plato alludes. The peace that was made between them by Aristotle should have been lasting, yet was not.

Mr. Stocks, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Manchester [died, 1937], writes his own Preface, and luckily is not seconded or anticipated in another, editorial, preface. His work consists of three sections: 1. Prologue, which is first Biographical (pp. 3-12), and then deals with The Socratic Succession (pp. 13-33); 2. Aristotle's World, in five subsections — Form and Matter (pp. 34-50), The Simple Bodies (pp. 50-62), The Animal Kingdom (pp. 62-80), The Life of Man (pp. 80-103), The

⁵ *La Philosophie au Moyen Âge de Scot Érigène à G. D'Occam*, pp. 1, 8.

City (pp. 103-18); 3. Epilogue, Aristotelianism (pp. 119-55), a section which is mainly based upon Sandys' *History of Classical Scholarship*.

An Epilogue of 37 pages is less than one-fourth of the whole. On the scope of the volume we read in the Preface (p. v):

Some apology seems to be required for the form of this essay, which so far departs from the scheme of the series that the account of the author under discussion occupies the greater part of it, and the account of his influence takes a secondary place. But the full story of Aristotle's influence would be a history of European thought.

The scheme of the series has been no better preserved by contributors who had less justification, and made no apology, for departing from it.

Within its limits, then, the book is good; it is spirited, clear, orderly, interesting, and fairly condensed. I cannot reduce the substance of it to the measure of a brief survey that any one would care to read; in the space remaining I shall but make casual remarks, partly of a general nature, partly on some particular points.

The sketch of Aristotle's life should have gained much from Burnet's lecture, above mentioned, which was delivered almost a year before this book appeared. Possibly the lecture itself did not appear in time for complete utilization by Stocks; he refers to it as his Notes (p. 160), but not in the Bibliography. Nor does this last contain Peter Petersen's *Geschichte der Aristotelischen Philosophie im Protestantischen Deutschland*, 1921.

Again, the sketch of Aristotle's writings (pp. 8-10) does not allude to an apparent gap in his interests which I have often thought should be discussed by writers on Greek learning. Though Aristotle took the encyclopedia of

knowledge for his province, he does not show the relation we might expect of him to the large and obvious discipline of Greek geography that runs from Homer to Strabo. Of his relation to astronomy I shall add something later.

On page 11 Stocks says: 'No author has ever written with a more scrupulous exactitude or with stricter consistency.' This will do for the general organization of Aristotle's works, but not for all details. Certainly he did not have our modern fear of inconsistency in 'cross-reference,' and his intense scrutiny of facts at one time in one set of relations let him be very inconsistent when he dealt with the same facts at another time in a different approach. A good example may be found in his contradictory statements about the proper outcome of tragic situations, in the *Poetics* (compare my Amplified Version, pp. 47-8), a contradiction that has been explained in a novel way by Marshall MacGregor in his *Leaves of Hellas*.⁶ Dante and Aquinas wrote with a stricter consistency. We may say so without at all denying the wonderful coherence of the Aristotelian system, or the precision of style with which it is elaborated.

The newest thing should not make us neglect things that are good though older. To any one desirous of a first-rate compendious survey, Sir Alexander Grant's *Aristotle* (1880), one of the volumes in Ancient Classics for English Readers,⁷ still remains useful. In certain points it needs revision because of the march of scholarship, but these are not points that need much concern the kind of reader for whom such series are designed. Here, for example, is the table of contents by chapters: 1. The Life of Aristotle (pp. 1-29); 2. The Works of Aristotle (pp.

⁶ London, E. Arnold, 1926

⁷ A series edited by W. Lucas Collins, the volume on Aristotle may be obtained from the J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia

30-49); 3. The Organon of Aristotle (pp. 50-76); 4. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Art of Poetry* (pp. 77-99); 5. Aristotle's *Ethics* (pp. 100-16); 6. Aristotle's *Politics* (pp. 117-29); 7. The Natural History of Aristotle (pp. 130-45); 8. The Biology of Aristotle (pp. 146-60); 9. The *Metaphysics* of Aristotle (pp. 161-78); 10. Aristotle since the Christian Era (pp. 179-96). In this booklet, more compact than Stocks', but with forty more pages of substance, the account of the *Rhetoric*, a work which Stocks thinks is 'now rather out of favor,' is fresh and illuminating. And for other reasons I venture to recommend Grant, as well as Stocks and Ross, to those who think that modern science has nothing to learn from Aristotle.

In the Epilogue, Stocks, when dealing with the more recent students of Aristotle, would seem to devote too much space to Hobbes; more space might well have been given to Bruno, historically a more influential opponent of Aristotelianism. The statement (p. 129) that 'Dante, . . . who refers to Aristotle more frequently than to any other Greek or Latin author, seems to have known no Greek at all,' goes too far in minimizing Dante's unquestionably small Greek, and is otherwise misleading; see Paget Toynbee, *Concise Dante Dictionary*, in the articles 'Aristotile' and 'Virgilio.' But on the whole one may safely praise the Epilogue; we may particularly note the closing words: 'It is Aristotle's special glory that every thinker is his pupil, even when he does not know it.' But I must quote no more.

Instead, let me close with a thought that might well have been worked out in this book. By a strange chapter of accidents the joint influence of Plato and Aristotle underlay the fortunes of the so-called Copernican theory regarding the solar system. Aristotle, at all events, might have accepted from Heraclides of Pontus the truth that Mercury

and Venus revolved about the sun; and it was but another step from that to the notion that the rest of the planets did likewise, a step that may have been taken in the century of Aristotle, though we do not certainly meet the notion until the time of Aristarchus of Samos in the next century. But as Aristotle was perhaps less interested than some of his predecessors in geography, so he seems to have been less awake than he might have been to the value of what was newest in astronomy, or what was divulged by astronomers outside of the Platonic school and his own circle. Or perhaps his death at the age of 62 kept him from doing what he might have done had he lived, as did other Greek philosophers (as Burnet suggests), to be an octogenarian; had he lived to complete the work of his old age, he might have incorporated the heliocentric theory in his system. But he died leaving his technical treatises in a state that was unsuited to their final publication. And after that these works, it is said, were lost from the time of Theophrastus until the first century B.C.; they were published by Andronicus towards the end of the century. Had they been known during the interval, the scholarship of Alexandria might have assimilated the heliocentric theory to them. When they did come to light, at Rome, there was perhaps no one who could modify the encyclopedia of knowledge in such a way as to effect the necessary accommodation. Then came Ptolemy, who developed the Aristotelian concept of the heavens, which was thus sent down through the Middle Ages with all that remained known of classical lore helping to establish it. So, after the revival of Aristotelian learning in the thirteenth century, Dante's main astronomical authority is Aristotle, *De Caelo*, and Dante's *Commedia* is founded, astronomically, in the Ptolemaic system. Only when the art of printing brought about the diffusion of other astronomical lore was it pos-

sible to revive the heliocentric theory of Aristarchus, which both Copernicus and at least some of his opponents knew he was reviving. At any rate, it looks like an accident that the heliocentric theory did not dominate the Middle Ages, and that there was ecclesiastical opposition to it at the time when it actually was again brought to light. Had it been dominant throughout the interval, what a difference there would have been, for Galileo, for Bacon, for the Renaissance, for the Reformation, and for modern physical science!

Yet the accident need not make us grieve. Had it not occurred, we should have neither the poem of Dante nor things which that poem stands for. The Middle Ages would not have had precisely the balance they did have between the ethical sciences, on the one hand, and the physical or natural sciences on the other. They were hardly scientific in our modern sense, which is a narrow one. We have, in fact, been cultivating the physical sciences with a greater injury to the ethical than the Middle Ages with their proficiency in the ethical sciences did to natural knowledge or to human life. They cultivated those disciplines which are more necessary to the higher forms of living, well aware that man does not live by bread alone. The truth is, we could get along better without a knowledge of the heliocentric theory than without Dante's poem, which is the best fruit of Aristotelian philosophy by its marriage to Christian poetical genius. After all, we have regained the heliocentric theory,⁸ and it, too, is a part of our debt to Greece and Rome. In Milton's time, it had not yet sufficiently engaged the poetic imagination, had

⁸ My remarks on it obviously are indebted to the admirable work of Sir Thomas Heath, *Aristarchus of Samos, the Ancient Copernicus* (Oxford, 1913). The book is listed in Stocks' Bibliography. The lecture of Professor D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson, *On Aristotle as a Biologist*, published at Oxford in the same year, is not listed. I will highly recommend it to any reader of the volume by Stocks, or indeed of the present article.

not acquired riches enough of poetical association, to be of great use in *Paradise Lost* or *Paradise Regained*; Milton employs it in a minor way, to such advantage as he can. But the time will come, and may not be far distant, when the newest of the old and the oldest of the new in modern science will ripen into fruition under the gaze of a poet. For that, however, we need another Dante.

BURNET ON ARISTOTLE¹

It was my privilege to be in the audience at the Rooms of the Royal Society, in London, when the 'Annual Lecture on a Master-Mind' (for the British Academy, under the Henriette Hertz Trust) was delivered by Professor Burnet on July 2, 1924; the impression then made by the eminent lecturer, Fellow of the Academy, has been only deepened by a study of his utterance since it was printed. It is a bold and fascinating tract, freighted with matter. I have marked so many passages for quotation, comment, or query, that I can here use but a part of them, sometimes in Burnet's own words, sometimes in paraphrase, with interspersed reflections, and with general observations at the end.

The lecture itself is a constructive review of Werner Jaeger's *Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwickelung* (Berlin, 1923); or rather it is a new construction upon a basis suggested by Jaeger. 'The great merit of [his] work,' says Burnet (p. 3), 'is that it abandons the untenable idea that the published works of Aristotle [now mainly lost] are all to be referred to his earlier life, while the unpublished lectures which we have belong to the time when he was at the head of the Lyceum at Athens.' The manuscripts of these lectures, thinks Burnet, whatever their dates, were not available for use after the death of Theophrastus until their recovery in the first century B.C. The assumption seems to be warranted for Aristotle's own

¹ Aristotle, by John Burnet; in the *Proceedings of the British Academy* 11 (1924-5) 109-24. London, Humphrey Milford, New York, Oxford University Press. Pp. 18

From *The Classical Weekly* 21 (1928) 139-42, by permission.

manuscripts, upon which his lectures or conferences were based, but does not exclude the probability, of which Burnet takes no account, that the substance of lecture-courses may continue in use through the notes of students who attend the lectures; we partly owe the *Encyklopädie* of August Boeckh to notes of this sort. However that may be, 'the manuscripts discovered at Scepsis are . . . of various dates, and have not been finally revised' (p. 6). Thus Book 1 of the *Metaphysics* is relatively early, and the *Nicomachean Ethics* 'is one of Aristotle's latest works' (p. 15). He 'gave lectures for over twenty years' (p. 5), a period embracing his stay in Asia Minor and his last period at Athens.

Very interesting are the relations, and also the contrasts, brought out by Burnet between Aristotle and Plato. We have Plato's published works, and know little about his lectures. The published works, save the *Laws*, were mostly finished before Aristotle first studied in Athens, or came under Plato's influence. The lectures were largely mathematical, and Aristotle, no great mathematician, was more deeply influenced by a later development in the interests of the Academy when it took up the classification of plants and animals. 'If we had only the lectures given by Plato in the Academy and the published works of Aristotle, . . . we should have a far more mathematical Plato and a considerably more popular Aristotle' (p. 6). In view of our ignorance, does not Burnet differentiate a little too sharply? 'When Aristotle first joined the Academy, Plato was apparently not there; . . . for the first ten years of Aristotle's membership, the personal influence of the head of the Academy on him must have been slight and intermittent' (p. 8). Even so, 'there can be no doubt at all that the influence of Plato on Aristotle was very great indeed.' The *Phaedo*, in particular, 'made a deep impression upon

him,' as may be judged from the argument on the immortality of the soul in Aristotle's early dialogue entitled *Eudemus* (see Frag. 45, Rose). The *Protrepticus*, somewhat later, likewise showed the influence of Plato.

When Plato died, Aristotle went to Asia Minor, and the second period of his scholarly life began, lasting approximately from 347 to 334 B.C. For the first three years of this he was at Assos, where Book 1 of the *Metaphysics* was composed, as were probably also Books 2 and 3. In other words, from the age of thirty-seven to that of forty-nine he was away from Athens, 'and we can hardly be wrong in holding that these were the most important years of his life' (p. 11). The statement should be valid enough for Aristotle's thinking, but not necessarily for his studies and writing, though he probably considered himself at the height of his powers at the age of forty-nine (see *Rhetoric* 2.14.1390^b 11), and did not then think them on the wane. At all events we should not slight the importance of the last thirteen years of his life, when he was at the head of the Lyceum, especially in view of Burnet's belief that, had Aristotle lived out the normal expectation of life for a Greek philosopher, as did Plato, — had he lived, say, to the age of eighty — he would have elaborated and revised the work of his constructive period.

From Assos Aristotle went to Mitylene, in Lesbos; here he must have studied plants and animals, for 'Professor D'Arcy Thompson has pointed out that most of the species described by Aristotle belong to Asia Minor, and, in particular, to Lesbos' (p. 12):

If this is right, it is . . . the clue to the whole development of Aristotle. He was not a mathematician like Plato, but he found himself when Plato turned his attention to biology. . . . To Aristotle, when once he had become interested in biology,

the mathematical form in which Plato had presented the theory [of Ideas] ceased to have any meaning (p. 12).

And ‘it was mainly Aristotle’s passionate interest in biology that led him to drop the theory of “Ideas” altogether’ (p. 13).

Here I must interject some query and comment. Plato himself, of course, was not at Mitylene; Burnet duly notes the existence of an Asiatic branch of the Academy at Assos, under the patronage of Hermias, a convert to Platonism. But what aroused Plato’s interest in zoology? Are we not here dealing with a more widespread interest? Or, if it be local, was not Ionia the home of geography and other special sciences? Indeed, why not begin, for Aristotle, with the probable interests of his father, who was both Ionian and a physician? Why should we not suppose that zoology came to Athens, to Plato, to the comic poets before Plato, or to the teachers of those poets, from without? It is a more probable supposition that there were scientific observers of birds, wasps, and frogs before Aristophanes than that Aristotle’s interest in biology developed only in a straight line from Plato. These observers, or their treatises, may well have come to Athens from abroad, as did philosophy itself; its alien origin is very properly a matter of great significance to Burnet (p. 7): ‘In the first place Aristotle was not an Athenian, but an Ionian. It is, indeed, one of the most remarkable facts about Greek philosophy that it was hardly Athenian at all.’ It is not so remarkable, however, that philosophy reached its culmination at the cosmopolitan centre, for tragedy, comedy, and rhetoric, likewise immigrant, were there developed to their highest point. One may imagine that the same is true of biology—that it came to Athens from abroad, and had taken root before the time of Plato. That the Academy

made investigations into botany and zoology we know, so far as I am aware, only from a fragment of the comic poet Epicharis.²

So the theory that the earth rotates upon its axis came to Athens from Pontus. Burnet thinks (p. 14) there is no doubt that under the influence of the Academy 'even the heliocentric theory had been evolved.' He gives no evidence to support this belief, nor does one find enough in Sir Thomas Heath's *Aristarchus*. Indeed, the fact that Aristotle does not accept the theory looks like a piece of evidence that it did not emanate from the circle of Plato. It may have been an advance made by the Academy, after Plato's death, upon the work of Heraclides; perhaps that is what Burnet means. Or perhaps he has in mind the Pythagorean concept of a spherical earth and a 'central fire' — something different from the geocentric theory; it has left its mark on Plato, and doubtless led to further speculations in his school. But the history of the heliocentric theory before Aristarchus is dark and problematical, while that of the subsequent Ptolemaic theory is relatively clear, with obvious results. Aristotle's stationary earth and revolving heavens were precisely the thing that made him (p. 14) 'unacceptable to the great men of the Renaissance, and has stood in the way of a proper appreciation of him ever since. . . . His real greatness was as a biologist' (*ibid.*). 'I am neither a biologist nor a mathematician,' says Burnet (p. 13), 'but I cannot help wondering whether there is not, in the twentieth century, a tendency for their opposite points of view to come together.'

To-day there are signs that, specialization in research having run to an extreme, we are now at the beginning of a counter-movement which should lead the specialists back to a comprehensive philosophy. Since Aristotle was

² See my volume, *An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy*, p. 26.

an encyclopedist, as well as a specialist in many fields, we can make allowance for any defect he showed on the side of mathematics; and even there we may give him more credit than does Burnet for the treatise *De Caelo*. Then, taking his biological interest in a wider sense than it has in the lecture, we see that Aristotle can do much towards bringing diverse branches of modern investigation into one complete and harmonious whole. It is doubtless true, as Burnet contends, that Aristotle had no natural bent for the mathematical 'ideas' of Plato — unless we conceive these mathematical ideas or forms under the likeness of things alive. But if Aristotle, rejecting mathematical concepts, passed over into biology in his search for the meaning of things, he did not desert the concept of *form*. And it appears that a biological concept of form, taken in the widest sense, is well-fitted to those disciplines which lie between mathematics or astronomy and zoology. Such are politics and poetry. Aristotle gains much when he assumes that the State is a natural form, and that 'man is by nature a political animal.' In poetry he gains much by likening a work of art to a living creature; as in *Phaedrus* (264 c) the Platonic Socrates also compares a speech to a properly articulated animal. But, in fact, the organic comparison doubtless was a commonplace to Greek thinkers both before and after Plato. In a general application it would be helpful to modern science and philosophy.

'Most of the best of what we have [from Aristotle] belongs,' says Burnet (p. 17), 'to the time when he was not at Athens.' The word 'most' would seem to include the biological writings, and to exclude the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics*. But the last thirteen years of his life, save the very end, were spent at Athens; and, in spite of the foregoing statement, Burnet thinks 'that what is most wanted is a study of his thought in these last years; . . . it is still pos-

sible to ascertain more than has yet been found out as to the chronological order of his works' (p. 17), even though the loss of most of his popular works makes it 'difficult for us to give an intelligible account of Aristotle's philosophical development,' 'and that is what is of most interest to-day' (p. 5). I question whether an account of that development is of more importance than the absolute value of Aristotle's riper work. However obsessed our generation may be by evolutionary notions, the study of any development is mainly significant when it throws light upon something of lasting value. Would the history of Aristotle's thought, if we knew it, greatly aid our understanding of the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics*? Burnet observes (p. 7) that 'Aristotle, who was the contemporary of Demosthenes, only mentions him twice or thrice in his *Rhetoric*.' This need not mean, nor does Burnet imply, that the *Rhetoric* was not written at Athens; and there are good reasons why Aristotle should mention Isocrates more often. There are good reasons for assigning both the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics* to one or other of the periods spent by Aristotle in Athens, where eloquence and the drama were long cultivated. We are tempted to put Book 3 of the *Rhetoric* rather late in his life.

But this brings us to a point that is not dwelt upon in Burnet's lecture — the probability that a teacher will keep revising a course of lectures, perhaps as often as he gives it. When Burnet interprets the signs of revision, one might think it was a labor that Aristotle never engaged in until he approached the end of his career. The possibility of occasional revision, or even of slight changes like the substitution of new examples, makes it very difficult to speak with certainty of the time when a set of lectures was composed. Further, we cannot be sure that Aristotle's method of teaching was by University lectures of the modern sort;

one may rather hope that he was too good a teacher to employ this method alone without recourse to dialectic. The Socratic, and the Platonic, method, from which his developed, was more elastic than that of pure exposition. Whatever the procedure, Aristotle would gradually alter and expand his notes for courses like those we now find represented in the *Poetics*. One could wish that Burnet had more to say on this point. To the *Rhetoric* he barely alludes; to the *Poetics* he does not allude at all.

The possibility of occasional revision is a ground for questioning Burnet's confident tone when he deals with matters that are at best conjectural. On the other hand, we may gladly accept what he says (p. 16) of Aristotle and 'the traditional Ionic scientific style.' Therewith we dispose of a good deal of nonsense that has been kept alive, by Margoliouth for example, on the 'esoteric' writings of Aristotle. This 'Ionic' style is comparable to that which has been developed for German technical scholarship. It is well-fitted to its purpose, and, as elaborated in lectures, was intelligible enough to its scholarly or scientific audience. The audience, however, did not need to be itself peculiarly 'Ionic'; it would merely not be composed of 'average' Athenians. Any student in a German University soon becomes conversant with the contemporary 'Ionic' style abroad; see T. F. Tout, in *History* 10 (1926). 317, on Felix Liebermann's defence of his technical style as the right medium for the discussion of the Old English laws.

We may provisionally accept Burnet's contention (p. 16) that, 'at the time of his death, Aristotle was on the point of teaching a system in which everything was to be subordinated to the theoretic or contemplative life.' It seems unlikely that he would have utterly submerged rhetoric, which he defends as a practical art, in the final

revision of his system; his three books on the subject would remain on their present level in his thought. The *Protrepticus* seems to have been composed before them; and 'the most striking feature of [this] work was that it recommended in the strongest manner the contemplative life as the highest possible for those that are capable of it' (pp. 9-10).

Finally, we may accept the very interesting notion (p. 17) that 'Aristotle's comparatively early death has deprived us' of the said revision, 'which he would certainly have undertaken,' had he lived, as did Plato and other Greek philosophers, to an advanced age 'It is worthy of notice that Plato had been head of the Academy till he was eighty, while Socrates was just over seventy when he was put to death at the height of his powers. The Greeks of this time lived to great ages.' When Aristotle retired to Chalcis in Euboea, where he died rather suddenly in his sixty-third year, he doubtless looked forward to a restoration of the Macedonian power at Athens, and a speedy return to his school and his library, and to the consummation of all his previous labors.

COLERIDGE, WORDSWORTH, AND MR. LOWES¹

Ernest Coleridge used to say of his grandfather that, whichever way you took 'S.T.C.', you were sure to regret it. If you tried to defend him, there would be a weak point in the defence, and if you attacked him where he seemed to be most vulnerable, something in your further investigation would make you sorry. The defence of Wordsworth is a safer undertaking. Otherwise Mr. Lowes and I now stand in equal jeopardy, for he has defended Coleridge at doubtful points, and in dealing with some of these I must be fairly destructive as critic of a book which too highly eulogizes Coleridge and his workmanship in *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner* and *Kubla Khan*.

Yet, as the saying goes, this new volume is a real contribution to the study of its subject. Mr. Lowes had the laudable ambition to publish a work that should be at once scholarly and popular. That he has impressed a popular audience with the conviction that scholarship may be interesting no one who has read popular reviews of the book can deny; nor is the reason to be found only in sixteen illustrations, or in the mottoes for the chapters, or in the appeal to current notions of psychology. And for the scholarly reader he has not spared himself. Working in and out among Coleridge's neglected or misinterpreted

¹ *The Road to Xanadu, a Study in the Ways of the Imagination*, by John Livingston Lowes Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1927 Pp xviii, 639 [Revised Edition, 1930, with 25 pp. inserted between p 603 and 605 (pp 604, 604 a, etc.)]

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memoranda, following slight clues with pertinacity — sometimes with a shrewdness that nearly amounts to genius — he has in remarkable detail traced the sources from which Coleridge derived his imagery, shedding light on the ways in which the poet combined or fused images that were drawn, consciously or subconsciously, from many parts of his experience and reading, above all in books of travel and description. Of course, this type of research is never-ending. So far as directly concerns Coleridge, Lowes has left undone no task he could think of, however onerous, that might illuminate his subject. He has not omitted a fact nor a note, which might have a bearing on the two poems of his choice, unless it be at p. 538 where he records his ill luck in losing the note he had made for the purpose! His scholarly conscience is clear. It may be said that no other two poems of recent date have had their 'sources' so vigorously ransacked. And the literary facts thus disclosed have been sympathetically studied in relation to the mind of the poet. The new disclosures of fact are not, indeed, so bulky as one might infer from the size of the volume, or as the reader would see if at any point in the text, bibliography, Notes, or Index, all the borrowings in *The Rime* and *Kubla Khan* that had hitherto been caught were assembled for inspection. Lowes has, however, re-examined nearly all the known borrowings, pursuing his quest tirelessly and independently, and doing more in it than all his predecessors combined; he has identified many new verbal reminiscences in detail, and, in a larger way, has made clear, for example (pp. 377-9), a considerable debt of *Kubla Khan* to the *Travels* of James Bruce.

Yet the volume is not without serious defects, and my treatment of these, and of various points in its subject, has turned into something different from an ordinary review.

Much of the book reposes on traditional estimates that have come to be tacitly accepted, but will not bear critical examination. Thus Lowes assumes that *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner* is a very fine poem; it is the common assumption. But Wordsworth on the whole thought otherwise. And Lamb was very doubtful about the wisdom of publishing *Kubla Khan*. Granted that each of the two poems has distinct merits, are both really works of the first order, to be severally compared, for example, with *The White Doe of Rylstone* and Milton's *Sabrina Fair*? How much plot or substance — essential form — does a first-rate poem need, and has *Kubla Khan* as much of it as Lamb, or Aristotle, or sound critics in general, would demand? And what of the repulsive notion in its lines 14–16? —

A savage place! as holy and enchanted
As e'er beneath a wan'ing moon was haunted
By woman wailing for her demon-lover!

Is the collocation of ‘holy’ with demoniac love a blemish or not? The lines certainly betray the lurking indelicacy to which Wordsworth objected in *Christabel*, and Ruskin — perhaps Arnold, too — in Coleridge as a poet. Or what of the error committed by the two hundred fellows of the Ancient Mariner? For agreeing after the fact that it was good to slay the bird, they suffer excruciating tortures, and die in misery. Is their credulous mistake an adequate tragic *hamartia*? Dream or no dream, the situation is revolting.

Again, Lowes thinks that Wordsworth was not a very good literary critic (a common mistake with those who have not studied all his prose), and is quite impatient of his strictures upon *The Rime*. But Wordsworth's criticism is in effect Aristotelian; for example: ‘The events,

having no necessary connection, do not produce each other.'² The censure is well-taken. The main thread of the narrative is geographical; and a spatial sequence, like a temporal, does not give organization to a plot; in the *Odyssey*, the spatial sequence of the Wanderings is the result of more important causes. On the law of probability we need not dwell; the objection of Mrs. Barbauld, admitted by Coleridge, is substantially that of Lamb (Lowes, pp. 301-3), who says. 'I dislike all the miraculous part of it.' In the treatment of the probable and the impossible, for the poems in *Lyrical Ballads*, Coleridge satisfies the demands of Aristotle less well than does his collaborator. Take, again, Wordsworth's complaint that the chief agent in *The Rime* 'has no distinct character.' Lowes makes merry (p. 198) over this objection, and compares the 'insignia' or outward trappings of Simon Lee. Wordsworth, however, is not so much thinking of the *insignia* as of the inward nature of the man, the *ethos*, as Aristotle calls it. It would have been better to compare the lines, strangely omitted from page 223 of this book, which Wordsworth says he contributed to *The Rime*, since they show his effort to supply in some measure the defect in characterization; and far better then to go on to the last episode in Book 4 of the *Prelude*. There, as I long ago argued, his defeated impulse to collaborate with Coleridge found an outlet in the delineation of the ghostly ancient soldier from across the seas; the surmise in my article, Wordsworth's Conception of the *Ancient Mariner*,³ is confirmed by evidence in De Sélincourt's edition of *The Prelude* (pp. xxi, xxxiii, 525). The episode in question was written very soon after the collaborative plan for *The Rime* broke down, and has precisely the elements of *ethos*

² Note at the end of *Lyrical Ballads*, 1800.

³ In Herrig's *Archiv* 125 (1910).89-92

which Wordsworth says are wanting in the poem of his friend. It is the simple truth that, in general, the poetry of Wordsworth has *ethos* in the Aristotelian sense, and the poetry of Coleridge lacks it when the subject is other than himself. There is no space here for a complete analysis of Wordsworth's objections, or of his discriminating praise. Before commanding *The Rime*, he lastly objects that 'the imagery is somewhat too laboriously accumulated.' Lowes dissents, yet the greater part of his volume goes to show how laboriously Coleridge gathered materials for this rhetorical accumulation, by methods which Wordsworth could daily observe.⁴ It also shows how little human interest — *ethos* — Coleridge gained from his reading of travels, how unerringly he pounced upon

Whatever in those climes he found
Irregular in sight or sound.⁵

Thus we come to his reading. Lowes quotes with approval (p. xi): "I have read almost everything," said Coleridge, not without warrant, a year before he wrote *The Ancient Mariner*. Now a young man of twenty-five may have read a great deal (every one knows that Coleridge did this), and in order to be a notable poet he must have done so (as Wordsworth then was systematically reading); but he has not yet read 'almost everything.' We may doubt whether Coleridge had then read on any subject after an ordered plan; his pursuit of novelties from one book to another by means of footnotes is not evidence enough of real system. Charles Lamb about the same time, up to the year 1800, had read as much of the Elizabethan drama as had Coleridge, and still had before him

⁴ Compare Lowes, p. 384. Coleridge 'was striking out, as the Note Book shows, from one book to another in directions which seemed to promise contributions.' The reference is to another poem, but the principle is the same.

⁵ Wordsworth, *Ruth* 127-8.

those years of reading which made him the authority upon the subject that Coleridge never became. Coleridge never was the sort of student of books that we find in a Burke or a Milton. He was omnivorous, but discursive. He lacked the command of modern languages possessed by Wordsworth, had not systematically memorized the chief English poets as Wordsworth had done, and never knew the minor poets as Wordsworth knew them. Nor did he know where to stop. Doubtless the best-read young author of our literature wrote the ode, *On the Morning of Christ's Nativity*; and Milton, who was not only 'industrious,' but 'select,' in his reading, says in his Tractate *Of Education* 'To search what many modern Januas and Didactics, more than ever I shall read, have projected, my inclination leads me not.' Of one thing we may be reasonably sure. If Wordsworth says that, before he and Coleridge began *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner*, Coleridge probably never saw Shelvocke's *Voyage* (from which the incident of the Albatross was taken), then Coleridge probably did not see it until he went on by himself to accumulate his imagery; see Lowes, p. 531.

And so we come back to the attempt at collaboration. Lowes almost steadily puts Wordsworth in a wrong light concerning this. Only on page 223 does he really admit 'the signal importance of Wordsworth's contributions to the scheme.' On page 93 he gives Coleridge credit for the 'sustained unity of a coherent plan.' The importance to Coleridge of Wordsworth's gift for effective organization needs a more constant emphasis. Of the five narrative poems attempted by Coleridge in 1797-98, only two, *The Rime* and *The Three Graves*, seem to have had a workable plan, and for both Wordsworth supplied it; the feeblest part of *The Rime* is the close, from the point where he offered nothing more for Coleridge to rest on. He had

what Coleridge lacked, and what Horace and Aristotle take to be the first requisite — poetic energy to formulate the whole. The volume before us shows but too clearly why Coleridge could not organize and finish *Christabel* and *The Wanderings of Cain*. How perverse (p. 5) to set the ‘most admired disorder’ of the Gutch note-book above the ‘severely ordered’ Commonplace Book of Milton! Above all, Wordsworth could formulate a plan, on reflection distasteful to him, in an effort to accommodate his genius to that of his friend.

Even more details than are commonly admitted may have arisen from this effort. Besides the six specified lines, Wordsworth in old age spoke of ‘four or five lines more, in different parts of the poem,’ which he contributed. I once thought I could identify at least thirteen lines as furnished by Wordsworth, and now suggest that ‘broad as a weft’ (in line 83 of the first edition) may have come from him. Lowes will have it (pp. 261–9) that Coleridge got the ‘weft’ from a person rather than a book, and thinks that the poet may have learned this word from one of his sea-going brothers — of whom Coleridge saw very little. But why not suppose that it came from Wordsworth, and that he heard it from the retired sea-captain whom he may have had in mind for the poem (p. 281), or, better, from his own seafaring brother John, with whom his relations were very close? *The Vocabulary of Sea Phrases*, 1799, No. 170, in the posthumous Catalogue of his library, probably came to him from John; though published after *The Rime*, this, like many other books belonging to Wordsworth, will help to show how indefatigable a student he was of diction. Here, again, he was more systematic than Coleridge. Moreover, ‘broad as a weft’ is not unlike the similes of Wordsworth in general.⁶ And

⁶ See above, p. 12.

be it noted that, of the two poets, he was by far the more given to studying the language actually used by seamen and other persons in humble life.

For another detail, Lowes too readily infers (pp. 222-4, 531) that 'the Old Navigator himself' was 'clearly in Coleridge's mind from the beginning'. He may have been so, but Wordsworth's account does not make the inference necessary; 'certain parts' Wordsworth says *he* 'suggested' — for example: 'Some crime was to be committed which should bring upon the Old Navigator, as Coleridge *afterwards* delighted to call him, the spectral persecution.' The italics for 'afterwards' are mine. A fair case can be made out for Wordsworth's presumable suggestion of the main agent in the story as well as the essential plot: '*The Ancient Mariner*' was founded on a strange dream, which a friend of Coleridge had, who fancied he saw a skeleton ship, with *figures* in it.' So Wordsworth as reported by Dyce; the italics again are mine. It will not do to minimize, as Wordsworth long after does, his share in the poem; there were reasons why he should not wish to have credit for too much of a hand in it; and these reasons strengthened as he grew older. I do not seek to magnify his part, either, at the expense of Coleridge and his eulogist.⁷

Nevertheless, let us look further at Wordsworth's part. In or about 1843 he told Miss Fenwick: 'I also suggested the navigation of the ship by the dead men.' Some years before (in 1834), he told Dyce: 'I also suggested the re-animation of the dead bodies.' Lowes says (p. 224): 'The

⁷ In the account of Price, hereafter cited, Wordsworth is made to say 'We agreed to write jointly a poem, the subject of which Coleridge took from a dream which a friend of his had once dreamt concerning a person suffering under a dire curse from the commission of some crime' Price does not specify that the person was a mariner; in fact, his evidence, as far as we can trust it, is against the identification. The evidence of Dyce on Cruikshank's dream is more trustworthy.

part played by angelic intervention may or may not have been an afterthought' If I understand this sentence, the word 'reanimation,' and lines 515-23, for example, of the first edition of *The Rime*, should settle the point. Wordsworth suggested not only the 'tutelary spirits' who avenge the crime, but also the reanimation of the dead bodies by souls presumably angelic; compare later editions, lines 347-9, and *Laodamia* 81: 'Alcestis, a reanimated corse.' The only 'afterthought' mentioned by Wordsworth (see his remarks to Miss Fenwick) was the marginal gloss, which 'was not thought of by either of us at the time—at least, not a hint of it was given to me.' There is also a question how long he tried to be joint author of the poem. Lowes says (p. 224): 'Before the evening which saw the poem's birth was ended, he had recognized that the spirits which he had evoked called Coleridge master but not him.' Now Wordsworth says he desisted from collaborating, not because of the subject (he having supplied a workable plot), but because 'our respective manners proved so widely different,' or, again, because 'I soon found that the style of Coleridge and myself would not assimilate.' Any one who reads the first edition can see in it faults of which Wordsworth, whatever his 'limitations' (to use Lowes' word), never could be guilty. But, further, in 1844 he told Price (*Memoirs* 2.454; English ed. 2.444): 'We tried the poem conjointly for a day or two, but we pulled different ways, and only a few lines of it are mine.' Lowes does not quote this passage even in the Notes; there he merely refers us to the *Memoirs*. It conflicts with the evidence of Miss Fenwick (Lowes, p. 223), recorded at a time, within a year or so of the conversation with Price, when Lowes (p. 225) thinks that Wordsworth had to refresh his memory by consulting Shelvocke. Yet perhaps the difference between a late afternoon with its evening and *one or*

two days is not very important. The poem was begun, say, on Nov 13, 1797, and finished on or about March 23, 1798. During that interval Coleridge was in almost daily contact with Wordsworth and his sister, while, according to Wordsworth, the ballad 'grew and grew'.⁸ Dorothy is supposed to have furnished suggestions for it in these months, why not her brother, too, though no longer in the capacity of joint author? Some time after May 9, Cottle, as he says (*Early Recollections* i. 314), 'spent a week with Mr. C and Mr. W. at Allfoxden house, and during this time (besides the reading of ms poems) they took me to Limouth, and Linton, and the Valley of Stones.' That is, Coleridge, Wordsworth, and the publisher who then determined to issue the *Lyrical Ballads* repeated the tour that had produced *The Rime*. Was none of the poem declaimed or read aloud? The manuscript surely was read by all three before Cottle took it, and it alone, to Bristol and the printer. Was Wordsworth only a silent critic, for a week? If his memory in later years needed refreshing, the argument from it may cut in another direction. At the age of seventy-three he may have understated his share in the poem; he says nothing of the improvement his criticism effected in it for the second edition (1800). Lowes, no doubt rightly, assumes (p. 521) that the criticism was given and accepted. The result, however, was not merely the removal of 'archaisms'; matter was excised, and yet more of it in subsequent editions, with great benefit to the poem; though undesirable qualities inherent in the excised portions were inherent in the

⁸ Coleridge probably swelled it from 340 to 658 lines between Feb 18, when he wrote to Cottle, 'I have finished my ballad, it is 340 lines,' and March 23, when 'he brought his ballad finished' to the Wordsworths, see Cottle, *Early Recollections* i 307, Dorothy's *Journals*, ed. by Knight, i 14, and Coleridge, *Poetical Works*, 2 vols., ed by E H Coleridge, p 1048

whole, and still color what remains. Helpful strictures, of course, came from other sources; Coleridge's own taste as a critic likewise improved.

We may now take up some minor details.⁹ P. 14. In Coleridge's note, 'commit with devils,' no noun 'is wanting' (as Lowes thinks); see *King Lear* 3.4.79–80, and the *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. *commit* 6.c. P. 17. The word here appearing as 'D[u]pp[e] —' may be a memorandum for *Doppelganger*. P. 128. The identification of 'breeze,' originally (*Rime* 99) 'breezes,' with the Brises — Trade-winds — is illuminating, but Coleridge had to give up the identification not merely for the sake of clearness; the Trade-winds do not blow near Cape Horn, where 'the fair breeze blew.' Compare his marginal gloss: 'The fair breeze continues; the ship enters the Pacific Ocean.' P. 160. The 'electric contact of one mind with another' which produced *The Rime* seems to have been that between Coleridge and Wordsworth, and not so much the contact here suggested.

P. 171. Lowes thinks that Dorothy Wordsworth 'was more closely akin, through the exquisite delicacy of her perception, and through something aerial and spiritlike in its property, to Coleridge than to her brother.' Compare Wordsworth in *Ethereal Minstrel*, *She was a Phantom of delight, and Waterfowl*, with Coleridge:

His bones were black with many a crack,
All black and bare, I ween;
Jet-black and bare, save where with rust
Of mouldy damps and charnel crust
They're patch'd with purple and green.

⁹ In his edition of 1930, pp. 604–604*t*, Lowes in his *Addenda and Corrigenda* here and there is good enough to adopt a suggestion of mine, while some he does not. On reflection, I have decided to let this part of my article stand pretty much as it originally stood.

There the good 'S.T.C.' seems to have rather more in common with Monk Lewis and Ann Radcliffe than with any one named Wordsworth.

P. 172. In *She was a Phantom of delight*, Wordsworth refers, not to his sister, but to his wife. P. 176. 'The moving Moon,' etc. 'That is no moon of the books.' It is the moon both of Alfoxden and the poets, including Spenser. And, like Spenser's moon, it now certainly is a moon 'of the books.' P. 192. 'It is trifles, as everybody knows, . . . which are apt to be most potently suggestive.' But on page 160 we understood that vital thoughts were likely to arise from the 'electric' contact of gifted minds, this appears to be the more reasonable view. P. 199. Note Wordsworth's 'obtuseness.' P. 200. 'Sometimes a-dropping from the sky, I heard' (*Rime* 358-9). Note the 'hanging' or 'dangling' participle. P. 214. In *The Rime* 529-30, 'The planks looked warped' and see those sails, How thin they are,' etc., 'looked' seems to be a late, but now traditional, oversight in the printing. The reading in 1798, 1800, 1802, 1805, and 1817, was 'look'; the situation, and the verbs 'see' and 'are,' show that Coleridge intended the present tense. 'Looked warped' is cacophonous, cf. *Mod. Lang. Notes* 24 (1909). 34. P. 228. Wordsworth suggested the 'Tutelary spirits.' 'Precisely what Wordsworth may have had in mind,' says Lowes, 'I do not know.' Why not look into his reading, Browne's *Religio Medici* 1.35 to begin with? P. 231. The reference to 'a farmer' is said to be 'not pertinent,' but left in as 'quintessential comedy.' It might take us to Crèvecoeur's *American Farmer*, which belongs in the sphere of Coleridge's reading of travels. P. 314. The passage from *Ruth* is not to be commended until it is read as the utterance of a dubious character who, in Wordsworth's view, exaggerates.¹⁰

¹⁰ See above, p. 12.

P. 327. The diction of *The Rime* is mainly 'determined by the words and phrases taken over from the travel-books.' Lowes on the whole underestimates the draft upon other sources. In the unsigned Advertisement to the *Lyrical Ballads* of 1798, Wordsworth says: '*The Rime of the Ancyent Marinere* was professedly written in imitation of the style, as well as of the spirit, of the elder poets; but, with a few exceptions, the Author believes that the language adopted in it has been equally intelligible for these three last centuries.' The parallel statement of Coleridge (Hazlitt, *My First Acquaintance with Poets*), that he and Wordsworth were about to make use, in *Lyrical Ballads*, 'only of such words as had probably been common in the most ordinary language since the days of Henry II,' is less trustworthy. If Coleridge said or meant Henry VII, his date and Wordsworth's agree; if Henry IV, he included, not three, but four, centuries, taking us back to Chaucer and Gower. The Advertisement to *Lyrical Ballads* is not referred to in the Index (pp. 607-39) compiled by Walden for Lowes; the latter clearly has not made due use of it. Another thing he seems to have missed, among the sources, is the *Orchestra* of Sir John Davies, which powerfully influenced both Coleridge and Wordsworth; see the parallel, cited by Mrs. Humphry Ward, between *The Rime* 414-21 and Davies, stanza 49. See also Coleridge, *The Dungeon* 27, *Christabel* 50, *The Rime* 127-8; and Wordsworth, *I wandered*, *Waterfowl*, and other passages to be found in the Concordance under *dance*, *danced*, *dancing*. Of course many words and phrases in *The Rime* are of a currency earlier than the year 1500. Here we may notice a recent small discovery of my own. The 'lavrock' (= *lark*) in line 348 of *The Rime* as issued in 1798 may be more definitely assigned to Gower, *Confessio Amantis* 5. 4100, than to the Chaucerian

Romaunt of the Rose, though Coleridge and Wordsworth doubtless knew this too. Coleridge writes:

Sometimes a dropping from the sky
I heard the Lavrock sing;
Sometimes all little birds that are
How they seem'd to fill the sea and air
With their sweet jaigoning.

And Gower (of *Medea*):

Sche made many a wonder soun,
Sometime lich unto the cock,
Sometime unto the laverock; . . .
And riht so as hir jargoun strangeth,
In sondri wise hir forme changeth

One must compare, too, the formula, ‘Sometimes . . . sometime’ of Caliban describing the mysterious music of his island, in *Tempest* 3.2.141 ff.; see also ‘drop,’ *ibid.* 148, and William Bartram’s account (*Travels*, London, 1794, p. 284) of the sudden appearance in spring of small birds in Pennsylvania: ‘At once the woods, the groves, and meads, are filled with their melody, as if they dropped down from the skies.’ Here, then, for a single passage in *The Rime* are two, or three, reminiscences from ‘the elder poets’ as against one from a book of travels. Coleridge mentions Gower in ‘some lines I wrote at Stowey’ (Lowes, p. 471); for Wordsworth’s interest in Gower, see De Sélincourt’s edition of the *Prelude*, p. xxiii, and the Catalogue of Wordsworth’s Library, No. 674.

P. 328. Coleridge’s poetical ‘vocabulary’ is strange rather than ‘huge,’ at least in comparison with that of Wordsworth; see Arnold, *On Translating Homer* (ed. of 1902, p. 150), and *Modern Language Notes* 19 (1904).223. P. 354. ‘There are no variants whatever’ in

Kubla Khan.' That is not true.¹¹ Leigh Hunt's 'ordain' for 'decree'¹² would be reminiscent of *Paradise Lost* 4.215: 'His far more pleasant Garden God ordained.' P. 359. 'Goings on' is a locution of Wordsworth as well as Coleridge, and is perhaps rather Wordsworthian. P. 426, chapter-heading. For 'Imagination Creatrix' read *Imaginatio Creatrix?* P. 434. 'Forever Voyaging.' Wordsworth wrote 'for ever' (two words); see Calverley's lines entitled '*Forever*'.¹³

We come to the Notes, pp. 451-603; they contain a vast body of detailed information that will always be of great interest to the student of Coleridge. I can but warmly recommend these Notes to the thoughtful student; they could not be treated in detail within reasonable limits. But it is unfortunate that they are not adequately represented in the Index.¹⁴ Nor are they free from a bias that diminishes the value of the text. On page 516 Lowes is too sure that Wordsworth could have had no hand in the writing of *Lewti*; he has not fathomed the poet's adolescence and young manhood. Again, on page 521 he calls

¹¹ The discussion of this subject must now be wholly revised in the light of a communication by Alice D. Snyder in *The Times Literary Supplement* (London) 33 (1934) 541 entitled *The Manuscript of Kubla Khan*.

¹² See Lowes, p. 604 g.

¹³ The improvement is accepted by Lowes in his edition of 1930.

¹⁴ I naturally tried to see how much use had been made of my own study of Coleridge's reading in books of travel, demonology, and so on, and at first thought that my youthful articles of many years ago had escaped the attention of Lowes, though in the text he shows some enthusiasm for the queerest of them, *The Power of the Eye in Coleridge*. To judge from the Notes, however, and not from the Index, he has not missed much. Still, on page 453 he is unaware that any one but E. H. Coleridge (1906) and Bersch (1909) was ahead of him in comparing Wordsworth with Bartram's *Travels*, there should be a reference to the *Athenaeum*, London, April 22, 1905, pp. 498 ff. And possibly (p. 517, Note 102) one may learn more from my *Glance at Wordsworth's Reading* as it appears in *Methods and Aims in the Study of Literature*, 1915, than in its original shape of eight years before. For a small item that I had myself forgotten, see the *Athenaeum*, Sept. 5, 1903, p. 328. As for the parallel noted by Lowes (p. 526) between *The Rime* 446-51 and Dante, *Inferno* 21.25-30, it has been suspected before; I caught it twenty years ago while following up Charles Lamb in *Witches and other Night-fears* (see Macdonald's ed. of Lamb i. 135).

Wordsworth *disingenuous* and *obtuse* — the last uncomplimentary references to Coleridge's friend that I have noted in the volume.¹⁵ There are too many of them to balance the occasional praise. For an understanding of the two poets in their life at Stowey and Alfoxden it is necessary to sympathize with both of them. Their relations then and later are a difficult theme, in part because of the fragmentary evidence. Yet long study of all the evidence there is should convince a reasonable mind of Wordsworth's forbearance in his treatment of Coleridge, that loving, and lovable, but exasperating soul. For admirers of *The Rime* there is no juster criticism than that of Wordsworth when he says of the revised version for the *Lyrical Ballads* of 1800:

The poem contains many delicate touches of passion, and indeed the passion is everywhere true to nature; a great number of the stanzas present beautiful images, and are expressed with unusual felicity of language; and the versification, though the metre is itself unfit for long poems, is harmonious and artfully varied, exhibiting the utmost powers of that metre, and every variety of which it is capable. It therefore appeared to me that these several merits (the first of which, namely that of the passion, is of the highest kind) gave to the poem a value which is not often possessed by better poems.

Something must now be said of Lowes' own style and method of composition. There is far too much of the author in his book (for example, p. 55); too much of the way in which he secured his results, instead of, thanks to him, the most direct means to them; too much extraneous

¹⁵ Compare Sir Walter Scott, *Journal* 2 179 (May 12, 1828). 'I was glad to see my old friend [Wordsworth], whose conversation has so much that is fresh and manly in it. I do not at all acquiesce in his system of poetry. But a better or more sensible man I do not know than W W.' See also the very important book by Edith Clara Batho, *The Later Wordsworth*, Cambridge, University Press, 1933.

matter, brought in by the author's fortuitous mental associations; too much strain and stress in his language; and too much redundancy — too much repetition of phrase and substance. The line, or the passage containing the line, 'A still and awful red,' which is not very good sense or poetry, appears on pp. 64, 66, 71, 89, 208, 328, 329; the word 'phantasmagoria' on pp. 65, 82, 120, 376, 401, 408, 597. 'Quintessence' also is overworked.

If any part of the foregoing criticism should seem captious, let it be remembered that the book has been fulsomely praised by writers who know nothing of the subject. Lowes has worked hard, and knows more of it in detail than the present writer ever knew. As it seems to me, his defects chiefly arise from a relative ignorance of Wordsworth, and some traditional animus against this great originating poet. The animus still interferes with the advance of purity and restraint in English style. Even so I would have given the book more praise but for the strong likelihood that it would have another edition. In any case Lowes can profit from the compliment of an article evincing at least some investigation.

If he should chance to see these pages in the present book, he will note that the author of them is no more Platonist than Aristotelian, and is bent upon finding good poetry wherever he can in the works of Coleridge and Wordsworth.

THE POETICS IN THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY¹

This is perhaps a characteristic volume in the Loeb Classical Library. The series has supplied many needed editions and renderings, yet too often includes average, or inferior, and needless work that may get in the way of better and perfectly accessible texts and translations. In the present items, Roberts' work represents the fat, and Fyfe's, on the whole, the lean.

So far as I know, Mr. Fyfe had no other title to edit the *Poetics* than three pages of comment, on seven passages in the edition of Bywater, which he published many years ago in the *Classical Review* 24 (1910). 233-5. His text is based upon that of Vahlen (1885), and modified in general accord with that of Bywater; there is a grudging reference, like Bywater's, to the Arabic tradition, and a casual use of it, that betray no firm acquaintance with the recent studies of Gudeman, Tkatsch, and others, who have shed new light on the *Poetics* from that tradition. Bywater himself might well have escaped more often than he did from the influence of Vahlen, without underestimating the solid worth of the older German school. Since Bywater's death, much attention has been given to the *Poetics* by scholars in Germany, Italy, and elsewhere; I find no evidence that Fyfe has caught up with the more important writings on his subject.

¹ Aristotle, *The Poetics*; 'Longinus' *On the Sublime*; with an English Translation. By W. Hamilton Fyfe. Demetrius *On Style*, with an English Translation. By W. Rhys Roberts. London, William Heinemann; New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1927. Pp. xx, 501.

From *The American Journal of Philology* 49 (1928). 293-5; by permission

freakish. The general reader, and the scholar who is not a special student of Aristotle, had best turn to Bywater's translation, both for essential truth to text and for skilled propriety in the use of English. In rendering 12.1453^a 29, Fyfe calls Euripides (with reference to his dramatic economy) 'a bad manager'; the ordinary sense of these words will, when applied to the drama, almost certainly be misleading. The well-known comparison, 8.1451^b 5-6, reads: 'Poetry is something more *scientific* and serious than history.' But in Aristotle's view history is too scientific, in our sense, to be poetry. Far to be preferred is Bywater's 'more philosophic and of graver import.' Again, Fyfe, in a note, calls *Odysseus with the False Tidings* (16.1455^a 13-14) a 'play.' One may take it to be a lay in an epic poem, but must not assert that it was either play or lay, for we simply do not know what it was. For the context Fyfe does not seem to have read the article by J. A. Smith in the *Classical Quarterly* 18 (1924).165-8, nor that of Philipart in the *Revue des Études Grecques* 38 (1925).171-204, nor yet my humble interpretation of the passage in *Classical Philology* 13 (1918).251-61,² which had the merit of coming first in a temporal sequence. In his translation Fyfe actually skips the word $\sigmaυνθετή$, which the whole passage is meant by Aristotle to illustrate. Further, the nominative $\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\lambdaογισμός$ (1455^a 16), for the reading $\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\lambdaογισμόν$ in the Paris manuscript, is not, as Fyfe says of the last word in this passage, Vahlen's 'own suggestion'; or at all events one should not now so state the matter. Vahlen in 1885 accepted the accusative for his text, and in his apparatus guessed (with a 'fortasse') at the nominative; while Bywater, who in 1909 accepts the nominative, and from whom Fyfe doubtless takes it, finds it in ms. Riccardianus 46, and notes that Vahlen's guess is confirmed by the

² See the article as reprinted above, pp. 18-33, esp. p. 30

Arabic tradition. My preference of the reading in the Paris manuscript is supported by arguments to be found in the article noted above.

Elsewhere one great violence is still done to the text, a violence fathered by Susemihl, and fostered in the edition of Bywater. This is the excision of a sentence, 1456^a 7–10, and the insertion of it after μέχρι τοῦ τέλους at 1455^b 32. I protested against this unhappy shift some years ago in the *American Journal of Philology* 46 (1925). 192,³ and doubtless shall continue to argue against it, and in favor of an interpretation that leaves the passage where it traditionally stands — an interpretation which ‘has the best of arguments on its side, in that it makes sound sense, sustains the manuscripts, and is sustained by them.’ The dislocation of this passage may count as the last refuge of the textual dislocators who have used a malign art on the *Poetics*. For the *Poetics*, their breed goes back to Daniel Heinsius.

Oddly enough, for this volume of the Loeb series, ‘Longinus’ was not entrusted to the experienced hand of Rhys Roberts. Why not? For reasons of copyright? Fyfe likes the epistle *On the Sublime* better than he does the *Poetics*, and I like his treatment of it better than his treatment of Aristotle, save that he appears to be shy of mentioning Rhys Roberts’ fine edition (1899); certainly as a critic and translator Fyfe is a tyro in comparison with his ripe predecessor. He has used Vahlen’s fourth edition (1910) of the text of Jahn. His version of Sappho falls short, alike in tone and literal accuracy, of that by Symonds which was included in the edition, previously mentioned, of 1899.

For Demetrius *On Style*, Rhys Roberts avails himself of critical studies that have appeared since his edition of 1902.

³ See above, p. 163

He now offers, besides a new general Introduction of 31 pages (pp. 257-87), a supplement (pp. 288-9) to his 'full bibliography up to the year 1902,' a freshly scrutinized text, a Tabular Analysis of the treatise (pp. 290-3), and a revised translation. I hope that my presumably known admiration of Rhys Roberts' scholarship will lead no one to think that my praise of it here is overdrawn. He is always well-prepared for what he undertakes, always safe and sound in reckoning with tradition whether old or new, always fresh, independent, and stimulating. His treatment of Demetrius gives a special worth to this volume in the Loeb series.

GUDEMAN'S EDITION OF THE *POETICS*¹

The *Poetics* of Aristotle is too often neglected by students of philosophy, though it is a philosophical work and upholds the view that poetry is more philosophical than history or any other special science. With the *Rhetoric*, it helps us to know Aristotle as a man better than do certain other of his works — the *Physics*, for example — and has affinities also with yet other realms of his more human interests, namely *Politics* and *Ethics*. Butcher says it was ‘an observation of Goethe that it needs some insight into Aristotle’s general philosophy to understand what he says about the drama.’² Since the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* together form a very intelligible whole, there is more force in the notion that one needs some insight into Aristotle as a literary critic in order to understand him as a philosopher.

Gudemans edition of the *Poetics* may be warmly commended to all students of Aristotle. It is the ripe fruit of a long life, and of special studies by a scholar who never has let himself become a narrow specialist; he is characterized by the width and depth of his reading and research, and by a fertility and acumen, a scholarly imagination for things great and small, the like of which the present reviewer, fortunate in his friends, yet has not met in any other of his Classical acquaintance. These qualities are

¹ *Aristoteles ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ* Mit Einleitung, Text und Adnotatio critica, exegeschem Kommentar, kritischem Anhang und Indices nominum, rerum, locorum von ALFRED GUDEMAN Berlin und Leipzig, Walter De Gruyter & Co., 1934. Pp viii, 496.

From *The Philosophical Review* 45 (1936) 409–11; by permission.

² See above, p. 83.

nowhere better shown than in the part (pp. 11-28) of the *Einleitung* devoted to the 'sources' of the *Poetics*.

This new edition of the *Poetics* has at least two great merits. It puts the fund of information supplied by the Syro-Arabic tradition of the work at the disposal of any student of the text; and it gives a full account of what has been written on successive points in the words and statements of Aristotle in his book. Probably no other book in the province of Classics or Philosophy has aroused so much discussion as a whole or in its parts. Gudeman has digested the reading of a lifetime into the comment of what amounts to a variorum edition, and his virtually exhaustive references to what has been written on the *Poetics* are more helpful than our joint Bibliography³ in the *Cornell Studies in English*, the Bibliography will be most helpful when used with the edition.

This is hardly the place for a minute discussion of textual matters, even if the reviewer were more competent in them than he is. Other reviewers have objected, and will object, to what they take to be an excessive emendation of the hitherto accepted Greek text in deference to the Arabic tradition. Using the masterly, in part posthumously published, work of the Orientalist Tkatsch, and Latin translations by Orientalists, Gudeman, who is not one, has indeed made free with the textual work of Bywater and Vahlen in a havoc that will continue to offend their (rather prosaic) followers. The number of changes he has introduced from the Arabic source, as compared with modern texts based upon the well-known Paris manuscript in Greek, is very large. It seems too large. But his doings have already effected great good in minds that are not too inelastic to grow. His main position is sound. The lamentable Arabic version reposes upon a lost Greek

³ See above, p. 180

manuscript that was earlier, and in many places better, than any manuscript of the *Poetics* now extant. As a result, Gudeman's text is now the best one to consult, and will so remain for a long time to come unless new sources of knowledge are discovered. Until then, the rejection of Gudeman's readings will be in more trifling points, or something in his own footnotes will be substituted in the text above them. The textual apparatus is on the page, for any one to use who will.

We may turn to note two out of many places where Gudeman's textual effort has thrown light upon readings that were dark. One is in Chapter 16, the difficult passage about *Odysseus with the False Tidings* (false news of himself?) and the recognition involving the bow (bending it?), where Aristotle remarks upon an illegitimate inference, doubtless by some one whom the hero deceived. The other is in Chapter 15, where Aristotle treats of the agents in tragedy, and demands first that they shall be *good*. Already, in Chapter 13, he has premised that, though good, a tragic personage must be brought low through some frailty, infirmity of character, or characteristic mistake, and not through vice or depravity. Towards the end of Chapter 15 the two notions are joined; now it is held that 'the poet,' words here used generally, yet always when used alone suggesting Homer, must represent persons with tragic flaws as nevertheless friendly and honorable, normally kind and loving justice. Then in a passage which has given much trouble there is a clear reference to Homer and Achilles. But what Aristotle recommends is precisely what we find that Homer has done — made Achilles a generous and justice-loving man, in other words good, while yet his wrath is the mainspring of the *Iliad*, and his treatment of dead Hector a signal instance of hard-heartedness. Bywater and Vahlen bring in Agathon with

Homer: 'as Agathon and Homer represent Achilles.' Why Agathon? We know something, not much, about his poems, but certainly have no other proof that any of them dealt with Achilles. But the Arabic rendering here gives us Homer doing something, and does not here mention Agathon; so to speak, it gives us the word in lower case, not a proper noun, but the adjective *agathon*, *good*, the very notion with which this Chapter 15 begins; whereas other allusions to Agathon in the *Poetics* are in the Arabic duly indicated by his proper name. In order to get syntax out of the rest of the Greek sentence Gudeman resorts to a material transposition, without rejecting any phrase as do Ritter and Bywater; hereafter some one may have better luck in arranging and construing the group of words, though I doubt it. But can any one doubt that Gudeman is substantially right, and other editors wrong, about *Agathon*, *agathon*, and *good*? It is well-nigh inconceivable that the author of the *Poetics* should at this point link Homer with a name so much less impressive. Nor do the Western manuscripts warrant our doing it.

The edition is beautifully and correctly printed, the Greek types and the spacing being especially fine. The editor and his publisher have conspired to produce a volume that should gratify them both, and serve a host of scholars, in time to come.

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